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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN: BEYOND A 
MINIMALIST APPROACH 
Samza Fatima 
ABSTRACT 
The issue of corporate governance (CG) has taken central position in debates after 
the major financial crisis in almost all parts of the world. Numerous endeavours 
have been made to improve CG in Pakistan. However, these efforts did not 
produce the required results. Moreover, the existing literature fails to establish the 
impact of these efforts and CG norms on the performance of listed companies in 
Pakistan. Therefore, this study intends to investigate the CG framework of 
Pakistan, identify its weaknesses and explore opportunities for its improvement. 
For this purpose, the four variables of CG amongst others have been selected 
which include: the investigation of Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) of 
Pakistan (law in books), enforcement mechanisms in relation to the 
implementation of CG standards (law in action), the role of board of directors 
(BODs) and the role of institutional investors (IIs) in enhancing the companies’ 
performance and improving the CG practices. This study is conducted by 
employing a socio-legal research methodology due to its mixed nature of being 
legal and corporate. A qualitative research method is utilised by employing an 
inductive approach, interpretative research philosophy and exploratory strategy. 
The results of this study declare important for regulators to update CCG regularly 
by assessing its impact on companies’ performance and evaluating the attitude of 
companies towards the full and partial adoption of CCG. This practice will 
increase compliance with CCG. Moreover, this thesis develops a ‘Board 
Effectiveness Model’ in order to make BODs diverse and independent. 
Furthermore, this thesis explores strategies to enhance the part of IIs in the CG of 
their investee companies. The researcher believes that the recommendations 
proposed by this thesis, if implemented, could make considerable improvement in 
the corporate sector of Pakistan which will enhance investor confidence and will 
also attract foreign investment. 
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GLOSSARY 
The Code:                    the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan 
The CCG:                    the Code of Corporate Governance 
The Constitution:        the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
The Ordinance:            the Companies Ordinance, 1984 
The SECP Act:      the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 
1997 
Pyramiding:              Pyramiding is taking a control of a firm (subsidiary) 
through majority shareholding and then taking control of another firm with the 
combined shareholding and so on to build a large holding company that provides 
managerial and financial (and sometimes marketing) functions for the entire 
group. 
Cross share-holding:       Cross-shareholding is in which, minority stakes held by 
two companies in each other; this is often done to help strengthen long-term 
business relationship. 
Interlocking management:  A common business practice where a member of 
company’s BODs also serves on another company’s BODs or within another 
company’s management. 
Free-rider Problem:            Free-rider problem means that one shareholder bears 
the cost and has to do efforts; however the benefit is enjoyed by all shareholders.
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the introduction of this thesis. It presents the research 
background of this study in order to understand the significance of corporate 
governance (CG) and justify why CG is chosen for this research specifically 
relating to Pakistan. Furthermore, this chapter defines the research problem for 
this study and presents the evidence of existence of research problem in the 
corporate framework of Pakistan. After identifying the research problem, it 
identifies and explains the aim and objectives of this study followed by research 
questions. Furthermore, this chapter presents the rationale and significance of 
each research question and explains how this study will be conducted in order to 
get the answers of these research questions. Lastly, this chapter provides the 
structure of this thesis. 
1.2 Research Background 
CG is expanding and changing constantly,1 by a desire for transparency, 
accountability, fairness, disclosure responsibilities and increased investor 
confidence in the financial markets.2 There is no single generally accepted 
definition of CG,3 as it is not an easy concept to define,4 because every country 
has different structures of CG according to its needs.5 Therefore, some authors6 
                                                            
1  Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance 
(Routledge 2013) vii  
2 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance, Principles and Practice (2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press 2012) “See generally” 
3 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (4th edition, Wiley 2013) 5 
4 Ibid (n 1) 6 
5 Ibid (n 3) 8 
6 The names and definitions of these authors are presented below. 
2 
 
attribute broader meanings to CG and define it in broad way however, others 
attribute narrow meanings to CG.7 
The term CG has been defined broadly by the Cadbury Report as: ‘a framework 
through which companies are directed and controlled’;8 by Thomas Clark as: ‘CG 
relates to the exercise of power in corporate entities’9; by Monks and Minow as: 
‘a relationship among various participants in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations’10; and by John Farrar as: ‘the CG involves 
considering the legitimacy of corporate power, corporate accountability and 
standards by which the corporation is to be governed’11.  
In short, the broader definitions of CG encompass that the CG deals with the 
structure, processes, cultures and systems that stimulate the successful operation 
of the corporation.12  
The OECD, the UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Professor 
Mulbert and Sir Adrian Cadbury defined CG in narrow way. According to the 
OECD; the CG structure stipulates the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among divergent stakeholders in the corporation. Likewise, it additionally 
specifies the structure through which the company’s objectives are established and 
achieved and monitoring performance.13   
This researcher choose the broader definition of CG for this study which is: CG is 
the name of a framework within which the companies are managed and 
monitored. This definition takes the general stance and includes all internal and 
                                                            
7 Ibid  
8 The Cadbury Committee, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (The Cadbury Report 1992) Para 2.5  
9 Thomas Clarke, Theories of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 1 
10 Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (3rd edition, Blackwell Publishers 2004) 
1 
11 John Farrar, ‘Corporate Governance, Business Judgement and the Professionalism of Directors’ 
(1993) 5(1) Corporate and Business Law Journal 1 
12 Ibid (n 1) 7 
13 OECD, Principles of Governance (2004) 
11<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf> accessed 12 December 2015 
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external factors of a corporation which require direction and monitoring, hence 
more appropriate. 
However, CG is different from managing the companies on daily basis, as this is 
concerned with tasks delegated by board of directors (BODs) to executive 
management. On the other hand, CG relatively has a more strategic and 
overarching function: it focuses on steering a company in a direction that could 
lead towards long-term values and goals.14  
The advantage of effective CG is that it enhances share price.15 The principles of 
CG emphasise on the practices of check and balance among the companies’ 
management, accountability, transparency, disclosure requirements and corporate 
social responsibility. Such practices improve the image of a company and attract 
investors by signalling them that their investments are in secure hands. Therefore 
to achieve capital becomes easier.16 Moreover, foreign investors are usually 
reluctant to make investments in those companies that do not take after CG 
standards.17 This fact shows the importance of CG principles.  
CG is a relatively new term, which became popular in 1980s, however the 
principles of CG were already in practice by which the companies were being 
managed and controlled.18 This term is used to describe the phenomenon which 
has been practiced since the creation of corporate entities.19 The theoretical 
application of the subject CG is new however; the practice of the principles of CG 
is as old as trade. The need of CG principles was there even when in 1932 Berle 
and Means highlighted the agency issues. Whenever a principal has to rely on 
                                                            
14 Ibid (n 1) “See generally” 
15 Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edition, Oxford University Press 2013) 1 
16 Ibid  
17 Ibid 1, 2 & 3 
18 Ibid (n 15) 15; ibid (n 2) 4; George Peters and Karibo Bagshaw, ‘Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Financial Performance of Listed Firms in Nigeria: A Content Analysis’ (2014) 
1(2)  Global Journal of Contemporary Research in Accounting, Auditing and Business Ethics 
(GJCRAABE) An Online International Research Journal 103 
<www.globalbizresearch.org/files/gjcra_george-t-peters_Karibo-b-bagshaw-75205.pdf> accessed 
1st January 2015 
19 Ronald Gilson, ‘Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions 
Matter?’ (1996) 74 Washington University Law Quarterly 327 
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agents for the handling of his business, governance issues arise, and these issues 
have long been recognised in order to run and regulate modern enterprises.20 
1.2.1 Development of Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
Before 1997, the entities responsible for regulating and enforcing CG in Pakistan 
were the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Corporate Law Authority (CLA) and the 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). However, in 1997 CLA was replaced with the 
launch of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), which is now 
the chief enforcer working under MOF and controlling authority of corporate 
sector of Pakistan.  
The evolution of CG in Pakistan took place in three stages. First stage was during 
the period of 1999-2002,21 which was a structural formation phase. During this 
period SECP came into existence by replacing CLA and the first Code of 
Corporate Governance (CCG) was drafted for the listed companies of Pakistan. 
The drafting of CCG was initiated by Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Pakistan (ICAP) and was finalised with the collaboration of many stakeholders 
including Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pakistan (ICMA), 
academics and listed companies.  
The guidance was taken from other countries’ CCG for the formulation of CCG 
for Pakistan; most significantly from the UK and South Africa.22 The guidance 
was also taken from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Principles of CG. Asian Development Bank (ADP) was providing 
finance to develop CG in the corporate sector of Pakistan. However, at that time 
SECP and other partner institutions had to face financial obstacles from their 
sponsor (ADP). Moreover, during the same period listing regulations were also 
formulated and it was made a condition that all companies listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) will have to follow CCG. 
                                                            
20 Ibid (n 2) 4 
21 With the issuance of CCG. In 1999 the first CCG for Pakistan was drafted which was issued in 
2002, known as ‘the Code of Corporate Governance 2002’. 
22 SECP, ‘Manual of Corporate Governance’ <http://www.nzibo.com/IB2/manual-CG.pdf> 
accessed 11 February 2015 
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The second stage was during the period of 2002-2006 and this phase was about 
creating awareness regarding the benefits of adopting CCG among the business 
community. For this purpose Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) 
was established with the collaboration of International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
Initially CCG required implementation in public sector companies and banks. 
Third stage comprised from 2006 to date. This phase requires implementation of 
CCG in all listed, non-listed, and public companies. Banks also adopted the same 
CCG with some additional clauses. However, this stage is still incomplete because 
the CCG is not being adopted and implemented in its entirety.23 
1.2.2 Research Problem and its Evidence 
1.2.2.1 The Application and Enforcement of CCG in Pakistan (Weaknesses in 
‘Law in Action’) 
The background of Pakistan’s CG discussed above reveals that the major problem 
which lies in Pakistan’s corporate sector is the inappropriate application and 
implementation of CCG, which shows that the regulators such as PICG and SECP 
have failed to enforce CG principles in its true spirit and create an awareness 
among the general public and the business community about the advantages of 
CCG so far.  
The main factor behind this inappropriate compliance with the CG principles is 
the lack of interest/ignorance of government towards this issue.24 Rather 
government requires from PICG to formulate a separate code of governance for 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), 
Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), National Bank of 
Pakistan (NBP) and many more.25 This demand of government is not the only 
reason of assuming the non-serious role of government. There are a number of 
                                                            
23 Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspective 
of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance 13, 14 
24 The opinion of former Commissioner of SECP Mr. Etrat Hussain Rizvi 
25 Ibid  
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examples which elucidate the mala fide on the part of government rather than the 
failure of CG presented below. 
For example, PIA and NBP are listed on KSE but the appointment of their BODs 
does not take place according to company law. Rather, the government appoints 
its directors according to her will. The principles of CG require a proper plan of 
succession; however NBP does not have any such plan. One of its presidents was 
elected four times as a president of NBP. Secondly, the most important position of 
a public company, the office of CEO of SBP remained vacant for many months.26 
This shows the absence of a proper succession plan in such public organisations 
and clear violation of corporate laws on the part of government functionaries. In 
addition to these, many scams have also been noticed in insurance companies 
such as, National Insurance Company Limited (NICL).27 The evidence/examples 
of CG failures in SOEs are presented in following paragraphs. 
Firstly, the NICL was a multi-billion rupee scandal which remained in the news 
for a long time. It was against the son of former Chief Minister of Punjab Ch. 
Pervaiz Elahi and some directors of NICL. The scandal was about the deal of 
some favourite properties facilitated by Moonis Elahi (son of Pervaiz Elahi) 
during his father’s reign. The cost of public money was believed to be around 3.5 
billion rupees of which the share of Moonis Elahi was alleged to be 220 billion. 
The case remained in court for a couple of months, FIA and NAB were involved 
in the investigation. The investigation was completed and Moonis Elahi charged 
guilty but no action could be taken beyond this. Neither public money could be 
recovered nor was Monnis Elahi penalised. He flew abroad. The NICL was not a 
new or the only case in Pakistan sadly; powerful politicians are accused of 
                                                            
26 Ibid (n 24); Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the 
Perspective of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of 
Corporate Governance 13; ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspective of Pakistan 
Institute of Corporate Governance’(2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance 17 
27 Evidence is provided in the following paragraphs. 
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expropriating public money routinely and set examples for not obeying law and 
CG principles instead of being active to enforce laws and regulations.28 
Secondly, the privatisation of PTCL is another CG failure on the part of 
government. Since 1990, Pakistan has sold 166 SOEs for 476.5bn rupees to back 
shot-falls and expand efficiencies of the mismanaged companies to motivate for 
economic growth.29 It is a common belief that strategic corporations like PTCL 
ought not to be privatised in light of the fact that outside insight can access secret 
telephonic communication between Pakistan and other countries which can cause 
loss to Pakistan in its economic development.  
A deal like PTCL has not been honed anyplace else, which incorporates both 
value and administration control, and the purchasers have not paid the full bid 
money even after seven years of procedure. It is remained to be proven wrong 
whether the privatisation bargain has supported new purchasers to the expense of 
public and national interest.30 The privatisation of PTCL caused a big financial 
loss and unemployment.31 
Thirdly, Pakistan Railway (PR) is another example of a big CG failure. Just a 
couple of decades ago, PR were considered the safest and most economical way 
of transportation.32 Till 1980, PR accounted for 65 per-cent of Pakistan’s freight 
traffic, which sadly reduced to 15 per-cent by 2009 and now is at 1 per-cent or 
even less.33 Corrupt railway management led this corporation to disaster. Top PR 
management and the government of Pakistan (GOP) are responsible for 
                                                            
28 Few examples are provided in this section; The Dawn News, ‘An Article on NICL Scandal 
Published on 26 January 2011’ <http://www.dawn.com/news/601723/nicl-scandal> accessed 30 
November 2015; The News Tribe, Various Articles Published from January to November 2011 
<http://www.thenewstribe.com/tag/nicl-scandal/> accessed 30 November 2015; NICL scandal was 
also published in all newspapers of Pakistan; See also <http://www.transparency.org.pk/nicl.php>, 
<http://www.nicl.com.pk/> or <http://www.fia.gov.pk/en/index.php>  
29 Information is collected from the website of NAB Pakistan, <http://www.nab.gov.pk/> accessed 
30 November 2015 
30 Riaz Mangi and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Privatisation of PTCL: Corporate Governance Failure’ 
(2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance 36 
31 The Daily Times, 31 December 2014  <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/31-Dec-
2014/ptcl-s-privatisation-caused-financial-losses-unemployment> accessed 20 November 2015 
32 Information is collected from the website of PR <www.railpk.com> accessed 30 October 2015 
33 Ibid  
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appointing inexpert and ineligible staff beyond the capacity.34 Currently PR is 
facing around 40 billion rupees deficit and has closed down thirteen passenger 
trains so far due to financial constraint.35 The NAB also declared it a mega 
scandal of 480 billion rupees and submitted to the Supreme Court (SC) of 
Pakistan.36 
The report of the Auditor-General of Pakistan identified that wastage of assets, 
fraud, disappointment in recuperating outstanding payments and other financial 
anomalies adding up to billon of rupees resulted in such a big disaster.  According 
to the audit report, PR management decimating to recover 310.34 million rupees 
of maintenance and operation charges from the department of Defence, WAPDA 
and other government institutions for a considerable length of time.37  
Moreover, PR additionally sustained a loss of 1,324.13 million rupees because of 
not paying the amount of lease and rental charges from numerous government and 
private associations. The careless administration, faulty internal framework and 
carelessness had charged two billion rupees. Because of the absence of an 
appropriate governance mechanism, irresponsible management, over employment 
and corruption from lower level to the top administration devastated PR which 
was the most revenue generated institution.38 
Last but not least, the most recent example of a biggest CG failure and 
mismanagement is Nandipur Power Project (NPP). NPP is 425 MW (with 
potential of 1000 MW) joint cycled thermal Power Plant. The project was built by 
China Dongfang Electric Corporation (CDEC) and finished in March 2015. The 
potential expenses of the project was 23 billion rupees ($329 million) when it was 
proclaimed, which according to the current GOP Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), 
                                                            
34 Rukhsar Ahmed and Imam ud Din, ‘Failure of Corporate Governance in Pakistan Railway’ 
(2013) 4(5) International Journal of Multidisciplinary Science and Engineering 48 
35 Ibid  
36 The information is collected from the NAB website <www.nab.gov.pk> or 
<http://propakistani.pk/2015/08/05/nab-includes-ptcl-privatization-case-in-its-list-of-29-scandals-
submitted-to-sc/> accessed 30 September 2015 
37 ‘Audit Report 2012-13: irregularities, embezzlement detected in Railways’ 
<http://www.brecorder.com/business-and-economy/189:pakistan/1224000:audit-report-2012-13:-
irregularities-embezzlement-detected-in-railways?date=2013-08-23> accessed 25 June 2015 
38 Ibid (n 34) 49 
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increased to 57.38 billion rupees because of the postponement, carelessness and 
negligence of the former government of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). 
Notwithstanding, it is likewise guaranteed that the real cost has reached to 84 
billion rupees.39 
Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) had a contract of 23 billion rupees 
with CDEC in January 2008 and paid 10 per-cent of down payment to CDEC. By 
the middle of 2010, the major work of this project was done and it was anticipated 
to be completed in 2011. But the project has to be delayed because of the reason 
that the Ministry of Water and Power (MWP) sent summary to Ministry of Law 
and Justice (MLJ) for legal opinion which remained stuck for two years from 
March 2010 to March 2012. Consequently, the machinery worth $85 billion dollar 
stayed stuck at Karachi port.  
Due to this the CDEC terminated the construction contract of this project in 
September 2012 saying that their machinery worth $85 million got wasted 
because it could not get clearance on Karachi port. The CDEC also claimed 
compensation of $40 million for lose they suffered due to the damage and 
depreciation to machinery. Whether GOP paid CDEC all this amount of $85 
million of machinery and $40 million of compensation is not known.40 
In June 2013 current PMLN government came into power and the MWP started 
negotiations with CDEC to resume the contract. After a series of negotiations, 
CDEC agreed to resume the contract and in July 2014 engineers of CDEC came to 
Pakistan and to inspect machinery at Karachi port to resume construction. 
However, it was the same machinery, CDEC claimed that it was damaged and 
                                                            
39 The Express Tribune, ‘Nandipur Power Plant: Officials Pass the Buck as Project Fails to Kick 
Off’ (12 October 2015) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/971393/nandipur-power-plant-officials-pass-
the-buck-as-project-fails-to-kick-off-national/> accessed 20 November 2015; The Dawn News, 
‘Nandipur Power Plant Failure: What Needs to be Probed?’ (13 September 2015) 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1206683> accessed 20 November 2015; The News, ‘Failure of 
Nandipur Project a Result of Bureaucratic Incompetence’ (12 September 2015) 
<http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/62066-failure-of-nandipur-project-a-result-of-bureaucratic-
incompetence> accessed 20 November 2015 
40 Ibid; Mazhar Hussain, ‘Development of Low Head Hydropower Projects on Canals in Punjab 
Pakistan’ (2014) Pakistan Engineering Congress Paper No. 719, 251 
<http://pecongress.org.pk/images/upload/books/12-Mazhar%20Hussain.pdf> accessed 20 
December 2015 
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destroyed, that is why CDEC claimed machinery cost and compensation cost from 
GOP. Later when they resumed construction work they used the same machinery.  
The Prime Minister initiated the primary turbine of project on 31 May 2014. But 
sadly, the plant remained operative just for five days after inauguration and had to 
be closed down due to the bad governance, maladministration and inappropriate 
utilisation of fuel.  
It is claimed that the total cost of this project has reached to 84 billion rupees 
which also includes a huge corruption.41  The apparent few reasons of this CG 
failure are: firstly, it is not clear that who is the chief supervisor of this project; 
either he is Khawaja Asif (MWP), Shahbaz Sharif (Chief Minister of Punjab) or 
Abid Sher Ali (State MWP).  
Secondly, the CDEC is the same company which was black listed due to 
providing defective engines to PR. Why this contract was given to a black-listed 
company? Who is responsible for such negligence?  
Thirdly, there is acute lack of planning and management, GOP seems to be over 
ambitious without proper paperwork. The project management is nowhere.   
Last but not least, this project was the failure of previous government, in spite of 
doing its audit and accountability of responsible individuals for wasting public 
money, the current government resumed it without conducting proper paper 
work.42  
These are few examples43 mong many of CG failures in SOEs which occurred due 
to bad governance, mismanagement and high level of corruption. The former 
commissioner of SECP Etrat Hussain Rizvi said in one of his interviews that:44  
                                                            
41 The Daily Times, ‘OPP Demands NAB Investigate Nandipur Project Corruption’ (8 October 
2015) <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/08-Oct-2015/opp-demands-nab-investigate-
nandipur-project-corruption> accessed 20 November 2015 
42 Ibid (n 39, 41) 
43 Discussed in above paragraphs. 
44 Ibid (n 28) Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the 
Perspective of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (2013) 12(4) 13 
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The SECP is doing every effort for the development of CG in 
Pakistan; however I have questions about the governments’ part in 
light of the fact that they demonstrate almost no ability to implement 
CCG. In larger public companies such as, Oil and Gas Development 
Company Limited (OGDC) and Pakistan State Oil (PSO), the BODs 
were selected on the premise of their common legitimacy for example, 
two directors among every four territories. Regardless of the 
possibility that we have political purposes behind doing as such, we 
can choose the BODs from every one of the four corners of the 
country in view of legitimacy instead of nepotism. 
Moving further, families are the second key stakeholders after state in the 
business of Pakistan as most of the companies in both public and private sector 
are FOEs,45 and sadly, CG does not exist in FOEs according to the former 
Commissioner of SECP, Mr Etrat Hussain Rizvi.  
The number of FOEs listed on KSE was 800 which have reduced to 600 now. The 
number is reduced due to the mergers and delisting of many family companies 
because they find the compliance with CG principles very cumbersome.  
Another reason is that these FOEs disintegrate after their third generation. 
Likewise, the additional reason of lack of enforcement of CCG is that there are 
many public companies but there BODs are family members. The examples of 
family-owned business are textile sector, leather industry, construction 
companies, chemicals, agriculture, sports and entertainment products, carpets and 
rugs etc.  
The examples provided in this section of CG failures in state-owned and family-
owned businesses in Pakistan confirm the weak CG framework of Pakistan and 
the existence of problem in the enforcement mechanism of Pakistan. The faulty 
                                                            
45 SECP (n 22); Nasir Afghan and Tayyaba Waqar, ‘Succession in Family Businesses of Pakistan: 
Kinship Culture and Islamic Inheritance Law’ (2007) CMER Working Paper No. 07-54 
<https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6257372.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015; CDC, 
‘Corporate Governance With Respect to Family Owned Businesses in Pakistan’ 
<http://www.icap.org.pk/nfo/pdf/CDC.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015 
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enforcement mechanisms and inappropriate implementation of CCG are 
responsible for the lack of accountability, transparency, fairness and defective 
disclosure statements of Pakistani companies.  
Therefore, this thesis seeks to investigate these factors responsible for non-
implementation of CG principles in Pakistan and formulate proposals and 
measures to improve the application and enforcement of CCG in Pakistan. 
However, it is important to clarify here that investigating enforcement 
mechanisms is one of the objectives of this thesis to lead towards achieving the 
main aim of this study.  
1.2.2.2 The Corporate Laws of Pakistan (Law in Books) 
This section discusses the legal environment in Pakistan regarding the hierarchy 
of corporate laws. The intention is to provide a context, background and an 
overview of the regulatory system under which the corporate sector of Pakistan is 
working.  
A country’s growth relies upon the organisation of laws and strategies developed 
to a large extent and for that purpose law should be dynamic not stagnant, so that 
it could be changed according to the requirements, needs and changing 
circumstances of a specific governing system; as static laws and procedures 
strangle business development, performance and economic growth.46  
Hence it is necessary to update laws and regulations according to changing needs 
for giving motivation to economic development. The weak legal and regulatory 
system creates institutional insecurity and uncertainty due to which shareholders 
specifically institutional investors (IIs) do not prefer to invest their money in such 
unprotected environment and this institutional uncertainty therefore stifles market 
growth. The aim of establishing sound CG mechanisms is to safeguard the profit 
                                                            
46 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens, ‘Enforcement and Corporate Governance’ (2004) World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3409, 41 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625286&download=yes> accessed 10 May 
2015; Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12 
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for shareholders on their investments.47 Therefore, jurisdictions having ineffective 
CG structures cannot create positive changes for the upgrading of investment 
mechanisms and economic progress.48  
The development of CG and reforms in the corporate framework also requires 
political support like other economic and legal institutions.49 The researcher 
submits that the reforms are essential for developing economies, for example 
Pakistan where CG bodies are fragile and cannot provide protection to 
shareholders.50  
The following figure 1.1 shows the different sources of CG applicable in Pakistan. 
The researcher submits that whilst there are several corporate laws however, the 
problem lies in the proper enforcement of these laws; the weak and out-dated 
provisions of these laws is a significant issue and hurdle not allowing the CG of 
Pakistan to grow in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Figure 1.1: Sources of Corporate Law in Pakistan51 
                                                            
47 Ronald Gilson, ‘Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions 
Matter?’ (1996) 74 Washington University Law Quarterly 327, 340 
48 Amar Bhide, ‘Efficient Markets, Deficient Governance: US Securities Regulations Protect 
Investors and Enhance Market Liquidity. But Do They Alienate Managers and Shareholders?’ 
(1990) 72 Harvard Business Review  128 
49 Andrei Shleifer and Robert  Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52(2) The 
Journal of Finance 737, 738 
50 As evidenced is section 1.2.2.1 
51 Developed by the researcher 
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Company law is the key source of CG in Pakistan, which means that CG 
principles were already present in Pakistan’s Company Law even before the 
formulation of CCG; however the problem remained the same that they could not 
be implemented.52 Company law (the Companies Ordinance 1984) is the 
fundamental legislation that accommodates the rights and obligations of all 
stakeholders, distributes the power among directors and shareholders, voting 
powers to shareholders and the authority to issue shares. However, the application 
of company law is partially confined, depending on the kind of a company. For 
example, for public companies, company law provides stringent conditions as 
compared to private companies, in order to protect public interest.53  
The company’s constitution consists of Articles of Association (AOA) and 
Memorandum of Association (MOA). The MOA54 serves as the constitution of 
the company and declares the nature of business of a respective company. In case 
a company leads a business in contrast to its MOA or other than stated in its 
MOA, the directors of that company might be held responsible and penalised for 
this infringement.  
The AOA55 has secondary position after MOA and deals with the internal 
regulatory structures of companies. It deals with the internal matters of the 
company. The AOA contains CG provisions relating to the voting rights; 
appointment and elimination of directors; the authorities of directors; variation in 
rights and privileges. The AOA are a significant source of CG matters in a 
company.  
                                                            
52 Chaudhary AG, Company Law in Pakistan: A Commentary on the Companies Ordinance, 1984 
(Reprint edition 2011-2012, Khyber Publishers Lahore 2012) “See generally” 
53 Part IV of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
54 Part III of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
55 Part III of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
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Moreover, Securities Laws (SL)56 and Listing Rules (LR)57 also have considerable 
importance in CG as they provide protection to shareholders in the form of 
prevention on insider trading in the matters relating to the way in which the public 
offering is managed and transaction of shares is organised.58 They are applicable 
only to those public companies who managed to raise capital from public. 
Furthermore, another significant source of CG is the CCG. The CCG provides the 
basic principles of CG that are applicable to all types of companies in Pakistan. 
The researcher argues that the CCG is important because it can provide the 
solution for those issues which are not covered in other corporate laws. For 
example, it can provide guidelines to enhance the effectiveness of BODs and the 
protection of investors.  
Therefore, the CCG might complement the legal structure, particularly in areas 
relating to which states are hesitant or not able to incorporate and implement 
governance standards via legislation due to political causes or costs; and those 
governance standards might be incorporated in states’ legal structure when they 
have developed and been acknowledged by the business community.59 
The first draft of CCG in Pakistan as discussed above, was formulated and 
implemented in 2002 and was revised in 2012 with some changes. However, the 
CCG still requires amendments as it contains some weak and overlapping 
provisions with other corporate laws which cause inappropriate implementation of 
CCG.  
                                                            
56 Part X of the Securities Act of Pakistan 2015 
<http://www.secp.gov.pk/corporatelaws/pdf/2015/SecuritiesAct_2015.pdf> accessed 20 June 2015 
57 SECP, ‘Guide for Listing of Companies through Initial Public Offerings’ 
<http://www.secp.gov.pk/Guides/Guide_Listing_Companies_Initial_Public_Offerings.pdf> 
accessed 20 June 2015 
58 Khilji Miftahuddin, Corporate Governance in Pakistan: An Analytical Study (Lambert 
Academic Publishing 2011) “See generally” 
59 Ruth Aguilera and Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, ‘Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is 
the Trigger’ (2004) 25(3) Organisation Studies 417, 438; Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Corporate 
Governance “Codes of Conduct” Between State and Private Law’ (2007) Working Paper Series, 
WP 2007-07, 28-9 <http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032596> accessed 10-
01-2015 
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Therefore, this thesis seeks to investigate the CCG of Pakistan, identify its 
weaknesses and formulate recommendations in order to make a more efficient and 
effective CCG for Pakistan. The researcher believes that, the formulation of an 
efficient and effective CCG will help to improve CG in Pakistani companies.  
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research intends to examine the CG framework of Pakistan, identify its 
weaknesses, to establish the importance and advantages of CG principles and to 
formulate recommendations for the improvement of CG in Pakistan. Therefore, 
the main aim of this thesis is: 
 To develop a CG model for the listed companies of Pakistan to improve 
the CG practices beyond a minimalist approach. 
For this purpose, the four variables/objectives have been chosen whose answers 
will lead to achieve the main aim of this thesis. Those four objectives are as 
follows: 
1. To investigate the CCG of Pakistan, identify its weaknesses and make 
recommendations to develop a more effective CCG. (Chapter Four) 
2. To investigate the enforcement mechanisms of Pakistan relating to corporate 
matters, identify its lacunae and develop measures to improve it by 
exploring the role of the courts and capital market to enhance the 
implementation and enforcement of CG principles in the listed companies of 
Pakistan.  (Chapter five) 
3. To investigate the role of BODs in improving CG principles and develop a 
‘Board Effectiveness Model’ for the listed companies of Pakistan. (Chapter  
Six) 
4. To investigate the role of institutional investors and explore the ways for 
their enhanced role in improving CG practices in the listed companies of 
Pakistan (Chapter Seven) 
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1.4  Research Questions 
1. Why does the CCG important for companies and what could be the form 
of an effective and efficient CCG for the listed companies of Pakistan? 
2. How could the implementation and enforcement of CCG be improved in 
the listed companies of Pakistan by reforming the enforcement 
mechanisms of Pakistan? 
3. How do the BODs affect the CG of their companies and what could be the 
model of an effective Board for the listed companies of Pakistan? 
4. What role can institutional investors play in order to promote CG 
principles in the listed companies of Pakistan? 
1.5 Rationale and Significance of this Study 
CG has become considerably important in the contemporary corporate world due 
to the financial disasters and corporate scandals worldwide.60 These incidents 
(corporate scandals) elucidate that the absence of CG allows insiders, whether 
they are company managers, directors or public officers, to expropriate companies 
at the cost of investors and other stakeholders.61 Therefore, companies with fragile 
and ineffective CG frameworks are mostly expected to face severe consequences 
beyond financial scams in today’s globalised economy. As a result, there is an 
increased demand to adopt CG principles.  
As discussed and evidenced in section 1.2, the corporate framework of Pakistan is 
in its developing stage.62 The listed companies of a country (both SOEs and 
FOEs) have a considerable role in the growth of its economy, therefore it is 
necessary that the governance level of these companies should be of high level 
and fulfil the standards of transparency and accountability according to the CG 
principles.  
                                                            
60 Ibid (n 1-3, 10) 
61 Ibid (n 1-3, 10) 
62 Ayaz Ahmad and Henna Ahsan, ‘Contribution of Services Sector in the Economy of Pakistan’ 
(2011) PIDE Working Papers Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)  
<http://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/ife/PublishingImages/Performance%20and%20%20Credit%20Risk%2
0in%20Banking.pdf> accessed 20 June 2015 
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Hence, this research intends to add to this continuous debate on the benefits of CG 
principles specifically in regards to Pakistan in following ways:  
The aim of this thesis is to develop a CG model for Pakistan which could lead 
towards the advancement of CG practices in the country beyond a minimalist 
approach. To achieve this purpose four variables are selected to investigate.  
First, this thesis intends to examine the CCG, as in the initial phase of reform ‘law 
in books’ should be reformed first.63  The sound laws, rules and regulations are 
primarily necessary for structuring a strong system.64 For this purpose, the both 
CCG (2002 and 2012) has been thoroughly investigated, the weaknesses in the 
provisions of CCG have been identified and the recommendations have been 
formulated in order to update the CCG.  
While formulating the recommendations, the guidance has been obtained from the 
Combined Code of the UK. The reason for choosing the UK for guidance is that 
most of the laws of Pakistan including corporate laws and the CCG are already 
based on UK’s laws; Pakistan being the former colony of the UK.65 As discussed 
in section 1.2, while formulating the first draft of CCG for Pakistan, guidance was 
taken from the CCG of the UK and the OECD principles of CG.66 Therefore, this 
thesis gets guidance from the CCG of the UK and from the OECD Principles of 
CG to formulate recommendations in order to amend the existing CCG of 
Pakistan and redraft a new one. 
The second way to achieve the aim of this thesis is to investigate the enforcement 
mechanism of Pakistan in relation to CG. As has been discussed in section 1.2.1, 
CCG has not been implemented properly in the listed companies of Pakistan due 
to weak enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement of laws is also important in 
the current era of globalisation and competition when cross-border investments 
                                                            
63 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12 
64 Ibid  
65  For example, the Companies Ordinance 1984 of Pakistan is the same as documented by the 
British-India before in 1932 before partition with some amendments (the detail evidence is 
provided in chapter five). 
66 SECP, ‘Manual of Corporate Governance’ (2014) <www.secp.gov.pk> or 
<http://www.nzibo.com/IB2/manual-CG.pdf> accessed 1 February 2015  
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have increased.67 A legitimate framework can work successfully only if the 
framework to control is also effective for setting out an organised mechanism of 
check and balance. It is important for the second phase of reform, as without ‘law 
in action’ there is no use of ‘law in books’, no matter how strong these laws are.68  
Therefore, this thesis intends to investigate enforcement mechanisms of Pakistan 
and explore ways to reform these mechanisms by reforming the judiciary and 
capital market of Pakistan. The capital market and judiciary are the principal 
sources of enforcement of corporate laws in Pakistan.69 The aggrieved party can 
file a complaint in SECP, if s/he could not get proper remedy from SECP, s/he 
can file a complaint and go to the court. However, there are a number of 
irregularities70 in both institutions regarding enforcement which this thesis seeks 
to investigate and formulate measures to remove those irregularities and enhance 
the efficiency of these institutions relating to the enforcement of corporate 
matters. 
The third way to accomplish the aim of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness 
of BODs in the listed companies of Pakistan by investigating the impact of their 
size, diversity, composition and independence. The aim is to develop a ‘Board 
Effectiveness Model’ for the listed companies of Pakistan. For this purpose 
guidance is taken from the prior studies (both theoretical and empirical) 
conducted in different jurisdictions particularly from the King II Report, King III 
Report and the LR of Johannesburg Securities and Exchange Commission (JSE) 
of South Africa.  
The reason to get guidance from South Africa is that, the South African corporate 
boards are more diverse than any other Boards of any country including European 
Whites or Caucasians, Chinese, Indians, Mixed Race and Black Africans. The 
empirical research done on the 117 listed companies of South Africa in 2003 
                                                            
67 Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan’ (2002) 3 
European Business Organisation Law Review 756, 812 
68 Ibid  
69 The evidence is provided in chapter five (see sections 5.4 and 5.5) 
70 See section 5.4 and 5.5 
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established a considerably affirmative connection between the mixture of BODs 
and companies’ outcome,71 so as the other variables of board’s size, composition 
and independence.72  
The researcher believes that the effectiveness of BODs is essential in creating 
shareholder value,73 because good internal controls help in aligning managerial 
interests with that of shareholders and BODs is the central part of any CG 
structure.74 Only BODs can help to increase the implementation of CCG in a 
company, however the BODs in Pakistan’s listed companies are not independent 
and do not follow CCG, in fact they are not being appointed themselves according 
the corporate laws (Companies Ordinance 1984 and the CCG).75  
Therefore, it is essential to develop a board effectiveness model for the listed 
companies of Pakistan which would also create awareness among the 
management of companies regarding the benefits of CCG and help in promoting 
CG principles in the listed companies of Pakistan. Such work has not been done 
previously relating to Pakistan. 
The fourth way to achieve the aim of this study is to explore the part of 
institutional investors (IIs) in promoting CG norms in the listed companies of 
Pakistan. The IIs are large organisations/institutions who collect money from 
individual shareholders or companies and invest that money in large companies.76 
They can influence their investee companies, change share values and move 
resources in and out of investee company, with huge impacts on their costs and 
                                                            
71 Naomi Swartz and Steven Firer, ‘Board Structure and Intellectual Capital Performance in South 
Africa’ (2005) 13(2) Meditari Accountancy Research 145; Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 
‘South Africa is a Leader in Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, Says New Study’ (2013) 
<http://www.iodsa.co.za/news/135560/South-Africa-is-a-Leader-in-Gender-Diversity-on-
Corporate-Boards-says-New-Study.htm> accessed 20 December 2015 
72 Coles et al., ‘Boards: Does One Size Fit All’ (2008) 87(2) Journal of Financial Economics 329; 
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, ‘What Makes Great Boards’ (2002) 80(9) Harvard Business Review 108 
73 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour , Agency 
Cost and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305 
74 Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch, ‘A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance’ (1992) 
48(1) Business Lawyer 59 
75 As discussed in section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 
76 Chris Mallin, ‘Trustees, Institutional Investors and Ultimate Beneficiaries’ (2004) 12 (3) 
Corporate Governance-An International Review 239 
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hence economy in general. Being experienced and experts they can also contribute 
to increase the independence and competence of BODs.77  
Currently two types of IIs are working in Pakistan: Government-Owned IIs 
including, banks, Development Financial Institutions (DFI), National Investment 
Trust (NIT) and Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP); and private-owned IIs 
which includes, banks, DFI, insurance companies, mutual funds, modarbas and 
leasing companies.78 However, their role is limited in Pakistan generally and 
particularly relating to CG, as they are working mostly with banks, in fact they 
have representation in the BODs of banks.79 Though, there is a considerable 
potential for IIs to improve their role in CG80 which this thesis aims to explore to 
improve CG in the listed companies of Pakistan. 
In short, this study not only contributes in the existing literature of CG but also 
offers noteworthy theoretical and practical contributions to this essential area. The 
most significant and commonly used terms ‘corporate governance’81 and 
‘Institutional Investors’82 are defined in this chapter; however there are several 
other terms of CG used in this study and they are defined in Glossary. 
1.6 Structure of this Thesis  
This thesis is divided into eight chapters sketched in figure 1.2. The brief synopsis 
of each chapter is presented below.  
Chapter One: First chapter provides the introduction to this study. It presents the 
background of this research. It identifies the significance and challenges of the 
corporate sector of Pakistan. It provides aim, objectives, research questions, 
rationale and significance of this study. 
                                                            
77 Petra Nix and Jean Chen, The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An 
Empirical Study (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) “See generally”  
78 Shahnawaz Mahmood and Haroon Sharif, ‘Institutional Shareholders and their Role in 
Promotion of Corporate Governance in Pakistan’ 
<www.secp.gov.pk/IACCD/pub_iaccd/WORKING%20PAPER.pdf> accessed 20 March 2014 
79 Ibid  
80 Ibid (n 77, 78) 
81 It is defined at the start of section 1.2 
82 It is defined in section 1.5 and 2.4.5 
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Chapter Two: The second chapter intends to conduct a detailed literature review 
on CG. It also presents the theoretical considerations of CG relevant to this study. 
This chapter also explains the OECD principles of CG and their identical 
provisions like the CCG of Pakistan. It further analyses the literature relating to 
the compliance and enforcement of CCG. Additionally, it analyses the prior 
studies on the role and responsibilities of BODs. It examines studies establishing 
the role and importance of IIs in today’s corporate world. This chapter also 
identifies the gaps in literature and explains how this study is going to address 
these gaps. Lastly, the summary of this chapter is presented under the heading of 
conclusion. 
Chapter Three: The aim of chapter three is to provide details regarding the 
research methods and methodologies employed to conduct this study. It provides 
the research philosophy, research approach, and research strategy and research 
design of this study. It also explains the validity and reliability issues involved in 
qualitative studies and explain how these issues are handled in this thesis. It also 
presents the ethical considerations of this research. 
Chapter Four: Chapter four intends to investigate the framework of CG in 
Pakistan and CCG prevalent in the country. It identifies the weaknesses and 
overlapping provisions of the CCG and formulates recommendations to improve 
those provisions in order to make them more effective and up-to-date. This 
chapter identifies the benefits of adopting and implementing the CCG in listed 
companies of Pakistan. 
Chapter Five: Chapter five aims to examine the enforcement mechanisms in 
Pakistan in relation to CG. It identifies the factors which are responsible for the 
non-implementation of CG principles in the listed companies of Pakistan and 
formulate recommendations to improve enforcement mechanisms which are 
essential for the growth of CG principles in the listed companies of Pakistan. 
Chapter Six:  This chapter examines the role and responsibilities of BODs. It 
analyses the factors which help to make BODs effective and efficient in making 
policies and strategic decision for the companies such as, diversity, size, 
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composition and independence of BODs.  It also investigates the effectiveness of 
BODs in the listed companies of Pakistan and develops a ‘Board Effectiveness 
Model’ for the listed companies of Pakistan. 
Chapter Seven: This chapter aims to explore the role of IIs for promoting the CG 
practices, analyses their working mechanisms and provide recommendations to 
improve their role and also suggest new ways in which they can play their part 
more effectively for the growth of CG principles in the listed companies of 
Pakistan.  
Chapter Eight: Chapter eight is the final chapter and presents a brief summary of 
findings and an overall conclusion from the analysis in the previous chapters. 
Keeping in mind the end goal to draw down the ultimate findings, the main results 
from the four core chapters (from chapter four to seven) are united in the final 
chapter. The limitations of this study and numerous suggestions for future 
research are also presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present a detailed literature review on corporate 
governance (CG) in order to establish the effectiveness of CG norms in companies 
and institutions. It seeks to summarise a stream of research that has provided an 
insight into the concepts, theoretical work and empirical research done previously 
on the importance of CG principles, their compliance and enforcement, the role 
and effectiveness of board of directors (BODs), and the significance and part of 
institutional investors (IIs) in promoting CG practices.  
The previous studies provide evidence that good CG principles enrich the 
company’s value. This chapter is aimed at exploring the relevance of previous 
studies to this research and to provide a perspective of different schools of thought 
on the issues of enforcement of CG principles, effectiveness of BODs and the part 
of IIs in CG (which are the objectives of this study) in order to establish the 
significance of this thesis.  
This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion and analysis of existing 
literature and identify the deficiency of research relating to CG issues particularly 
in Pakistan which establish the originality of this work and its meaningful 
contribution to the existing knowledge. Figure 2.1 gives a plan of this chapter. 
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                                    Figure 2.1: Plan of this Chapter 
 
2.2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
As discussed in chapter one CG is a wide term which describes the means, 
framework and the procedures through which a company’s affairs are directed and 
monitored. The CG also increases the shareholder value in the long run by the 
procedure of accountability of directors and by increasing the returns of a 
company.1 When the directors of a company will be accountable to shareholders, 
they will perform their duties more responsibly and will take higher strategic 
decisions for the company. Such practices increase the share values along with the 
better performance of a company.  CG additionally reduces the conflict of 
ownership and control2 by describing the interest of shareholders and directors 
individually. 
                                                            
1 Michel Aglietta, ‘Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: Some Tricky Questions’ (2000) 
29(1) Economy and Society 146; Humera khan, ‘A Literature Review of Corporate Governance’ 
(2011) 25 International Proceedings of Economics Development and Research 1 
2 The conflict of interest between ownership and control also called the agency conflict is 
discussed in section 2.3.1. The aim of this section is to identify the role of CG to eliminate these 
conflicts. 
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The Principles of CG issued by Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)3 have been considered as standards for code of corporate 
governance (CCG) in a number of countries particularly in developing 
jurisdictions.4 The OECD has additionally issued a Survey of CG Developments 
in OECD countries.5 The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) 
upholds several connections to codes of corporate conduct for several countries on 
its website. The OECD has further published various studies on CG in Asia, the 
most prominent being its White Paper on CG in Asia.6 The following sections 
provide the principles of CG devised by OECD which are relevant to the 
objectives of this thesis.  
2.2.1 The Rights of Shareholders and Stakeholders 
The OECD principles emphasise that the framework of CG should be devised in a 
manner that it could safeguard shareholders’ rights, and ensure the fair treatment 
with all shareholders and stakeholders.7 A mechanism should be provided for 
investors to get actual compensation for infringement of their rights. Moreover, 
the rights of stakeholders should be recognised in CG framework as established 
by law and lively collaboration between stakeholders and companies should be 
encouraged in generating jobs, stability of economically strong companies and 
maximising the wealth of companies.8 
                                                            
3 OECD, ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ (1999) 1 <www.oecd.org> accessed 20 
June 2015 
4 Robert McGee, ‘Corporate Governance in Asia: Eight Case Studies’ (2008) 1 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081954> accessed 01 March 2015 
5 OECD, ‘Corporate Governance: A Survey of OECD Countries’ (2004) 17 
<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/21755678.pdf> accessed 10 
January 2015 
6 OECD, ‘White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia’ (2003) 11 
<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/25778905.pdf> accessed 10 
January 20015 
7 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1 <www.oecd.org/daf/ca/2014-review-oecd-
corporate-governance-principles.htm> accessed  10 January 2015 
8 Ibid  
28 
 
2.2.2 The Responsibility and Effectiveness of the Board 
The OECD principles also accentuate that CG should guarantee the strategic 
assistance of the company, the active supervision of administration by the BODs, 
and the responsibility of BODs to shareholders and to the company. Similarly, the 
correct and timely disclosure should also be ensured regarding all substantial 
matters of the company, including ownership, governance, financial situation, and 
performance of the company.9 
As one of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of BODs 
and formulate a ‘Board Effectiveness Model’ for Pakistani listed companies, so 
that the rights of shareholders could be protected and the supremacy of the BODs 
could be replaced with a transparent accountability mechanism. Although, 
Pakistan’s CCG is formulated along the lines of the UK and OECD principles of 
CG, it is not proving as effective as in other countries such as the UK. This 
research investigates these reasons and proposes recommendations to close these 
gaps. 
2.3 Theories of Corporate Governance Relevant to This Thesis 
This section presents the related existing theories that connect internal CG 
structures and companies’ financial and corporate performance. Theories 
underlying CG have been drawn from a range of subjects, involving accounting, 
economics, finance and law.10 Clarke11 provides a comprehensive detail of these 
CG theories.  
                                                            
9 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
<www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf> accessed 10 January 
2015 
10 Kami Rwegasira, ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging Capital Markets: Whither Africa?’ 
(2000) 8(3) Corporate Governance-An International Review 258; Christian Mallin, Corporate 
governance (5th edition, Oxford University Press 2015) “See generally”; Jill Solomon, Corporate 
Governance and Accountability (2nd edition, John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2007) 16; Boris Durisin and 
Fulvio Puzone, ‘Maturation of Corporate Governance Research 1993-2007: An Assessment’ 
(2009) 17(3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 266 
11 Thomas Clarke, Theories of Corporate Governance: Philosophical Foundations of Corporate 
Governance (Routledge 2004) “See generally” 
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2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory ascertains the agency relationship in which one party (the 
principal) delegates his authorities to another party (the agent). In the context of 
companies, the owners are the principal and the directors are the agent.12 Agency 
theory is imitative from the studies of Berle and Means,13 Jensen and Meckling14 
and Fama and Jensen.15 Jensen and Meckling describe an agency relationship:  
“as an agreement through which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) delegate their authorities to some other person (the 
agent) to act for their sake, for example, the authority to take 
decisions on behalf of them.”  
Agency theory determine and resolve issues which emerge at the time when the 
benefits of principal and agent are in strife and when it is troublesome or costly 
for the former to check what the latter is performing for his sake. This theory 
proposes that the former can confine errors from his agent by sustaining so as to 
establish proper motivations for the agent and checking costs intended to restrict 
the irregular exercises of the agent.16 These may incorporate endeavours with 
respect to the principal to monitor the conduct of agent via contractual 
understandings in regards to remuneration approaches, working principles, 
spending budget confinements inter alia. 
This thesis identifies (see section 5.3) that a large number of companies in 
Pakistan are family-owned enterprises (FOEs), which is a big hurdle in reforming 
the CG structure there. The members of a family dominate BODs usually and they 
                                                            
12 Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edition, Oxford University Press 2013) 16 
13 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Harcourt, 
Brace and World 1932) “See generally” 
14 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 308 
15 Eugene Fama and Micael Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983a) 26(2) Journal 
of Law and Economics 301; Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims’ (1983b) 26(2) Journal of Law and Economics 327 
16 Ibid 
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do not welcome CG reforms.17 Therefore this thesis recommends that the 
composition of BODs should be balanced with the equal number of executive and 
non-executive directors (NEDs) in order to undermine the family dominance on 
BODs.  
In this case, the ownership of company will be separated from control which will 
obviously raise agency issues. The similar case is of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).18 The agency theory provides the guidelines for such cases to resolve the 
matter which arises from the parting of ownership from control. 
2.3.2 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory can be utilised to elucidate the connection between CG systems 
and a companies’ performance.19  It elucidates the behaviour when two parties 
have access to different information; and one party (a company) choose whether 
and how to signal (communicate) that information, and other party (shareholders, 
stakeholders) choose how to interpret the signal.20 
This theory was initially pushed with a specific end goal to clarify information 
asymmetry in the labour markets. From that point forward it has been produced in 
various different zones including disclosure of voluntary information.21   
This theory recommends that in corporate reporting,22  companies that have 
confidence that they are ‘better’ than other companies flag this to shareholders 
and investment institutions to pull investments and good reputation.23  Companies 
might ensure this by voluntarily revealing financial information in abundance of 
                                                            
17 Moin Fudda, ‘Corporate Governance in Family-Owned Companies in Pakistan’ (2014) 1 
<http://www.cipe.org/publications/detail/corporate-governance-family-owned-companies> 
accessed 20 June 105 
18 The State is the second largest stakeholder in Pakistani companies. 
19 Michael Spence, ‘Job Marketing Signalling’ (1973) 87(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
355 
20 Brian Connelly et al., ‘Signalling Theory: A Review and Assessment’ (2011) 37(1) Journal of 
Management 39 
21 Stephen Ross, ‘The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach’ 
(1977) 8(1) The Bell Journal of Economics 23 
22 Because of asymmetry in the market for the information 
23 Robert Verrecchia, ‘Discretionary Disclosure’ (1983) 5 Journal of Accounting and Economics 
179 
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the requirement of law and other regulation. Correspondingly, not revealing can 
also be a sign in itself. 
Nevertheless, companies would constantly desire to indicate that they are better 
than ordinary companies. Then again, companies will constantly have the desire 
to flag that they are superior to anything normal. In this manner they will prefer to 
pick disclosure over non-disclosure.24  Henceforth, the harmony situation will be a 
complete revelation because almost all companies will have an impetus to 
uncover all progressive distinctive characteristics hypothetically with a specific 
end goal to maximise their individual egocentricity.  
In like manner, companies may agree to CG standards to evidence to investors 
and different partners that they are being supervised in a better way and 
accordingly its worth putting resources into. Moreover, by appointing INEDs to 
the BODs, a company flags to potential shareholders its aim is to have connection 
with them reasonably, by ensuring their venture. By revealing adoption of CG 
standards (signalling), a company decreases information asymmetry.25 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to improve the enforcement mechanism in 
Pakistan. This thesis advocates that in order to improve CG in Pakistan’s 
corporate market, the compliance with CCG should be enhanced; and disclosure is 
one of the key features of CCG. The CCG, require from companies to unveil in 
annual reports, their strategies, decision-making techniques and other working 
parameters transparently and explicitly. Such disclosure is not welcomed by some 
vested interest groups and business tycoons (see section 5.3). In such situation, 
signalling theory unveils the advantages attached with following the disclosure 
requirements which can encourage those reluctant groups to follow CG principles. 
                                                            
24 According to signalling theory  
25 Amama Shabbir and Carol Padgett, ‘The UK Code of Corporate Governance: Link between 
Compliance and Firm Performance’ (2005) Working Paper ICMA Centre 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=934313> accessed 01 March 2015; Black et al., ‘Does Corporate 
Governance Predict Firms Market Values? Evidence From Korea’ (2006) 22 Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation 366 
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2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman and Reed26 characterise stakeholders as any gathering or person who can 
influence or is influenced by the success of a company and company’s goals. 
Stakeholder theory is utilised to comprehend those groups and people that can 
influence and are influenced by the success of a company’s motivation. This 
theory is classified in managerial stakeholder theory and ethical stakeholder 
theory.27 The former branch unequivocally alludes to concerns of stakeholder 
force, and how a stakeholder’s virtual force affects their capacity to ‘drive’ 
company into agreeing to their expectations. 
Conversely, the latter branch contends that all stakeholders have the privilege to 
be dealt with reasonably by a company.28 This theory might likewise be utilised to 
clarify why companies ought to comply with CG practices. For example, 
consistence with collective communal concerns as prescribed by the King III 
Report e.g. HIV/AIDS, group effort programs, livelihood value and so forth might 
be an endeavour by companies to demonstrate to further stakeholders their great 
corporate citizenship. Along these lines, this theory can be utilised to clarify 
consistence with CG standard norms in such manner. 
2.3.4 Information Asymmetry 
Prior studies29 have relied on information asymmetry and managerial signalling as 
a supporting theory to elucidate the link between shareholders (principals) and 
managers (agents). It suggests that managers as insiders typically have more 
information than shareholders, including private information, about their 
companies.30 Theoretically, by electing to comply with the recommendations of a 
                                                            
26 Edward Freeman and David Reed, ‘Stockholders and Stakeholder: A New Perspective on 
Corporate Governance’ (1983) 25(2) California Management Review 88 
27 Craig Deegan and Jeffrey Unerman (Eds) Financial Accounting Theory (McGraw Hill 2014) 10 
28 Ibid  
29 Ibid (n 14) 309 
30 Paul Healey and Krishna Palepu, ‘Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure literature’ (2001) 31 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 405; Panayotis Kapopoulos and Sophia Lazaretou, ‘Corporate 
Ownership structure and Firm Performance’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 144  
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CCG, a company will principally be signalling to shareholders that it is better-
governed.  
Consequently, investors will offer up share prices in light of the fact that with 
better CG, they are prone to get a more noteworthy part of their companies’ 
benefits instead of being confiscated by directors.31 For example, by appointing 
INEDs to the BODs, a company gives indication to possible shareholders its 
expectations of having relationship with them decently, and for that matter the 
safety of their investment.  
Likewise, by signalling (disclosing) its better governance qualities to investors, a 
company reduces information asymmetry. This is likely to lead to an increase in 
share price and company value for existing shareholders due to the potential 
increase in the demand for its shares.32 Equivalently, a growth in a company’s 
share value should, ceteris paribus, end in a reduction in the price of outside 
equity capital.33 A noteworthy route by which companies can creditably indicate 
their standards of excellence to the business market or potential investors is the 
adoption and implementation of CG standards. 
2.3.5 Stewardship Theory 
In contrast to agency, information asymmetry and signalling theories that give 
importance to managerial speculation and monitoring, stewardship theory posits 
that executive directors are intrinsically reliable persons.34 Hence, they should be 
authorised completely to direct and manage companies due to the fact that they 
                                                            
31 LLSV, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57(3) The Journal of Finance 
1147; Beiner et al., ‘An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation’ 
(2006) 12(2) European Financial Management 249 
32 Black et al., ‘Corporate Governance Indices and Firm’s Market Values: Time Series Evidence 
from Russia’ (2006b) 7(4) Emerging Markets Review 361 
33 Christine Botosan, ‘Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital: What Do We Know?’ 
(1997) 72(3) Accounting Review 323 
34 Gavin Nicholson and Geoffrey Keil, ‘Can Directors Impact Performance? A Case-based Test of 
Three Theories of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 15(4) Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 588 
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are good wardens of the assets depended on them.35 This theory marks numerous 
assumptions about the behaviour of senior managers.  
Firstly, it undertakes that executive directors usually devote their whole working 
lives in that company they administer; they will probably have understanding of 
companies’ affairs superior to anything NEDs thus can settle on better choices.36  
Secondly, they have more noteworthy formal and casual data and information 
regarding the company they manage, which can lead towards improved value of 
decision-making.37 Consequently, advocates of stewardship theory stress that the 
improved financial returns of a company is prone to be connected with inner CG 
norms which confers greater powers to managers.38  
Stewardship theory contradicts the stance taken by this thesis, as this study 
advocates that there should be more INEDs as compared to executive directors on 
BODs. The argument taken is that the higher independent BODs ensure higher 
effectiveness for the financial and corporate performance of company, likewise 
more effective boards ensures higher protection of shareholders’ interests.39  
2.3.6 Resource Dependence Theory 
This theory is the final supporting theory of CG that this study relies on. It 
suggests that the institution of internal CG structures, such as BODs is not just 
vital for guaranteeing that the activities of managers are being monitored viably, 
additionally they serve as a necessary connection between company and the basic 
assets that it requires to enhance financial performance.40 
                                                            
35 Letza et al., ‘Shareholding Versus Stake-holding: A Critical Review of Corporate Governance’ 
(2004) 12(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 244 
36 Lex Donaldson and James Davis, ‘Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance 
and Shareholder Returns’ (1991) 16(1) Australian Journal of Management 52 
37 Lex Donaldson and James Davis, ‘Boards and Company Performance – Research Challenges 
the Conventional Wisdom’ (1994) 2 Corporate Governance: An International Review 151 
38 Ibid (n 25) “See generally” 
39 The more detail on this contradiction is provided in section 2.4.5 and 6.4. 
40 Jeffrey Pfeffer, ‘Size, Composition and Function of Boards of Directors: A Study of 
Organisational-Environmental Linkage’ (1973) 18 Administrative Science Quarterly 350 
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For example, the BODs and NEDs in particular can provide necessary assets; for 
example, professional assistance, experience, impartiality, expertise and 
knowledge.41 Secondly, they can bring to the firm reputation and critical business 
contacts.42 Thirdly, the BODs can encourage admission to business elite, data, 
knowledge and capital.43 Finally, the BODs provide an acute relationship to a 
company’s outer environment and significant stakeholders, for example, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and competitors. Therefore, it has been argued that more 
connections to the outer environment lead to have more access to assets.44 This 
can impact positively on company’s financial performance. 
This theory validates one of the objectives of this thesis advocating the view that 
effective boards are necessary for the better performance of a company. 
Therefore, this topic is worthy of investigation. 
2.4 Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Studies 
Many articles and books have been composed about CG in recent years alone. 
This section provides the detailed theoretical literature review and empirical 
studies on CG and CG issues which are being investigated in this study.  
2.4.1 Historical Foundation of CG and the Impact of CG Principles on 
Companies’ Performance 
The literature review provided in this section confirms the significance of CG 
issues raised in this thesis and validates the objectives of this research.  
Tricker45 believes that earlier to the corporate collapse of 1980s the word CG was 
not being used, though CG principles were there and companies were using them 
in their governance mechanisms. However, the previous couple of years have 
                                                            
41 Roszaini Haniffa and Terry Cooke, ‘Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations’ (2002) 38(3) Abacus  319 
42 Roszaini Haniffa and Muhammad Hudaib, ‘Corporate Governance Structure and Performance of 
Malaysian Listed Companies’ (2006) 33(7) Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 1039 
43 Ibid (n 34) 600 
44 Ibid (n 34) 601 
45 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd edition, Oxford 
University Press 2015) 4 
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noticed an outbreak of interest in CG around the world. The UK’s Combined 
Code46 exemplified the results of a set of three reports: the Cadbury Report,47 the 
Greenbury Report,48 and the Hampel Report.49   
The Cadbury Report (1992) issued the outcomes of the Committee on Financial 
Aspects of CG. The Greenbury Report (1995) discussed directors’ remuneration. 
The Hampel Committee Report (1998) addressed the identical matters as the 
Cadbury and Greenbury reports. It has distinct divisions relating to the principles 
of CG, directors’ role and responsibilities, their remuneration, the role of investors 
and accountability. 
McGee50 conducted a study of CG in eight Asian countries based on research 
undertaken by The World Bank.51  His research concluded with the overall 
unsatisfactory CG performance of its investee jurisdictions. However, he did not 
provide the clear and in-depth information as to what basis his study drew such 
conclusion; his work neither identifies the specific weaknesses of any countries’ 
corporate system nor suggested any recommendations on the basis of which those 
countries may improve their corporate performance. 
Moreover, Turnbull52 wrote about the corporate watchdogs, and limitations of CG 
best practices. Dignam53 embellished much about the UK regulatory systems in a 
                                                            
46 Combined Code, Combined Code Principles of Corporate Governance (Gee & Co Ltd London 
1998) 
47 Cadbury Sir Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (Gee & Co Ltd London 1992) 
48 Greenbury Sir Richard, Directors’ Remuneration (Gee & Co Ltd London 1995) 
49 Hampel Sir Ronnie, Committee on Corporate Governance: Financial Report (Gee & Co Ltd 
London 1998) 
50 Robert McGee, ‘Corporate Governance in Asia: Eight Case Studies’ (2008) Working Paper 1 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081954> accessed 01 March 2015 
51 The world Bank 2003; 2004a and b; 2005a, b and c; 2006a and b 
52 Shann Turnbull, ‘Corporate Watchdogs: Past, Present and Future?’  (2002) 2 
<http://ssrn.com/anstract=608244> accessed 10 March 2015; Shann Turnbull, ‘How US and UK 
Auditing Practices Became Muddled to Muddle Corporate Governance Principles’ (2005) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=608241> accessed 10 March 2015; Shann Turnbull, ‘The Limitations of 
Corporate Governance Best Practices’ in Thomas Clarke and Douglas Branson (eds),  The Sage 
Handbook of Corporate Governance (Sage: London and Thomas Oaks 2012) 428 
53 Alan Dignam, ‘Exporting Corporate Governance: UK Regulatory Systems in a Global 
Economy’ (2000) 21(3) Company Lawyer 70; Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis, ‘The 
Globalisation of Corporate Governance’ (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1839545> accessed 20 
February 2014; ‘Capturing Corporate Governance: The End of the UK Self-Regulating System’ 
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Global Economy. He discussed how the UK has a pioneer role in the development 
of CG best practices globally. Similarly, Armour54 and Andersson55 addressed the 
issues relating to CG in the UK in many ways. However, these studies were 
purely relating to the UK perspective, which provide an in-depth knowledge about 
the origin, importance and pros and cons of CG in the current changing world.  
CG is a broad topic that encompasses the means by which ‘companies are 
administered and controlled’.56 There are many drivers that influence the way in 
which companies are governed. They range from external factors such as 
regulators, shareholders/voters, capital markets, the takeover market, legal system 
and the press, to the internal drivers being the BODs, management and 
disclosure.57 Arguably, the benefits of good governance have been generally 
recognised as evidenced by the plethora of governance codes and regulations that 
have been promoted or enacted globally since the Cadbury Report of 1992.  
Aguilera and Cazurra58 assert that, the jurisdictions that have adopted CCG seem 
to have developed the governance of their companies. Wignall et al.59 wrote about 
the economic crisis of the world and the Great Depression. This researcher argues 
that these crises happened even in the presence of good CG principles. Therefore, 
there is a need to monitor these CG principles thoroughly and redraft them 
according to the requirements and need of companies working in different 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(2007) 41 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 24; ‘The Future of Shareholder 
Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 36 Seattle University Law Review 639  
54John  Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical 
Research’ (2008) Law Working Paper No. 108/2008 <www.ecgi.org/wp> accessed 01 March 2015 
55 Jan Andersson, ‘Evolution of Company Law, Corporate Governance Codes and the Principle of 
‘Comply or Explain’ – A Critical Review’ (2011) Nordic & European Company Law Working 
Paper No. 10-19 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1869916> accessed 10 
March 2015 
56 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (4th edition, John Wiley and Sons Ltd 
2013) 6 
57 Victoria Krivogorsky, ‘Ownership Board Structure, and Performance in Continental Europe’ 
(2006) 14 The International Journal of Accounting 176 
58 Ruth Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, ‘Codes of Good Governance worldwide: What was the 
Trigger?’ (2004) 25(3) Organisation Studies 417; Ruth Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, ‘Codes of 
Good Governance’ (2009) 17(3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 376 
59 Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., ‘The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What banks 
Do’ (2009) 11(2) OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 1  
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jurisdictions having different cultural, social, political and working environments, 
and most importantly to ensure their enforcement. 
Faryal and Siddique documented CG in Pakistan from the perception of Pakistan 
Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG)60 and Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP).61 The perspective of SECP is based on an 
interview of former commissioner of SECP. Though this article has issue of 
validity due to the selection of very limited sample for interview (only one 
interview), and has not been corroborated with others opinion; therefore it may 
also has the issue in generalising its findings. However, the information provided 
in it is reliable because the interviewee is an experienced and reliable person. He 
has been the part of formulating first CCG for Pakistan.  
This article explores the role of SECP in CG of Pakistan being an implementing 
and monitoring body. It also asserts that it is the responsibility of SECP to consult 
with related authorities whenever it formulates a new law, however it does not 
happen actually. The reason why it does not happen and a proper procedure is not 
being followed in formulation of a new law is not mentioned. Further this article 
also finds the FOEs and non-serious role of government as a major cause for CCG 
not being implemented and enforced properly in Pakistan, as identified in this 
thesis as well.  
Being the opinion of former commissioner of SECP, it has considerable 
importance for this thesis as it validated the approach of this thesis to raise the 
enforcement issue as paramount importance declaring FOEs and government as a 
major factor in the non-implementation of CG principles. However, this article is 
limited to this issue, but this thesis goes far and investigated many other factors 
which are also responsible for the non-implementation and weak enforcement 
                                                            
60 Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspective 
of Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance’ (2013) 12(4) IUP Journal of Corporate Governance 
17 
61 Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspective 
of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (2013) 12(2) IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance 13 
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mechanisms of CG in Pakistan (see section 5.3). Moving further, this thesis also 
recommends the measures to improve CG enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan. 
In their second article, Faryal and Siddiqui highlight the role of PICG to create 
awareness regarding the benefits of implementing and adherence to CCG. This 
article is also based on one interview conducted from Mr Faud Azam Hashimi, the 
former President of PICG, and has the same methodology issues mentioned above 
relating to their previous article;62 however it also contains some very good 
points. This article takes the stance that though concentrated shareholdings63 and 
related family transactions create conflict of interests but even then the number of 
corporate failures in Pakistan is less as compared to those countries where broad-
based shareholdings culture prevail.  
By saying this, Faryal and Siddiqui indirectly favour the culture of FOEs and 
consider it as an advantage of shareholdings being concentrated in few hands; 
likewise they also discourage apparently the presence of IIs. Hence, this article 
takes completely adverse position as compared to this thesis. This thesis 
discourage concentration of shareholdings in few hands and takes strong point 
that these vested interest groups do not let CG principles grow in the corporate 
sector of Pakistan; secondly this thesis considers IIs important for the 
development of CG norms, in fact it is one of the objectives of this thesis to 
explore the role of IIs in promoting CG in Pakistan.    
Likewise, this thesis differs from them on another issue. They (Faryal and 
Siddiqui) argue that the corporate failures only happen in the presence of criminal 
intent and sadly, CCG has nothing to do with mala fide. By posing this argument, 
they are completely denying the significance of CCG. This thesis argues that, 
though failures occur due to criminal intent, but if companies follow CG 
principles in their true spirit recognising and believing on the benefits of 
compliance with CG principles, such mala fide will get no/less opportunity to 
                                                            
62 Methodology issue: the sample of interviewee is very short as it based on only one interview. 
63 Shareholdings being in the some hands for example in FOEs and SOEs 
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grow and consequently there will be no failures or at least their number will be 
reduced.  
Mahwesh64 attempted to investigate whether the Anglo-Saxon model of CG 
embraced by Pakistan, does in fact satisfy the necessity of being illustrative of the 
issues that are particular to Pakistan. She could not give any straightforward 
answer however; she highlighted the various variables, the communications of 
which structures the corporate system of any nation. The findings of this article 
are confusing to draw any conclusion that what the perspective Mahwesh has on 
her point. However, this researcher submits that whatever the model is, the basic 
principles of CG are same in every model. Therefore, the significant issue is to 
make their compliance better in order to get required results. As only ‘law in 
books’ would have no desirable consequences unless the ‘law in action’ work 
effectively. 
Yaser and Safdar65 conducted empirical research to find the impact of CG 
practices on the financial performance of companies in Pakistan. A sample of 50 
non-financial companies was arbitrarily chosen, for the period ranging from 2003 
to 2005. They concluded that, computing a governance score in this way is not 
entirely impartial. Many of the parameters like quality of narrative are very 
subjective in nature. One might get diverse score according to one’s observation. 
Likewise, the outcome can be totally diverse by varying the weighting of these 
parameters. Secondly, the data was taken from annual reports, so researchers had 
to believe what was reported regardless of the actual situation. Therefore, they 
could not reach a clear conclusion regarding the influence of CG standards on 
financial performance of companies.  
                                                            
64 Mahwesh Mumtaz, Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Adopt or adapt? (University of 
Cambridge 2005) “See generally” 
65 Yasir Tariq and Safdar Butt, ‘Impact of Corporate Governance Practices on Financial 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan’ (2008) Conference Paper 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648547> accessed 01 March 2015 
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Makki and Lodhi66 determined the basic relationship in the middle of CG and 
economic performance. Their study presumed that CG does not enhance financial 
performance reliably. Maybe it can upgrade it altogether through misusing elusive 
assets. However, their study does not clarify that how it asserts that CG can 
enhance the financial performance of companies but does not improve 
consistently.  
This researcher’s opinion is that the improvement in financial performance 
depends upon the governance of companies; if a company follows CG principles 
consistently, its performance will also improve consistently, on the other hand, if 
a company does not follow CG rules and govern the company according to 
managers/directors own will neglecting shareholders rights, not disclosing their 
performance mechanisms properly in annual reports, not having an independent 
audit, such company will ultimately loose its trust and confidence; its performance 
cannot be improved but rather will collapse. 
As discussed above, a large portion of the experimental work for investigating 
conceivable connections between CG and performance of companies has been 
attempted for advanced countries. For example, an extensive study was conducted 
for the US companies by Brown and Caylor67  for the purpose of calculating the 
effect of CG on the outcome of those companies and they found that better 
represented companies are generally more beneficial, more significant and 
maximise the wealth of their shareholders.  
This thesis argues that, the debate regarding the association in the middle of CG 
and companies’ performance has been generally concentrated however come to no 
agreement. On the other hand, there is a generally held perspective that great CG 
practices are connected with better performance of companies.  
                                                            
66 Muhammad Makki and Suleman Lodhi, ‘Impact of Corporate Governance on Financial 
Performance’ (2013) 33(2) Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 265 267 
67 Lawrence Brown and Marcus Caylor, ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation’ (2004) 25(4) 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 409, 412 
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There are additionally a few research works in which the impact of CG norms and 
companies’ financial outcomes have been interrelated. A few studies have 
discovered this vital connection noteworthy68 and some discovered it as 
inconsequential.69  Several CG methods have additionally been demonstrated as 
having inverse connection.70 Although, numerous studies demonstrate that CG is a 
performance booster and increases the value of a company.71 Indeed, even those 
studies which give uncertain results identified with CG and performance contend 
that CG has, no less than, an indirect impact on the performance of a company.72 
Bad corporate performance has additionally been dealt with as an outcome of poor 
CG. For instance Gompers et al.,73  look at the association between CG standards 
and their impact on long haul equity values, company’s esteem and financial 
performance. Their outcomes uncover that all around represented companies 
illustrate higher value returns, higher esteem and better financial outcomes when 
contrasted with their ineffectively administered partners. 
Similarly, Drobetz et al.74 located an affirmative association between CG norms 
and anticipated stock profit in the public companies of Germany. Brown and 
Caylor75 assert that, the better administered companies are more beneficial, 
appreciate greater market esteem and maximise profits of their investors. Shaheen 
                                                            
68 Benjamin  Ehikioya, ‘Corporate governance structure and firm performance in developing 
economies: evidence from Nigeria’ (2009) 9(3) Journal of Corporate Governance 231; Marek 
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Funds’ (2006) 12(5) European Financial Management 725 
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73 Gompers et al., ‘Corporate Governance and Equity Prices’ (2003) 118 Quarterly Journal of 
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and Nishat76 investigated the association among CG and company performance. 
They additionally locate a constructive relationship between CG standards and 
company performance. 
Che-Haat et al.,77 when concentrating on transparency, CG and the impact of 
these standards on the outcomes of Malaysian companies by using ordered 
regression method on 73 ‘virtuous’ companies and 73 companies whose 
performance was weak and found that CG variables have a solid foreseeing force 
on the outcomes of company in Malaysia primarily because of the supervision of 
debt and foreign investment.  
Javed and Iqbal78 analysed the impact of CG on a company’s outcomes in 
Pakistan and concluded that not all components of CG upgrade the outcome of a 
company. They additionally concluded that great CG procedures unveil less 
generation and awful administration through transparent disclosure and 
transparency guidelines.  
Furthermore, Ehikioya79 directed research on CG mechanism and company 
performance in the light of listed companies of Nigerian Stock Exchange and 
reasoned that ownership convergence has optimistic influence on outcome and 
more than one relative in BODs demonstrated an antagonistic impact on company 
outcome.  
Abdullah and Page80 conducted a research on CG and performance, utilising 
information of FTSE 350 companies of the UK and discovered minute backing of 
a link between CG and performance. They contended that CG components clarify 
only limited discrepancy in risk attributes.  
                                                            
76 Rozina Shaheen and Mohammad Nishat, ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in an 
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However Sueyoshi et al.81 advocated a novel observational confirmation that CG 
modifications by the government of Japan have had an impact on the outcomes of 
Japanese companies. They demonstrated that remote investors encourage 
administrative discipline and knowledge which eventually upgrade the 
performance of Japanese companies.  
Bauer et al.,82 while contemplating the effect of CG on Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REIT) and their outcome discover that CG Quotient Index (CGQ index) is 
neither identified with REIT esteem nor to any of the three operational methods of 
performance, though REIT with more prominent instruments demonstrate an 
association between CGQ index and outcome of REIT.  
Similarly, Aboagye and Otieku83 examined the connection between CG of small 
companies and their performance. They find no relationship between 
classification taking into account CG and classification in view of financial 
performance.  
Renders et al.,84 discover a noteworthy positive association between CG 
evaluations and outcome in a Cross-European study comprising on fourteen states 
in the wake of directing sample selection bias. Moreover, the quality of this 
association appears to rely upon the nature of the institutional environment. 
Similarly, Reddy et al.85 conducted a study by applying normal least squares and 
two stages least squares regression procedures to analyse the effect of New 
Zealand Securities Commission’s standards of CG on company performance. 
                                                            
81 Sueyoshi et al., ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence From Japanese 
manufacturing Industries After the Lost Decade’ (2010) 2(3) European Journal of Operational 
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Their study established that these CG standards have a constructive impact on 
company outcomes. 
In short, it can be concluded that, although the opinions are mixed about the 
relationship of CG and company’s performance, as few researches discover a 
substantial influence of CG on financial performance,86 while others demonstrate 
no such association.87 These diverse outcomes invite the academics to examine 
further the part of CG and its impact on financial performance. However, all 
studies accept the importance of CG and its positive effect on companies’ 
performance in one or other way. Indeed, even those studies which give uncertain 
outcomes contend that CG has at any rate backhanded impact on performance.  
These results validate the significance of this thesis confirming the importance 
and impact of CG principles on the performance of companies which ultimately 
affect the economy of a country. 
2.4.2 Pakistan’s Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
There is an extensive assortment of experimental exploration that has evaluated 
the impact of CG on company performance for the advanced markets (as stated 
earlier).88 These researches have demonstrated that great administration practices 
have driven the noteworthy growth in the financial performance of companies, 
higher profitability and less danger of precise economic disaster for states.  
The studies conducted by Shleifer and Vishny89 and Hermalin and Weisbach90  
provide a great deal of literature review about the impact of good CG practices on 
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the company’s performance. It has now turned into an essential region of 
exploration in developing markets too.91  
Clarke92 condemned CG mechanisms in Asia. His condemnation concentrated on 
the Asian corporate scandals, which was created by weak CG standards. Ali93 
attests that, not at all like the Berle and Means model of division of possession 
and control, Pakistan’s prevailing corporate ownership structure takes after a 
concentrated family possession structure. Mainstream investors hold control of a 
company as well as are occupied with its administration. As a result of Pakistan’s 
common law foundation, the state’s legal framework takes after the Anglo-Saxon 
model; on the other hand, the ownership structure of Pakistan is the inverse of the 
Anglo-Saxon structure of dispersed ownership which is a clear mismatch.  
This thesis asserts that Pakistan’s model of CG should be devised according to its 
needs of concentrated types of shareholdings. For instance, instead of following 
any particular model of a country or converging the characteristics of other 
countries’ models; if Pakistani listed companies start following only the basic 
principles of CG such as, transparency, disclosure, fairness, independence and 
accountability, the picture of Pakistan’s CG mechanism will be changed 
automatically.  
However, the CCG of Pakistan overlooks this difference and advantages from the 
UK and South African reform activities. Therefore, following the enforcement of 
the CCG 2002, hesitant companies consider the usage of new administration not 
only costly to implement as well as essentially hard to execute. Whereas on one 
hand there is an administrative weight to uphold the CCG, on the other, there is a 
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conceded absence of important aptitude that can help with the implementation of 
the quintessence of CG in Pakistan. 
Ali94 takes after the recommendation of Khalil95 that, the non-compliance ought to 
be entirely followed during the procedure of the “comply or explain” rule. As 
needs be the companies ought to be rigorously required to guarantee compliance 
with their ‘Statement of Ethics and Business Practices’ in addition to the presence 
of such an explanation. In such manner, SECP ought to give a common example 
establishing the basic substance for ‘Statement of Ethics and Business Practices’ 
and moreover, necessitate the companies to extend their own particular Statement 
on the premise thereof. 
Javid and Iqbal96  investigated the CG issues in the equity market of Pakistan, its 
repercussions for corporate valuation, corporate financing and corporate 
ownership. To measure the company’s governance level they utilise a rating 
framework to assess the rigour of an arrangement of administration norms and 
cover different governance types, for example, board composition, possession, 
shareholdings, transparency, disclosure and auditing. 
However, their findings cannot be generalised as they used the model of 60 non-
financial companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). The findings of 
this sample does not depict the situation of financial companies, secondly, it is 
also not clear which rating framework they utilised to assess the rigour of 
administration practices. Javid and Iqbal97 utilised information from yearly reports 
for 2003 to 2006 to assess elements of CG. Therefore, the results generated from 
that data may not be completely reliable as the annual reports of Pakistani 
companies are usually published merely to fulfil a requirement.98 
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Moreover, Ashraf and Ghani99  examined the business community and their effect 
on CG in Pakistan for non-financial companies recorded on the KSE of Pakistan 
for 1998-2002. Their confirmation demonstrates that shareholders see the business 
community as an instrument to seize individual investor or minority shareholders. 
Then again, the proportional financial performance outcomes propose that 
business groups in Pakistan are effective financial game plans that replace for 
missing or wasteful external organisations and markets. 
In any case, the study by Cheema et al.100 proposed that CG can play an important 
role for Pakistan to draw in foreign direct investment (FDI) and accumulate more 
noticeable investment funds via capital provided the CG structure is perfect with 
the objective of floating external equity capital via capital markets. The corporate 
framework of Pakistan is described as concentrated with family control, pyramid 
structures, cross-shareholding and interlocking directorships. The worry is that 
reforms whose fundamental target is to safeguard investors’ interests may reduce 
profit increasing motivations for families without giving balanced advantages 
through the method of equally proficient monitoring by individual investors. In 
the event that this occurs, the reform may wind up making imperfect motivations 
for enhancing the profits by families.  
They contend that a critical test for regulators is to enhance the double purposes of 
individual investor security and the preservation of profit enhancing motivating 
forces for family administrators. This researcher submits that, there is a 
requirement for progressive and dynamic companies to take initiative in struggles 
for reform in CG too. As the PICG taking initiatives to increase awareness among 
general public and business community regarding the advantages attached to the 
compliance with CG principles.  
If the family owners realise that adopting CG principles would enhance the 
growth of their business which is ultimately in their benefit, the interests of 
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minority shareholders would also be protected. This issue is addressed by this 
thesis in two ways: via splitting the stock market into segments (see section 5.5.2) 
and secondly IIs can also play their role in this. Moreover, the example of 
multinational companies based in Pakistan can also serve the purpose, as 
multinational companies are more incline to adopt CG principles and they are 
earning profits more than any other company listed on KSE. 
Rais and Saeed101  examined Pakistan’s CCG 2002 from the perspective of 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) system and its authorisation and 
implementation in Pakistan with a specific end goal to understand the progress of 
community decision making and evaluate the viability of the regulation strategy 
of SECP in the enclosure of CG. Their investigation demonstrates that however 
the listed companies are outfitting themselves to embrace the CCG; there are a 
few requirements and objections regarding its drafting and application. They 
argue that the use of RIA has not been considered while formulating the CCG. 
However, SECP claims that all necessary requirements were fulfilled and required 
steps were followed in order to formulate a good CCG, but the opinion of 
stakeholders and listed companies rebut this stance of SECP. 
This observation is consistent with one of the objectives of this thesis; to assess 
and identify the weaknesses of CCG of Pakistan and explore the measures to 
improve them, as Pakistan’s CCG is not drafted in a proper way keeping in mind 
the key realities of Pakistani corporate culture but rather converged from foreign 
Codes (as discussed above). It is important to mention here that the objective is 
not to evaluate the RIA of CCG rather its substance, weak and overlapping 
provisions. 
Mir and Nishat102 and Shaheen and Nishat103 investigated rating of CG in view of 
yearly reports and survey information correspondingly for the year 2004 and 
                                                            
101 Rasul Rais and Asif Saeed, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment of SECP’s Corporate governance 
Code in Pakistan’ (2005) CMER Working Paper 06-39 LUMS <www.secp.gov.pk> accessed 20 
February 2015 
102 Mir Shahid and Mohammad Nishat, ‘Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Performance in 
Pakistan: An Empirical Study’ (2004) Paper presented at Annual Conference on Corporate 
Governance at LUMS 
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associate this administration score with company’s esteem. Every one of these 
studies arrives at the assumption that better governance practices expand the 
company’s esteem.  
The SECP, PICG and International Finance Corporation (IFC), conducted a 
survey identifying awareness with regards to CG for the year 2006. A significant 
expanding interest was noticed in examining the influence of CG on the stock 
market in Pakistan but several matters here remained unidentified. Specifically, 
company-level CG and its impact on the corporate ownership, corporate financing 
and corporate valuation are vital concerns around there which require inside and 
out investigation.  
2.4.3 Compliance and Enforcement of Corporate Laws 
This section analyses the studies focussing on the importance of the enforcement 
of corporate laws and CG principles which will also validate the significance of 
this research. The existent literature supports this researcher’s view that strong 
enforcement mechanisms are necessary in order to obtain the required results from 
corporate law and CCG. 
The idea of actual enforcement as opposed to simply the procurement of the law 
in books is not novel in theory.104 Enriques105 argues that, the application of law is 
imperative in a time of globalisation and competition where foreign investment 
has been expanded. This marvel identifies the significance for both local investors 
as well as to draw in foreign investors. Therefore, this research focuses on the role 
of the courts and capital market as enforcer of corporate laws.  
This researcher states that the general courts in Pakistan are the principal forum 
for the enforcement and protection of rights; but, they have neglected to solve 
                                                                                                                                                                  
103 Shaheen Rozina and Mohammad Nishat, ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An 
Exploratory Analysis’ (2005) Conference Paper LUMS 
<http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228628660_Corporate_Governance_and_Firm_Perform
ance-An_Exploratory_Analysis> accessed 20 February 2015 
104 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12 
105 Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence From Milan’ (2002) 3(4) 
European Business Organisation Law Review 756, 812 
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corporate issues by effectively implementing the corporate law. Consequently, it 
is required to reform the judiciary and improve its capacity for the proper 
enforcement of laws. Secondly, the capital market of a country assumes a viable 
part in the execution of corporate law, but sadly, Pakistan’s capital market could 
not succeed to carry out this obligation.  
A few steps were attempted by the state in this regard, for example the 
establishment of PICG with the collaboration of IFC in order to enhance the 
awareness regarding the advantages of CG principles (as discussed above); the 
steps were also taken to enhance the judicial capacity.106  Nonetheless they could 
not yield required results because of the personal stakes of individuals who did 
not appreciate even partial change.107 Hence, it is required to modify Pakistan’s 
capital market according to the business environment of the country.  
Berglof and Claessens108 argue that, in the initial stage of reform, the formulation 
of strong laws is essential regardless of the fact that there is a weak enforcement 
framework. The law in action can be guaranteed in the second stage of reform, by 
upgrading institutional aptitude. In this way, countries should enhance their 
enforcement frameworks for the purpose of making laws operative.109  
Hence, it is submitted that even the best laws in books without their effective 
implementation and enforcement mechanism cannot be productive. An effective 
machinery to implement the laws in true spirit is inevitable for the development of 
CG norms, the protection of shareholders’ interest and the company performance 
which ultimately leads to the improvement in the economy of country.  
                                                            
106 The initiatives taken to reform the judiciary in Pakistan are investigated in chapter five (see 
section 5.4). 
107 Such groups are identified above and also mentioned in chapter five (see section 5.3) 
108 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens, ‘Enforcement and Corporate Governance’ (2004) World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3409, 41 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625286> accessed 20-02-2015 
109 Robert Cooter, ‘Expressive Law and Economics’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 585, 606 
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Wymeersch110 wrote about the enforcement of CCG. He also argues that the 
implementation primarily happens through market structures, including by 
investors utilising their lawful and genuine rights inside the company. Likewise, 
LLSV111 argued that the security of shareholders is pertinent for the growth of a 
market and CG standards. They further highlighted that the enforcement 
framework can be improved and operative in the presence of good laws and vice 
versa. 
Ashraf and Ghani112 examined the inceptions, development and improvement of 
financial and disclosures practices in Pakistan and the elements that affected them. 
They archive that an absence of shareholders’ security, judicial inefficiency, and 
frail implementation frameworks are more basic variables in contrast to social 
components in clarifying the economic condition in Pakistan. They reason that the 
implementation framework is foremost in enhancing the nature of economic 
conditions in emerging countries.  
Haris113 wrote about the development of CG in Pakistan. He also declared the 
FOEs as an important factor responsible for the unsuccessful implementation of 
CCG. He put the responsibility of Pakistan’s weak CG mechanism on inactive and 
irresponsible financial press as well.  
Moving further, Simon114 asserts that there are three key advantages of a CCG 
versus mandatory approach to regulate CG: knowledge dissemination, flexibility 
of corporate practice and transparency. This is a descriptive study shedding light 
on the pros and cons of developing and implementing CCG. He asserts that 
voluntary CCG have been employed increasingly across the globe to derive CG 
                                                            
110 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘Corporate Governance Code and their Implementation’ (2006) Working 
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reforms. However, the challenge lies in ensuring their effective implementation 
and enforcement.  
Notwithstanding, this researcher submits that it is not the voluntary or mandatory 
nature of laws that matter it is the effective implementation and enforcement that 
matters. Moreover, the nature of law whether it should be hard law or soft law 
also depends upon other factors; such as in Pakistan voluntary provision of law 
cannot work effectively, at least, in current scenario when the corporate sector is 
in transition stage. Therefore, this thesis advocates that the CCG formulated with 
the combination of both voluntary and mandatory provisions will make them 
more effective for the corporate market of Pakistan.115 The hard law approach can 
also curb the criminal intent which leads to corporate failure as proclaimed by 
Faryal and Kamran (mentioned above). 
2.4.4 Role of Board of Directors (BODs) in Promoting CG Best Practices 
This section provides the literature review regarding the significance of effective 
BODs, followed by variables which make the boards effective such as, size, 
composition, diversity and independence of BODs. As one of the objectives of 
this thesis is to formulate a board effectiveness model for the listed companies of 
Pakistan, the prior studies discussed and analysed in this section validate the 
significance of the objective of this thesis in a way that this topic is worth 
investigating with reference to Pakistan. 
The BODs is the uppermost body of a company that is in charge of dealing with 
company and its procedure. It assumes key part in policy decisions concerning 
financial blend. Pfeffer and Salancik116 locate a critical association between size 
of BODs and capital framework. The proof with respect to bearing of connection 
between size of BODs and capital framework is diverse. Berger et al.117 discover 
                                                            
115 The detail discussion and arguments regarding hard law and soft law are provided in chapter 
five (see section 5.3 sub section IIs) 
116 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, The External Control of Organisations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective (Harper and Row 1978) 16 
117 Allen Berger et al., ‘Executive Board Composition and Bank Risk Taking’ (2012) 38 
<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/56024/1/688561233.pdf accessed 20 December 2015>; 
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that companies having large BODs for the most part have poor outfitting levels. 
They contend that large BODs apply weight on managers to take after poorer 
outfitting levels and improve company’s performance. However, this thesis takes 
the stance that smaller BODs are better and more effective than larger BODs (see 
section 6.3). 
Abor118 examines the association in the middle of CG and capital framework 
choices of Ghanaian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) by utilising 
multivariate relapse investigation. His outcomes give proof about adverse 
connection between size of BODs and influence proportions and SMEs with large 
BODs for the most part have poor level of equipping.  
Then again, Wen et al.,119 identify an affirmative association between BODs size 
and capital edifice of a company. They content that extensive size of BODs take 
after a strategy of more elevated amounts of adapting to upgrade company’s 
esteem particularly when these are settled because of more prominent checking by 
regulatory authorities. They likewise contended that large BODs may face trouble 
in landing at an agreement in decision-making which can eventually influence the 
nature of CG and will convert into higher financial influence levels.  
Jensen120 asserts that, companies with high adapting level have large BODs. 
Anderson et al.,121 identify that the expense of obligation is by and large lower for 
large BODs in light of the fact that banks believe that these companies are being 
controlled all the more viably by an expanded arrangement of specialists. So debt 
financing turns into a cost effective decision. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Allen Berger and Loretta Mester, ‘Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the 
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Much empirical research has been carried out on the composition of BODs and its 
impact on company performance. The existence of NEDs on BODs of a company 
signals to the business sector that company is being checked proficiently so loan 
specialists consider the company more credit commendable. Resultantly, this 
makes it less demanding for the company to promote long haul reserves through 
debt financing. It is speculated that higher representation of NEDs on BODs 
prompts higher adapting levels. The structure of BODs speaks to the extent of 
NEDs on BODs and is computed as the quantity of NEDs separated by aggregate 
number of executives.122 
Zulfiqar and Safdar123 conducted a study to examine the effect of the nature of 
CG, as determined by a uniquely built CG record, on the normal expense of equity 
figured utilising the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). An aggregate of 114 
listed companies were inspected to examine the link between two attributes for the 
period 2003 to 2007. They utilised expressive measurements, a relationship 
network, a basic ordinary least squares (OLS), and settled impact model to 
examine the board information gathered. They discovered an inverse connexion 
between the size of BODs and managerial ownership with the expense of value, 
and an affirmative connexion between independence of BODs, audit committee 
autonomy, and CG with the expense of equity. These outcomes could be because 
of the move stage under which the corporate sector of Pakistan is passing through 
after the declaration of the CCG in 2002.  
Conversely, Sunday-O124 directed a research on CG and the performance of 
companies utilising twenty listed companies of Nigeria somewhere around 2000 
and 2006. Utilising panel methodology as a strategy for assessment, the outcomes 
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were diverse; CEO dichotomy and size of BODs were critical however 
composition of BODs and audit committee were irrelevant. 
Azeem et al.,125 tried to find CG scores figured by receiving a record from prior 
studies. Their study highlighted that BODs and audit committees are not as free as 
a decent CG society would request or expect. One purpose behind this could be 
that the data are tilted in the direction of turning area, in which the number of 
FOEs is higher. Another explanation behind this situation is the non-appearance 
of an unmistakable meaning of INEDs in Pakistan. Companies are motivated to 
mark all NEDs as free voluntarily.  
This researcher believes that there is a prompt requirement for CCG to think of an 
exact and enforceable meaning of INEDs, and for controllers to guarantee that it is 
legitimately taken after. With the rise of genuinely autonomous directors, who act 
not for a specific stakeholder but rather for the combined benefits of all 
stakeholders, companies will turn out to be more transparent in their verdicts. 
Resultantly, this ought to prompt better CG and more prominent investor trust in 
listed companies.126  
Furthermore, Gill et al.,127 find that one of the governance mechanisms, being 
increased reporting or disclosure, has a positive relationship with improved 
company performance. A central CG question is whether and to what extent, does 
the BODs matter in the governance or directing and controlling of the company. 
Qiu and Largay128 find an affirmative association between the activities of BODs 
and company’s upgraded esteem. 
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However, Arshad and Safdar129 explored the relationship between CG and capital 
framework of listed companies in Pakistan. Their research covers the period 2002 
to 2005 for which company level information for 58 haphazardly chose non-
financial listed companies from KSE. Consequences of their study uncover that 
the size of BODs and managerial shareholding is contrarily associated with 
obligation to equity proportion. Though, corporate financing behaviour is not 
discovered essentially affected by CEO duality and the existence of NEDs on the 
BODs. In this manner, outcomes propose that CG variables like ownership 
structure, size and administrative shareholding assume an essential part in the 
investigation of the financial blend of companies. 
Moving further, the relationship between the presence of NEDs and capital 
framework has been investigated. Pfeffer and Salancik130 accentuate that NEDs 
assumes a significant part in improving the ability of a company to obtain 
acknowledgment from outside stakeholders. This prompts decrease in instability 
about the company and improves the capacity of the company to raise reserves. 
They find that a larger representation of NEDs on BODs prompts higher 
performance levels.  
Jensen131 and Berger132 identify that companies with better performing levels have 
generally more NEDs while companies with less number of NEDs practice less 
influence. Abor133 additionally give proof about the existence of a positive 
association among adapting levels and CEO duality, composition and skills of 
BODs.  
Then again academics such as Wen et al.,134 provide proof about the presence of a 
fundamentally adverse link between financial position of a company and presence 
of NEDs on BODs. The probable cause is that NEDs monitor the administrators 
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for all the more proficiently and successfully so directors are compelled to look 
for lower intending levels for getting prevalent outcomes. Thus companies having 
BODs dominated by NEDs are sure to take after low financial influence with a 
high market estimation of equity. It is normal that restricting the size of BODs is 
to increase company performance in the light of the fact that the advantages of 
large BODs results into expanded monitoring by the weak correspondence and 
decision-making of bigger groups.135  
The study by Yermack136 gives an opposite connection between the size of BODs, 
cost-effectiveness and resource use. Anderson et al.,137 arrives at an inference that 
the cost of debt is lesser for large BODs, on the grounds that creditors trust these 
companies are having more viable controllers of their financial accounting 
procedures. Brown and Caylor138 identify those companies with sizes BODs of 
anywhere about six and fifteen have greater returns for value and greater net profit 
margins than companies with other sizes of BODs. 
The connection between the extent of external directors, an intermediary for 
impartiality of BODs, and company performance is uncertain. Weisbach139 and 
Bhagat and Black140 discover no connection between the extent of external 
directors and different performance procedures. However, Baysinger and Butler141 
and Rosenstein and Wyatt142 demonstrate that the business sector appreciates 
companies for employing external directors.  
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Brickley et al.,143 locate a constructive connection between the extent of external 
directors and the business sector response to ‘poison pill’ implementations. 
Anderson et al.,144 demonstrate that the expense of obligation is conversely 
identified with the autonomy of BODs. The researches that utilise financial 
statement information discover no relationship between the independence of 
BODs and company’s performance, whereas those utilising stock profits data or 
bond yield data locate an affirmative connection.145  
Brown and Caylor146 do not find any growth in the autonomy of BODs, yet they 
do find that companies with autonomous BODs have greater return limitations, 
greater returns on equity, higher stock trading, higher dividend yields and 
proposing that independence of BODs is connected with other essential ways of 
firm performance. 
The outcomes of existing studies (both theoretical and empirical) discussed in this 
section show the differing opinions regarding the size, composition and 
independence of BODs. However, these studies confirm that these variables have 
considerable impact on the effectiveness of BODs. Therefore, this section approve 
that the variables (size, composition and independence of BODs) selected in this 
thesis to examine the effectiveness of BODs and formulating the board 
effectiveness model for Pakistani listed companies is purely valid; apart from the 
discussion that whether larger or smaller BODs are more effective, more 
independent or less independent BODs are more effective; the BODs with more 
executive or more NEDs are more effective which has been analysed and 
concluded with valid arguments in chapter six (see sections 6.3 to 6.5) 
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2.4.5 The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance 
This section reviews the literature on IIs, their increasing importance and role in 
the contemporary corporate world. As it is one of the objectives of this thesis to 
explore the role of IIs in promoting CG practices in Pakistan,147 the literature 
review of this section establishes the worth of this objective and validates the 
reasoning of this study for investigating this topic. 
Chris Mallin148 claims that IIs are associations who collect money from people 
and companies. They put money as significant players in the stock market 
utilising proficient administration and work inside the limitations set by their own 
rules and contractual obligations and in addition tax and legitimate 
contemplations. Their objective is to boost the profits on investments and reduce 
the probability of risk appended to the shares of individual companies. 
Dhaliwal Spinder149 claims that, keeping in mind the end goal to draw in more 
finances and grow existing ones IIs have to make investments which will not be 
negative to their reputation of being harmless and trustworthy. Thus they have a 
tendency to abstain from putting resources in small companies and new projects. 
They additionally tend to restrain the most extreme size of any holding in light of 
the fact that the bigger size the more troublesome it is to discard the shares 
notwithstanding poor performance. Their technique is by and large to investigate 
the past performance of companies and to put resources into large, steady, 
effective and successful companies. 
Mike Strivens150 conducted a study on the influence of institutional shareholding 
in CG of the UK companies’. He finds that institutional shareholding is estimated 
as percentage of shares seized by institutions (institutional investors (IIs)) as 
disclosed in annual financial reports. The existence of institutional shareholding in 
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a company leads it to collect long haul money at a valuable cost.  In any case, 
institutional shareholders themselves go about as a wellspring of long haul debt as 
they are willing to give debt to a company over whose BODs they have an impact.  
Furthermore, IIs serve as a powerful monitoring gadget over the company’s policy 
decisions. They cut down company’s agency expenses furthermore lessen 
administrative advantage. This offers certainty to the overall population and 
different loan specialists; bringing about ideal terms of getting for the company. It 
is in this manner estimated that companies with higher institutional shareholding 
are liable to have a higher debt to equity proportion.151  
Contemporary studies on CG additionally give careful consideration to the matter 
of investors’ character. It focuses on that the target capacities and the expense of 
practicing control over directors change considerably for distinctive sorts of 
owners. The repercussion is that it makes a difference not the amount of value a 
shareholder claims, but rather additionally the identity of shareholder; whether a 
family, a private individual, labourer, director, money foreign enterprise or 
financial institution.152 
The potential influence of large shareholders in the UK was recognised by Berle 
and Means in the 1930s, when they highlighted the departure of ownership and 
control of the companies, because of the fact that the managers were having all 
controlling authorities.153 This partition prompts the issue connected with agency 
theory. However, all through the 20th century, the ownership arrangement kept on 
changing and the individual ownership weakened and institutional share 
ownership expanded.154  
After Berle and Means, Prais155 firstly attracted attention, regarding the part of IIs 
in the advancement of large companies in the UK. The ramifications of the growth 
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of these mediators are that their possession of the larger part of UK normal stocks 
prompted an apprehension of convergence of economic control over industry. The 
others also shared this apprehension. The then Governor of the Bank of 
England156 noticed the developing convergence of stocks in the influences of the 
IIs. 
Briston and Dobbins157 had already acknowledged the development of IIs and 
investigated their imaginable effect upon the Stock Exchange, investors and 
corporate controlling. They evidenced that institutional shareholdings grow with 
time in all types of company.158 Rutterford159 expressed that their existence was 
presently so conspicuous that each aspect of investment is influenced by their 
presence. Their investment procedures, policies and performance have expansive 
outcomes.  
In 1980 the Wilson Report160 was established to examine the role of IIs in the UK. 
The report identified the primary issues raised by the IIs. The fundamental focuses 
were: the absence of accountability of IIs; their investment techniques and 
policies (British industry and accordingly the economy all in all was enduring in 
light of the fact that IIs were contributing wholes abroad); new and small 
companies were being famished of method of finance as IIs favoured putting 
resources into huge, well-settled companies; they were likewise blamed for short-
termism administering to their benefits with a specific end goal to go after custom.  
This issue was also highlighted later by Spinder161 in 1992 (as discussed above), 
that IIs avoid investing in small and new ventures and prefer to make investments 
in large well-settled companies. Spinder further identify the reason of this act or 
strategy of IIs that, purpose of IIs’ investment is to maximise the profits of their 
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clients’ money, that’s why they invest in well-established and large companies on 
one hand; and in the company who’s BODs can be influenced by them on the 
other hand. Resultantly they are blamed for doing short-term investments.  
The Wilson Report162 did start a reaction and a few studies took after either 
supporting the conduct of them or censuring it. Similarly, IIs’ risk unwilling 
investment techniques prompt smaller and new companies not being financially 
solid ventures, assumed the way of IIs’ obligations. The IIs own extensive parts of 
value in numerous companies over the world, and the key pretended by them in 
CG cannot be thought little of.  
The Wilson Report criticised the workings of IIs in four ways: the absence of 
accountability of IIs to strategy makers; the foreign investment of their assets; 
their act of not investing in new and small companies and; their short-term 
investment strategies. The Wilson Report was a big critique to IIs. However, it 
failed to provide rationale behind such activities of IIs. As it is logical and 
justified for IIs to have diversified portfolios and if foreign countries provide them 
higher returns with lower risks then they have rationale to invest overseas. As far 
as new and smaller companies are concerned, the transaction cost involved in 
these shares might not be sustainable for them.163  
Furthermore, Cosh et al.164 analysed various issues worried with the connection 
between IIs’ responsibility for the UK company securities and the financial 
performance of companies. One of the findings was that, no deliberate proof was 
found about the capacity and eagerness of IIs to apply impact over the strategy 
and approach of a company; in spite of the fact that the study noticed they were 
not as idle as by and large depicted.  
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Similarly, Mallin165 has also written substantially on the importance of IIs, their 
role and responsibilities, stewardship code and its effectiveness, and about the 
international CG norms. She also wrote about IIs and their Voting Practices: an 
International Comparison; and the role of IIs in CG.  
Wilson Report,166 Briston and Dobbins,167 also investigated numerous issues 
addressing the link between the activism of IIs and the performance of the UK 
companies. They found a considerable improvement in companies’ performance 
and strategies where institutional shareholders took part actively in the 
companies’ matters and highlighted and criticised the mal-practices of managers. 
They use the strategy of exit if company management does not recognise their 
voice.  
However, the Myners Report168 highlighted that there is, indeed, need for more 
activism by IIs as they had traditionally been too passive and tolerant of poor 
performance. Simon Wong169 wrote about the development and implementation of 
CCG and the UK stewardship code for IIs; he pointed out the efforts to convince 
IIs to be active stewards and the reasons why they have not been so.  
Moving further, the study by Lehmann and Weigand170 found that the presence of 
IIs owning the large portion of shares of traded companies expands corporate 
performance. Hart171 argues that IIs can attain adequate advantages from the 
                                                            
165 Ibid (n 154) 104; Christine Mallin, ‘Institutional and Other Shareholders’ in Kent Baker and 
Ronald Anderson (ed), Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research and Practice 
(Wiley Publications 2010) “See generally”; Christine Mallin, ‘Institutional Investors: the Vote as a 
Tool of Governance’ (2012) 16 Journal of Management and Governance 177 
166 Ibid (n 160) 
167 Ibid (n 157) 
168 Myners’ Report, Myners Report on Institutional Investment (HM Treasury London 2001) “See 
generally” 
169 Simon Wong, ‘The UK Stewardship Code: A Mixed Opportunity for Higher Standards’ (2010) 
Responsible Investors <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640897> accessed 10 March 2015; Simon 
Wong, ‘Developing and Implementing Corporate Governance Codes’ (2008) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321127> accessed 10 March 2015 
170 Erik Lehman and Jurgen Weigand, ‘Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? 
Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany’ (2000) 4 European Finance 
Review 157 
171 Oliver Hart, ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications’ (1995) 105 The 
Economic Journal 678; Sanford et al., ‘Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem and the theory of 
the Corporation’ (1980) 11(1) The Bell Journal of Economics 42 
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investee company because of having a motivation to supervise because of vast 
shareholdings possessed by them, as compared to minority shareholders.  
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny172 (as discussed above) assert that, large 
shareholders have more noteworthy motivation to monitor the performance of 
investee companies when contrasted with the members of the BODs in the light of 
the fact that the members of BODs have no substantial investments in the 
company. However, this view is not right in case of Pakistan, where individuals 
from the BODs have more noteworthy stakes in the company being the owners 
either directly or indirectly. 
In the same line, McConnel and Servaes173 highlighted that the pioneering 
conduct of managers can be controlled by IIs as they have the ability to compel 
them to focus more on the application of CG norms. Likewise, Chung et al,174 
argue that the large shareholdings owned by institutional shareholders, act as a 
warning for the managers in following astute objectives.  
Moreover, Myners175 and Cheffins176contend that the essential purpose behind the 
ascent of institutional share ownership in the UK is tax benefits for institutions. 
For instance, pension funds are excluded from the capital gain tax and 
commitments to such finances by their recipients are made out of pre-tax wage. 
Paul177 confirms that the increment in private retirement funds, as insurance and 
pension schemes, is another cause enhancing the development of institutional 
investment in the UK. 
                                                            
172 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94(3) 
Journal of Political Economy 461, 462 
173 John McConnell and Henry Servaes, ‘Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate 
Value’ (1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 595, 597 
174 Richard Chung et al., ‘Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earnings Management’ 
(2002) 8(1) Journal of Corporate Finance 29 
175 Paul Myners, ‘Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review’ (London 2001) 27 
176 Brian Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 346 
177 Paul Davies, ‘Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom’ in Daniel Prentice and Peter 
Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press New York 1993) 
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Hobson178 and Clark179 contend that the aggregate investment through institutions 
likewise permits people to increase their venture ultimately amongst a much more 
extensive scope of companies, in this manner decreasing their disclosure to the 
danger of a debacle from any such company breakdown and people might declare 
that IIs are more skilled in choosing the better suitable companies for their 
investments. 
Moreover, McCahery et al.180 find that, CG is of importance to institutional 
shareholders in their investment decisions and a number of them are willing to 
engage in shareholder activism. According to Demb and Neubauer,181 over the 
last five years or so there has been increasing pressure from government, ultimate 
beneficiaries, and various stakeholders on IIs to engage with their investee 
companies. Gompers et al.,182 show that companies with more grounded 
shareholder rights good reputation, higher benefits, higher increase in sales, most 
reduced capital consumptions and made less corporate acquisitions. 
In addition, the discoveries of LLSV,183 demonstrate that powerless shareholder 
insurance restricts abundance to outside fund. Shleifer and Wolfenzon184 contend 
that providing improved disclosure and transparency of data to the investors, and 
the requirement of laws that ensure shareholders’ rights, diminish the expenses of 
outside fund.  
                                                            
178 Dominic Hobson, The National Wealth: Who Gets What in Britain (HarperCollins 1998) 1035 
179 Robert Charles Clark, ‘The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management 
Treaties’ (1981) 94(3) Harvard Law Review 561 
180 Joseph McCahery et al., ‘Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of 
Institutional Investors’ (2010) Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 010/2010 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576041> accessed 1 December 2015; Joseph McCahery et al., ‘Behind 
the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors’ (2015) 1 
<http://abfer.org/docs/2015/program-2/behind-the-scenes-the-corporate-governance-preferences-
of-institutional-investors.pdf> accessed 01 January 2016 
181 Ada Demb and Friedrich Neubauer, The corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes (Oxford 
University Press 1992) 193 
182 Ibid (n 73) 108 
183 LLSV, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57(3) The Journal of Finance 
1147, 1150 
184 Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Wolfenzon, ‘Investor Protection and Equity Markets’ (2002) 66 
Journal of Financial Economics 3 
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Perotti and Volpin185 give prove that better shareholder security not just support 
rivalry and passage into the advanced economic framework, it is likewise good for 
the politically responsible states and IIs have capacity to exert pressure on 
companies to achieve these objectives. Further, they also recommend that 
enhancing formal shareholder security rules whereas disregarding its 
implementation might not enhance profits.186  
Specifically, shareholders can appoint directors as a response to the company 
performance, but likewise the performance of the company may also be in 
response to the appointment and/or contribution of an experienced director. Both 
the variables of company performance and director experience may impact upon 
each other. Consequently much of the research in governance yields conclusions 
that refer to ‘associations’ between governance factors and performance, as 
opposed to attributing causality.187 
In 2011, OECD188 published a report on the role of IIs in promoting good CG. 
The Report conducted the in-depth investigation of the role of IIs in promoting 
good CG in three countries: Australia, Chile and Germany. The Report asserts that 
the OECD Principles of CG are developed on an assumption that shareholders can 
safeguard their interests in much better way if they have right and proper access to 
information. The Report acknowledged the importance and impact of IIs by 
concluding that the increased existence of IIs in the last decade has raised this 
expectation that a new community of highly skilled, experienced, well-resourced 
professional shareholders will protect their rights in more efficient way and 
promote CG principles in their investee companies.  
                                                            
185 Enrico Perotti and Paolo Volpin, ‘The Politics of Investor Protection and Competition’ (2012) 
<http://faculty.london.edu/pvolpin/lobbying.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015  
186 As discussed in section 2.4.3. It also justifies the importance of strong enforcement mechanisms 
this thesis seeks to investigate in Pakistan. 
187 Ibid (n 185)  
188 Corporate Governance, ‘The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate 
Governance’ (OECD 2011) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf> accessed 20 June 2015 
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This researcher submits that, although some studies (analysed above)189 criticise 
IIs for their policies and short-term investment strategies; a large number of 
studies (both theoretical and empirical) acknowledge their importance and 
conclude that IIs have much potential owning large portion of shareholdings to 
improve companies’ performance. They can monitor and influence the activities 
and policies of BODs, can exert pressure on management for the better 
compliance of CCG, the appointment of experienced and independent directors, 
protect shareholders’ interests; and by doing all this can help in increasing 
companies’ performance.  
They use the strategy of exit (as discussed above) if company management does 
not recognise their voice, which is highly useful strategy as management would 
not prefer to lose a large portion of shareholding of their ventures.190 The analysis 
of these studies confirm the importance of IIs in today’s corporate world and 
therefore establish the significance of the objective of this research; that is to 
explore the part of IIs in promoting CG in Pakistan. 
Shleifer and Vishny191 assert that, although a great part of the current literature 
depends on the working of the companies of advanced jurisdictions, and 
consequently postulates a more extensive dispersion in ownership structure in 
contrast to transitioning economies. Such as in Pakistan where substantial 
shareholdings are basic as concentrated ownership, it is contended that large 
investors’ motivating force and capacity to obtain data and to monitor 
administration decrease agency costs. 
Mahmood and Sharif192 conducted a study to explore the institutional ownership 
design in Pakistan for both the government-owned and privately owned 
institutions, using data from haphazardly selected companies listed on KSE. This 
                                                            
189 For example, the Wilson Report (n 160), Briston and Dobbins (n 157) 
190  Alessio Pacces, ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Shareholder Activism in 
Corporate Governance’ (2015) 1 <http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-
economics-studies/20151105_pacces_shl_activism.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015 
191 Ibid (172) 461 
192 Shahnawaz Mahmood and Haroon Sharif, ‘Institutional Shareholders and their Role in 
Promotion of corporate Governance in Pakistan’ Working Paper 
<www.secp.gov.pk/IACCD/pub_iaccd/WORKING%20PAPERS.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015 
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was a pioneering research work in this direction in Pakistan. They specifically 
investigated the role of institutional shareholders in the promotion of CG and 
attempted to investigate the part of IIs activism for two specific viewpoints: 
selection of NEDs and external auditors.  
They further investigated the role of nominee directors on the board. They found 
that financial institutions are block-holders in Pakistan. They found that 45% of 
companies have possessions more prominent than 20%. In this manner a lot is on 
the line and motivating forces for shareholder activism are available. Likewise 
candidate executives of these block holders are available on 60% of test 
companies’ BODs. In spite of the fact that the legal environment in Pakistan is not 
prospering the business sector for corporate control specifically for non-banking 
financial sector, proxy voting is permitted and there is no limitation on 
harmonisation among institutions.  
The criticism on this study is that it was conducted in the year 2001 therefore the 
situation in 2001 and today is quite different; secondly they (Mahmood and 
Sharif) used sample of non-financial privately owned companies; however this 
thesis seeks to explore the role of IIs for public listed companies. 
Notwithstanding, the difference of public or private companies does not matter as 
much; because the sole intention of this thesis to explore ways to improve CG 
practices in Pakistan.  
The major criticism on their study is that they did not answer the actual question 
they posed for their research. As the aim of their research was to examine the part 
of IIs in relation to the appointment of NEDs and external auditors; they did not 
provide answer any of these. They provided the reason that they could not explore 
the activism of IIs due to the lack of complete data and improper way of recording 
the minutes of Annual General Meeting (AGM) proceedings.  
However, they highlighted some significant points; for example, they find that 
45% of companies have holding greater than 25%, therefore motivation and scope 
exists for the activism of shareholders; however the laws of Pakistan put 
limitations on institutional shareholding and therefore do not support IIs.  This is 
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an evidence of stance of the researcher of this thesis that the corporate laws of 
Pakistan are weak and unsupportive and require reforms. Secondly, their study 
also declares FOEs as a major reason for the limited appearance of IIs in Pakistani 
companies and the compliance with CCG.  
Syeda Saima193 conducted a study regarding the role of IIs activism in CG of 
Pakistan. She posed the aim of her article to explore the part of institutional 
shareholders’ involvement in improving CG standards in investee companies of 
Pakistan. However, she did not explain that how she will conduct her study, in 
which investee companies she will explore the role of IIs.  
Her study is based on the UK and the USA based literature and takes a stance that 
IIs can assume a major part in the CG of Pakistani companies only if they become 
active, as currently they are doing very less efforts in order to improve the CG 
environment in Pakistan mostly because of their inactive part and half way the 
non-efficacy of the CCG and corporate laws. But she does not provide any 
evidence for her statements. In the end, she highlighted that the corporate laws of 
Pakistan are weak which was not actual aim of her study; likewise she listed some 
recommendations for SECP to consider for the improvement of CG but again 
neither it was her objective nor she justified on what basis she is posing these 
recommendations. 
These were the only two studies this researcher could find mainly focussing on 
the role of IIs in CG of Pakistan. The analysis of these both studies confirms that 
there is a much room for this topic to explore further both theoretically and 
empirically. This thesis fills this gap by exploring the part of IIs in promoting CG 
principles in Pakistan theoretically in more strategic way instead of conducting 
empirically due to the methodological limitations provided in chapter three. The 
researcher submits that, though this thesis will fill this gap; however much room 
will still remain to be explored for future studies. 
                                                            
193 Syeda Shabbir, ‘The Role of Institutional Shareholders Activism in the Corporate Governance 
of Pakistan’ (2012) 1(2) Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 
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2.5 Gap in Literature: Addressed by this Thesis 
This section presents a brief discussion on the potential research gap relating to 
the importance of CG principles for the performance of companies; significance 
of strong enforcement mechanisms; effectiveness of BODs and; the part of IIs in 
CG. The existing literature on these issues is critically reviewed which yields 
significant findings beyond the existing theoretical perspectives and justifies and 
validates the aim and objectives of this thesis. The literature review conducted in 
this chapter confirms that these topics are worth investigating as they have 
considerable impact on the growth of CG of investee companies which leads to 
the growth in the economy of a country. The following paragraphs provide gaps in 
literature one by one relating to the each objective (research question) of this 
thesis. 
Firstly, a number of studies advocate the importance of CCG for the better 
performance of companies. However, very few studies are undertaken mainly 
focussing on Pakistan’s perspective, and talks about the weaknesses in the CCG 
of Pakistan. The difference between those studies and the first objective of this 
thesis is that, this thesis not only declares the provisions of CCG of Pakistan weak 
and overlapping with other corporate laws, rather it identifies those provisions and 
also formulates recommendations to improve them. Secondly, the prior studies 
only talks about the old version of CCG 2002, however this thesis first time 
analyses the provisions of current CCG 2012 of Pakistan. 
Secondly, the existing literature put emphasis on the issue of proper compliance, 
implementation and enforcement of CG principles, and corporate laws. The 
academics of CG consider the reforms in ‘law in action’ as important as ‘law in 
books’. A few studies particularly relating to Pakistan have also been conducted. 
However, those studies confirm that the enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan are 
weak and ineffective but do not provide the solutions and measures to improve 
implementation of CCG and enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan relating to CG 
principles.  
72 
 
Moreover, those studies identify a few factors such as, FOEs and SOEs 
responsible for the non-enforcement of CG in investee companies of Pakistan. 
However, this thesis not only identify a number of other factors which do not let 
the CG to grow in listed companies of Pakistan rather it provides detailed 
mechanisms of reform to take appropriate measures which can improve the 
compliance of CG principles, and the enforcement mechanism in Pakistan. 
Thirdly, a significant number of existing literatures confirms that the size, 
composition and independence of BODs are key factors which make BODs 
effective. Although the outcomes of those studies are relatively mix on the points 
whether larger or smaller boards are more effective; BODs with majority of 
executive or NEDs are more effective and; whether more independent BODs are 
more effective.  
However, there are only two studies available so far relating to Pakistan primarily 
focusing on the association between size of BODs and companies performance 
and the composition of BODs and companies performance conducted by Zulfiqar 
and Safdar, and Arshad and Safdar, which confirm that there is a considerable 
room of research in this area. This study fills this gap as it seeks to develop a 
board effectiveness model for Pakistani listed companies by investigating the 
variables; size, composition, diversity and independence of BODs. 
Lastly, the literature review conducted on the role and importance of IIs in their 
investee companies confirm that IIs can be instrumental as agents of change 
because of having large shareholdings and being professional and experienced 
investors. They can influence BODs of their investee companies and can make 
compliance with CCG better which may lead to the emergence of more 
accountable BODs to their shareholders and more transparent in their disclosure 
requirements.  
However, there are only two studies focussing on Pakistan exploring the role of 
institutional shareholders in CG of Pakistan, which confirms that this topic 
requires further research. This thesis fills this gap by exploring the role of IIs in 
promoting CG practices in their investee companies in Pakistan. This thesis 
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investigates that which incentives can make IIs active to work in Pakistani 
companies and; which can be the appropriate methods through which IIs can 
intervene in the policies and strategic decision-making of their investee 
companies.   
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the review of existing literature and the theoretical 
foundations of this study. The literature review is conducted relevant to the 
research aim and objectives of this study in the way of a comprehensive critical 
analysis on the significance of CCG, compliance with CG principles and strong 
enforcement mechanisms, effectiveness of BODs and finally the part of IIs in CG 
of their investee companies, with concentrating on published work, raising 
questions, identifying areas of controversy and potential research gaps. The 
current chapter additionally offers noteworthy visions regarding diverse theories 
of CG in favour or against this thesis. A detailed discussion on research design, 
research methods and methodology essential to conduct this research is provided 
in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presents the literature review which establishes the 
presence of a gap in existing literature and establishes the significance to 
conduct a dedicated study in the area of Corporate Governance (CG) in 
Pakistan particularly regarding the effectiveness of board of directors 
(BODs) and the role of institutional investors (IIs). After identifying the 
research gap and research questions, it is essential to define the 
methodological and philosophical approaches deployed in this study.  
The current chapter presents the epistemological grounds of this study and 
the rationale for a qualitative exploratory study using interpretative and 
descriptive approach on the enforcement mechanisms of CG, the role and 
effectiveness of BODs and the part of IIs in the corporate sector of Pakistan. 
Furthermore, it provides details of the data collection and data analysis 
methods used for this study, establish the trustworthiness of this thesis and 
justify the ethical considerations involved in this study. Figure 3.1 provides 
the plan of this chapter 
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                              Figure 3.1: Plan of this Chapter 
 
3.2 Research Methods and Methodology 
Research methods and methodology are frequently confused to be the same, 
though this is not true.1 McGregor and Murname2 explained the difference 
between these two terms in the following words: 
“The word methodology consists upon two words: method and ology, 
which implies a branch of knowledge; therefore, methodology is a 
branch of knowledge that deals with the common principles or 
maxims of new information. It alludes to the reasoning and the 
philosophical suppositions inherent to any natural, social or human 
science study, whether expressed or not.”  
Table 3.1 clarifies the distinction between research methods and research 
methodology. 
                                                            
1 Linda Smith, Decolonising Methodologies – Research and Indigenous People (2nd edition, Zed 
Books 2012) 12 
2 McGregor et al., ‘Paradigm, Methodology and Method: Intellectual Integrity in Consumer 
Scholarship’ (2010) 34(4) International Journal of Consumer Studies 419  
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         Table 3.1: Distinction between Research Methods and Methodologies3 
Research Methods Research Methodology 
 by which researchers carry 
out research into a particular 
subject. 
 Methods are tools by which 
researchers collect and 
analyse data for example, 
qualitative or quantitative, 
interviews, surveys, case 
studies, document analysis, 
content analysis etc. 
 It involves experiments, 
tests, surveys and the like 
 Its aim is finding solutions 
to research problems 
 For the current research 
study the research method is 
qualitative.4  
 describes the methods 
through which a researcher 
conduct his/her research 
 Methodology is the study of 
those methods. It is a 
philosophy of research, or a 
school of thought for 
example, positivism, 
interpretivism, 
phenomenology etc. 
 It involves numerous 
techniques to carry out 
research; for example, 
experiments, surveys and 
critical studies search 
 It aims at the employing the 
right procedures to reach at 
solutions 
 Methodology employed for 
this thesis is exploratory using 
interpretative and descriptive 
approaches. 
 
As a corollary, it can be submitted that research methods intend to find solutions 
to research problems. However, research methodologies intend to consider 
deploying accurate procedures to find out solutions. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that research methodology defines and provides the means for research 
methods to conduct study appropriately. Research methodology is the start while 
research methods are the end of any scientific or non-scientific research which 
leads towards findings or conclusions.5 
                                                            
3 Developed by the researcher 
4 Explanation is in following parts 
5 Ibid (n 2) 420 
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3.3 Research Design 
This section explains the basic elements of a research design and also provide the 
research design which this researcher is going to use for her study. The researcher 
believes that there are six basic aspects to design a qualitative socio-legal research 
study. Figure 3.2 shows those six stages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
                                 Figure 3.2: Research Design/Process Chart6 
 
First, the researcher needs to identify a particular topic on which s/he aims to 
conduct research.  
Secondly, to clearly define the dimensions of the research problem (as done in 
section 1.2.1), keeping in view that the problem area should not be too broad so 
that it becomes difficult for the researcher to unfold it within a specific time; 
neither should it be too specific and narrow that it cannot reach the level of 
doctoral work.  
                                                            
6 Developed by the researcher 
 
Identify the 
topic 
Define the 
research problem 
Determine how 
to conduct study 
Collect and 
analyse data 
Discuss and 
conclude 
Ethical 
considerations Research Design Stages 
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Thirdly, the researcher needs to decide the technique, most suitable to obtain the 
answer of research question inside of any limitations, for example, restricted 
access to data, ethical contemplations, etc. A researcher will consider whether a 
case-study method, surveys and interviews, participant observation, document 
analysis,7 or a mixture of these techniques is expected to answer the research 
question.  
Fourthly, the researcher will need to consider how to select her research subjects 
or document; and how many to select, in keeping with the data collection methods 
that she has chosen to adopt. Moreover, how the data is to be analysed; data 
analysis and the drawing of the conclusions and findings from the data are among 
the more contentious aspects of qualitative research. Will the researcher use a 
grounded theory method,8 content analysis,9 discourse analysis,10 thematic coding, 
historical or linguistic analysis, or statistical analysis?  
Lastly, the researcher will need to conclude and provide the outcomes of the 
research and lastly ethical contemplations should be of primary concern for the 
researcher. 
3.3.1 Research Design Employed For This Study 
Figure 3.3 shows and explains the research design which is employed in this 
research. The research method adopted for this study is qualitative; however the 
methodology employed is exploratory. The philosophical stance of this study is 
interpretative, and descriptive which has been used to interpret CG rules, 
regulations and procedures; as this study is socio-legal study and combines both 
research methods.   
                                                            
7 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (transl. Peter Putnam, Manchester University Press 1992) 91 
8 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (Aldine 2012) 15 
9 Martin Bauer, ‘Classical Content Analysis: A Review’ in Martin Bauer et al  (eds), Qualitative 
Research with Text, Image and Sound A Practical Handbook (Sage Publications 2000) 132 
10 Rosalind Gill, ‘Discourse Analysis’ in Martin Bauer et al (eds), Qualitative Researching with 
Text, Image and Sound A Practical Handbook (Sage Publications 2000) 172 
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Furthermore, exploratory philosophy is used to explore the authorities’ intention 
behind the legislation and to explore the solutions of identified problems in this 
study. Lastly, the descriptive philosophy is used to describe the current position of 
the working of BODs and IIs in Pakistan, in order to establish the worth and 
originality of this research.  
The research approach employed in this thesis is inductive. The deductive 
approach is rejected. The first reason for employing inductive approach and 
rejecting deductive approach is that; the qualitative studies mostly rely on 
inductive reasoning however; quantitative studies are associated with deductive 
reasoning.11 As the study conducted for this thesis is qualitative, the inductive 
approach is more suitable for this study.  
Secondly, the deductive approach works on a general hypothesis made before data 
collection; while the studies adopting inductive approach seeks to derive study 
patterns and general themes from the data collected as the research progress. And 
this thesis in current form is derived from the data collected time-to-time with the 
progress of research, it has to be changed many times based on studies and 
moulded in its current form. Therefore, the inductive reasoning best describes the 
procedures followed in this thesis.  
Data has been collected by using both primary and secondary sources. The 
detailed explanation of this research design is provided in part 3.5 of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert 
Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press 2010) 
38 
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                    Figure 3.3: Research Design Deployed for this Study12 
 
3.4 Research Approaches Commonly Used in Socio-Legal Research 
This section provides a general discussion regarding the research methods and 
methodologies which are usually adopted for a socio-legal study. It is important to 
discuss them here so that the reader can understand the process employed in 
choosing a particular method and methodology most appropriate for this 
contemporary research work. 
Legal research is the process of obtaining information necessary to support legal 
decision-making.13 Broadly speaking, legal research originates with an analysis of 
the realities of a problem and concludes with finding the results of investigation.14 
As is done in this research by analysing and investigating the problems of 
corporate failures in Pakistan and the findings of this study provide measures to 
improve corporate governance (CG) of Pakistan which will reduce these failures. 
Socio-legal studies cannot consider methods only without knowing the usage of 
                                                            
12 Developed by the researcher 
13 Ibid (n 11) 39 
14 Ibid (n 11) 39 
Research Design employed for this study 
Interpretive philosophy is used to interpret and understand the intention of CG rules, regulations and 
procedures 
Exploratory philosophy is used to explore authorities’ intention behind legislation and to explore the 
solutions of identified problems 
Descriptive philosophy is used to describe the current laws and the working of procedures, BODs and 
institutional investors in Pakistan, in order to establish the worth and originality of this research. 
Data is collected through the combination of primary and secondary sources 
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those methods in diverse theoretical backgrounds, which means that theory and 
method are inextricably inter-linked.15 All research studies depend on a specific 
vision of the world utilise a methodological approach and suggest outcomes went 
for predicting, analysing and explaining, describing or exploring.16 The following 
figure shows these stages. 
 
 
 
                             Figure 3.4: Showing Research Stages17 
These stages have been used in this study in descending order. Table 3.2 shows 
that how these stages are applied in this research. 
                        Table 3.2: Research Design Phases and Stages18 
Research Design Stages Explore Describe Analyse/
Explain 
Predict 
Identify topic Yes Yes   
Define research problem  Yes   
Determine how to conduct study  Yes   
Collect data   Yes  
Analyse data   Yes  
Discuss and conclude   Yes Yes 
 
There is no consensus as to the definition of socio legal studies. Thomas19 defines 
it as: ‘socio in socio legal does not refer to sociology or social sciences, but 
represents a line with a background within which law exists’. Campbell and 
                                                            
15 Peter Cane and Herbert Krtizer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford 
University Press 2010) “See generally” 
16 Raymond – Alain Thietart et al., Doing Management Research: A Comprehensive Guide (Sage 
Publications 2001) 19 
17 Developed by the researcher 
18 Developed by the researcher 
19 Phil Thomas and Wheeler, Socio legal studies (Hart Publishers 2000) 267 
  Predict Analyse/ Explain Describe Explore 
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Wiles20 differentiated the socio legal work from the work relates to sociology of 
law.  
Empirical research in law is the norm.21 Reading cases and statutes and ascribing 
(legal) meaning to these texts, to attempt to discover ‘what is the law’ is actually a 
form of qualitative research, using documents to ascribe meaning given a shared 
code of understanding about what different words mean.22 This is exactly what is 
done in this study. The researcher has analysed CG rules and regulations of 
Pakistan to understand the meanings of their provisions, to get the intention of 
legislature and to examine the affect/implementation of CCG in the listed 
companies of Pakistan. 
Socio-legal research in law is less usual.23 It goes beyond legal documents, to 
analyse the law through different media. It may consider context and structure. It 
considers ‘law’ widely defined, and in situ, using social-science techniques (the 
socio) as well as legal techniques (the legal).24 As this study is not purely legal, it 
contains some legal elements as well as some business, commercial and social 
elements. Therefore, socio-legal method is more suitable for this study. 
Broadly, there are three types of research methods; qualitative (which emphasise 
on developing theory and generating knowledge), quantitative (which emphasise 
on testing theory and hypothesis) and mixed method (which tends to unite both 
research methods).25  
Qualitative methods are different from that of quantitative, such as: a ‘qualitative 
research’ recognises the existence or non-existence of something; however 
‘quantitative research’, deals with calculating the degree to which some elements 
                                                            
20 Collin Campbell and Paul Wiles, law and Society (Barnes and Noble Imports 1979) 2 
21 Ibid (n 15) 
22 Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What Do People Think About Going To Law? (Hart Publishing 
1999) 67 
23 John Flood, ‘Chapter 2 Socio-Legal Anthropology’ in Reza Banakar and Ma x Travers (eds), 
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005) 33 
24 Ibid  
25 John Creswell, Research design Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (4th 
edition Sage Publications 2014) 155 
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exist.26 Thus, qualitative investigation does not deal with statistical quantification, 
however endeavours to obtain and categorise social phenomenon and their 
meanings.27  
In epistemological28 terms, quantitative research is often associated with 
positivism (objectivist, scientific, traditional, explanatory and deductive), while 
qualitative research tends to be rooted in phenomenology (subjectivist, 
humanistic, interpretative, exploratory, descriptive and inductive), however mixed 
method is associated with pragmatism.29 Some authors argue that descriptive 
approach also comes under quantitative research.30  
The following diagram shows almost all available choices of research methods 
and methodology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
26 Jerome Kirk and Marc Miller, Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research (Sage 
Publications 1986) 20 
27 Ibid (n 9) 140 
28 Epistemology is one’s understanding of the nature of knowledge 
29 Gary King et al., Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 
(Princeton University Press 1994) 3 
30 Herbert Kritzer, ‘The Data Puzzle: The Nature of Interpretation in Quantitative Research’ 
(1996) 40(1) American Journal of Political Science 1; Herbert Kritzer, ‘Conclusion: “Research is a 
Messy Business” An Archaeology of the Craft of socio-Legal Research’ in Simon Halliday and 
Patrick Schmidt (eds), Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections on Methods and 
Practices (Cambridge University Press 2009) 264 
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                        Figure 3.5: Choices Available in Research Methods31 
 
3.5 Research Approaches Deployed in this Study 
This research employs a qualitative research method. It is difficult to provide a 
precise or widely accepted definition of qualitative research and its underpinning 
theory. Most researchers who conduct qualitative research would agree that it is 
socially concerned, examines phenomenon in their social settings (if field work is 
undertaken) and considers those phenomenon in context.32  
For this investigation, a variety of research methodologies, methods and 
techniques have been considered before choosing the most appropriate and 
rejecting others.  
                                                            
31 Developed by the researcher 
32 Ibid (n 25) 157 
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A quantitative approach has been rejected because the quantitative methods 
provide statistical investigation by calculating certain aspects mathematically in 
figures.33 Quantitative data is self-explanatory and does not need human 
interpretation. As this study does not involve statistical investigations there is no 
need to employ a quantitative method.  
Moreover, positivism and phenomenology have been rejected as being 
inappropriate and irrelevant for this study. Phenomenological methodology 
requires valuing the behaviour of the participants in their own subjective frame of 
reference. Given that there are no direct participants involved in this study the 
phenomenological methodology has also been rejected. Likewise, positivistic 
methodology requires the studying of human behaviour in a similar way as 
research conducted in the natural sciences. Therefore it has also been rejected as 
having nothing to do with the current study.   
This study aims to identify the key problems in Pakistani code of corporate 
governance (CCG), explore the solutions for them, investigate and explore the 
role of BODs and IIs in Pakistani listed companies. For this reason a qualitative 
research is more suitable, as it identifies the presence or absence of something.  
3.5.1 Data Collection Tools 
In qualitative studies, the data is commonly obtained by three key methods, 
separately or in combination: analysis of documents, direct observation and in-
depth interviews.34 For this research work, the method of document analysis is 
used as being the most appropriate method, keeping in view the research 
objectives (see section 1.3) as it involves the investigation of CCG, investigation 
about the current corporate practices prevalent in Pakistan through the companies’ 
annual statements and using primary and secondary sources.  
                                                            
33 Ibid (n 25) 157 
34 Tim May, Social Research: Issues Methods and Practices (3rd edition, Open University Press 
2001) 138; Michael Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd edition, Sage 
Publications 2002) 4; Keith Punch, Introduction to Social Research (2nd edition, Sage Publications 
2005) 139 
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Direct observation is rejected as there is no human participation involved in this 
study.  
Furthermore, using interview or questioner techniques would not be useful for this 
study because the potential contributors would be government and SECP officials, 
investors, directors and managers of top listed companies. Government officers 
have their own restrictions to reveal the truths and admit irregularities in the 
whole procedure of laws, strategy development and its enforcement, particularly 
in Pakistan’s scenario where government officials set examples to break law and 
non-adoption of CCG (as established in section 1.2.1). Likewise investors 
particularly IIs would never admit any weaknesses on their part. 
Moreover, companies’ directors and managers’ stance would not be different from 
their disclosure statements, so the annual reports of companies would serve this 
purpose. State functionaries, companies’ officials and investors would endeavour 
to draw the whole examination in their favour and, consequently, this technique 
would not be useful to collect impartial and reliable data.  
Another important and contributing factor for not conducting interviews is the 
restricted financial resources and the security situation of Pakistan these days. 
Several incidents lead the researcher to stick to desk based research.  
First, the researcher is a sponsored student, as soon as she passed her RS1 her 
sponsor stopped her funding (due to sponsor university’s internal politics), which 
remained stopped for more than a year and finally reimbursed with the order of 
High Court.  
Secondly, all major listed companies of Pakistan are based in Karachi, and the 
security situation in Karachi has been worse throughout this period of time due to, 
terrorist attacks, target killings, political instability and many more.  
The offices of government officials, financial institutions and some IIs are also 
based in Islamabad and Lahore. The researcher even could not got to those cities, 
because of an Azadi March held in Islamabad started from Lahore by Pakistan 
Tehrik-E-Insaf (political party) in Pakistan from 14-08-2014 to 17-12-2014 after 
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that the security situation became even worse followed by a massive and one of 
the most terrible terrorist attack on Army Public School Peshawar which killed 
141 children and many more.  Therefore, the methodology to conduct this study 
had to be changed. 
 However, the researcher believes and her research outcomes show that not 
conducting interviews did not affect this study in any way. Therefore, the desk 
based research employing document analysis method by using both primary and 
secondary sources are the more suitable data collection tool for this study.  
3.5.1.1 Document Analysis 
Data can be collected through document analysis ranging from official to the 
public.35 Document analysis has several approaches, and there is insufficient 
space here to discuss them all. Concisely, the method of analysis36 partially 
depends on the nature of the documents, for instance whether they are formal37 or 
informal communications.38 Some researchers may consider the context within 
which the documents were written and their intended audience. Others may 
examine the substance of the document but not its context.  
The critics of document analysis method argue that documents are susceptible to 
scientific, systematic analysis in keeping with positivist traditions.39 This 
researcher submits that this criticism does not apply on this study as this study is 
neither positivist nor scientific. This is socio-legal study and socio-legal 
researches usually use and support document analysis method.40 Socio-legal 
researchers argue that, documents reflect or report reality, describing an event, a 
perception or an understanding.41  
                                                            
35 Ibid (n 11); Lisa Webley, Adversarialism and Consensus? The Messages Professional Bodies 
Transmit About Professional Approach and Professional Identity to Solicitors and Family 
Mediators Undertaking Divorce Matters (IALS: London 2008) “See generally” 
36 The mode of selecting and extracting data from documents 
37 Legislations, case reports, newspaper articles or policy documents 
38 Informal discussions, private letters, solicitor file notes etc. 
39 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edition, Oxford University Press 2008) 515 
40 David Silverman, Qualitative Research (3rd edition, Sage Publications  2011) 77 
41 May (n 34) 158 
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An alternative argument is that documents represent the practical requirements for 
which they were created for, or in other words the purpose of the document. For 
many researchers, documents offer confirmation of strategy guidelines, legislative 
aim, and identifications of potential weaknesses or good practice in the legal 
framework.42 This is exactly the purpose of choosing document analysis method 
for this study.  
The researcher’s aim is to analyse the policy directions of the authorities, to 
explore the legislative intention and to investigate the shortcomings or the best 
practice in the legal system of Pakistan in order to find the true spirit of CCG for 
the better implementation of CG best practices in Pakistani listed companies. For 
this purpose both primary and secondary data is used. Following table provides 
the list of primary and secondary data which is used in this study. 
                                    Table 3.3: Sources of Data43 
Primary Data Secondary Data 
 Corporate Laws, Statutes 
 Code of Corporate Governance 
 Financial Statements 
 Companies’ Disclosure 
Statements 
 Business Reports of Companies 
 Government Publications 
 World Bank Reports 
 Published Research 
 Cases 
 Judicial Decisions 
 Theses 
 Surveys 
 Conference Proceedings 
 Internet 
 Books 
 Journal Articles 
 Online Journals 
 Working Papers 
 Newspapers 
 Business Magazines 
 Business News 
 Business Shows 
 Some government 
publications 
 
                                                            
42 Ibid (n 34) 140 
43 Developed by the researcher 
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3.5.2 Data Analysis Tools 
Data analysis and the drawing of conclusions and findings from the data are 
among the more contentious aspects of qualitative research. How can a researcher 
derive valid and dependable findings from the realms of documents?  
Miles44 explains that: the major difficulty in using the qualitative data is its mode 
of analysis, as they are not well defined and articulated unlike quantitative data 
which has clearly defined conventions that a researcher can use. However, the 
analysts of qualitative data have very limited guidelines for protection against 
self-delusion. 
There are three relatively widely used modes of document analysis: content 
analysis, discourse analysis and the grounded theory method. Gibbs45 states that: 
the document analysis includes identification, classification and recording of one 
or more paragraphs/portions of text or other data items such as the parts of 
pictures that, in some sense, demonstrate the same descriptive or theoretical idea. 
Typically numerous passages are chosen and then they are given a particular name 
called the code. 
In qualitative research, code symbolises the comprehensive and significant portion 
of data relevant to researcher’s work. This data can be in the form of observation 
field notes, interview transcripts, policy documents, journals, internet sites; 
literature, email correspondence etc.46  
The coding of data normally consists upon two cycles. In first cycle, the coded 
data can consist upon a single word, a paragraph or a full page of text. In the 
second cycle of coding process, the coded data can comprised of exactly relevant 
units, passages of text and analytic memos of the data developed so far.47 
                                                            
44 Matthew Miles, ‘Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis’ (1979) 
24 Administrative Science Quarterly 591 
45 Graham Gibbs, Analysing Qualitative Data (Sage Publications Ltd 2007) 38 
46 Ibid (n 10) 
47 Johnny Saldana, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (2nd edition, Sage Publications 
2013) 3 
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According to Charmaz,48 coding is a ‘critical link’ between data collection and the 
meaning of their explanation. 
All methods of document analysis (content analysis, discourse analysis, grounded 
theory) seek to develop codes and to use those codes in slightly different ways.  
The method of classical content analysis is used in this study as a data analysis 
tool however, discourse analysis and grounded theory is rejected.  
The grounded theory method is rejected because it involves developing a theory 
which generates theory from the collected data and it follows the natural pattern of 
human inquiry.49 Though the purpose of this study is neither generating a theory, 
nor any human participation is involved in it therefore; this method is not suitable 
for this dissertation. 
Discourse analysis focuses on texts and examines the use of language, syntax, 
grammar, pauses, hesitations, repetitions, and so on in the discourse being studied. 
It is an extremely detailed method that analyses the text word by word, pause by 
pause, coupling description with evaluation.50 All forms of texts may be analysed 
and it is the structure of the discourse rather than the meaning behind the text that 
is the key object of the study. The organisation of the text and its content are the 
subject of the inquiry. This form of analysis does not attempt to uncover objective 
facts.51 That is why this method is rejected because it does not unearth the context 
and objective behind a writing or document. This method may be best suitable for 
language studies but not for this study.  
As the aim of this research is to explore facts and analyse the documents and 
reports in order to examine that what role IIs and the BODs can play in promoting 
                                                            
48 Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory’ in Robert Emerson (eds) Contemporary Field Research: 
Perspectives and Formulations (2nd edition, Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press 2001) 335 
49 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative 
Analysis (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage 2006) 42 
50 Ibid (n 11) 39 
51 Gee et al., ‘Discourse Analysis’ in Le Compte et al (eds), The Hand Book of Qualitative 
Research in Education (San Diego CA: Academic Press 1992) 227 
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CG in Pakistani listed companies; therefore there is no need to use discourse 
analysis as a tool of data analysis in this study. 
3.5.2.1 Content Analysis 
This thesis adopts content analysis as a tool for data analysis due to many reasons. 
Firstly, content analysis has wider application.52 Secondly, it can be utilised to 
examine the nature and frequency of particular types of legal phenomenon within 
press reports or legal cases, or to consider the content of strategy documents.  
Content analysis can be descriptive, delineating the codes and the relationships 
between them, but it may also be used to explain or to develop a theory or 
theories.53 Content analysts are usually more inclined towards a qualitative 
interpretation. Code selection and development are a matter of researcher 
interpretation and researcher judgment. The researcher will develop an index of 
descriptors with labels that summarise the essence of the code to allow data to be 
categorised.54  
The researcher reads the text to pull out emerging themes, attempting to make 
them as specific as possible by analysing how they are used, the limits of their 
use, the context within which they appear and so on. Some researchers may 
analyse using pen and paper, while others may use computer software such as 
NVivo and Atlas to assist them in their work. Computer assisted analysis may 
help to systematise coding, but it is still reliant on the researcher’s selection of 
codes and her interpretation of the relationships between them.55  
Thirdly, content analysis can be a relatively highly systematised mode of 
qualitative data analysis, with relatively well-developed rules of sampling, 
selection of codes, and analysis of those codes and reporting of findings. Content 
analysis is reliant on a relatively large data set, which allows the researcher to 
                                                            
52 Lisa Webley (n 11) 12 
53 Margrit Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice (London: Sage 2012) 20 
54 Philip Mayring, ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’ (2000) 1(2) Qualitative Social Research 20 
55 Ibid (n 29) “See generally” 
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interrogate the content of a range of documents to draw conclusions relating to a 
theme or themes or a group or groups such as, solicitors and judges.56  
3.5.3 Legal Methods of Data Analysis 
After exploring the primary sources as mentioned in Table 3.3 this study will 
further use interpretive research philosophy to interpret and analyse the primary 
and secondary sources for example, corporate law, CCG, rules, regulations, 
principles and practices adopted to improve CG best practices, policies adopted by 
various governments, judgments of the court, text books, specialist commentary 
services, journal articles and previous research in the relevant field. 
3.5.3.1 Doctrinal Legal Research 
Doctrinal research is a research, which offers a systematic explanation of the rules 
and regulations governing a specific legal perspective, analyses the relationship 
between rules, identifies the problem areas and sometimes envisages future 
developments.57 The word ‘Doctrine’ deals with the legal concepts and principles 
such as, cases, statutes, rules etc.  
However, the doctrinal research is mainly qualitative.58 As this study is not purely 
legal rather socio-legal (a combination of legal and corporate issues), therefore, 
doctrinal research methodology does not depict this study appropriately; instead 
qualitative method of research is suitable and appropriate for current study. 
                                                            
56 Ibid (n 29) “See generally” 
57  Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline 
Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service 1987) “See generally” 
58 Nigel Duncan and Terry Hutchinson, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83; Lisa webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical 
Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds) Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal 
Research (Oxford University Press 2010) 1   
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3.5.3.2 Black Letter Law 
Black Letter Law denotes to the principles of law, which are commonly known 
and independent from any doubt.59 It demonstrates the well-established technical 
legal rules recognised by everyone in the legal sector. Black letter laws are those 
which provide the foundation for other laws to be established. For example, the 
definition of a contract, trademark and constitutional law is considered a black 
letter law, as nobody objects about what these laws are. As this study does not 
involve checking the foundation of any law and deals with the CCG, therefore, 
there is no need to use this Black Letter Law approach for this study. 
3.5.3.3 Literal, Golden and Mischief Rule 
Literal Rule determines the intention of the legislature for introducing a law from 
words and expressions utilised as part of the assemblage of law; Golden Rule is 
utilised where the outcome of literal interpretation is evidently irrational and its 
investigation provides inadmissible outcomes; Mischief rule permits wide 
understanding of the words and expressions utilised as a part of statutes.  
This research does not include the interpretation of any Act of Parliament or 
legislation therefore; there is no need to apply Literal, Golden and Mischief Rules. 
This study analyses the CCG, and for this purpose, an interpretative research 
philosophy facilitated to get the answer of research question.  
3.6 Trustworthiness of Qualitative Research 
All research studies are open to criticism and evaluation generally.60 A study 
could have dire consequences if its worth could not be assessed, the methods 
employed to carry out this study are not accurate and reliable, and its findings and 
conclusions do not have any impact or contribution in existing knowledge. 
Confusing or pointless conclusion of a study may result in wasted time and effort. 
However, wrong findings can have harmful and dangerous consequences. 
                                                            
59 Legal Information Institute, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/black_letter_law> accessed 10 
January 2015 
60 Andrew Shenton, ‘Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects’ 
(2004) 22 Education for Information 63, 64 
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Therefore, the criticism and evaluation of studies is inevitable for the application 
of its findings.61 Conventionally, such evaluation is conducted by assessing the 
validity and reliability of the methods used to carry out the study. The following 
sections define both of these terms, their purpose and usage in qualitative studies 
and then establish the trustworthiness of this thesis. 
3.6.1 Validity and Reliability  
Though the term ‘Reliability’ is primarily used in quantitative research however, 
the underlying idea is utilised in all types of research for analysis and assessing 
purposes. Therefore, the most significant check of any qualitative study is its 
quality. A good qualitative study can lead us to comprehend a mysterious or 
ambiguous situation easily that would not have been possible otherwise.62 This 
idea narrates the quality research; while reliability is a notion used to assess 
quality in quantitative research with the intention of elucidation; however the idea 
of quality in qualitative study intends to generate understanding’.63 This 
difference of purposes in the evaluation of quality in qualitative and quantitative 
studies leads to the concept of reliability irrelevant rather misleading in qualitative 
research.64 
An alternative view is that the validity and reliability are two elements which 
should be considered by qualitative researchers at the time of designing a study, 
evaluating and outcomes.65 This apprehension leads to a question that how can an 
inquirer convince his/her readers that the results of his/her research are important 
to be considered?66  
                                                            
61 Ibid  
62 Elliot Eisner, The Enlightened Eye: Qualitative Inquiry and the Enhancement of Educational 
Practice (Macmillan Publishing Company 1991)  58 
63 Caroline Stenbacka, ‘Qualitative Research Requires Quality Concepts of its Own’ (2001) 39(7) 
Management Decision 551 
64 Ibid  
65 Ibid (n 34) 
66 Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Beverly Hills CA: Sage 1985) 290 
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To answer this question, Healy and Perry67 stress that the quality of a study should 
be assessed by using the terms of its own paradigm. Such as, in quantitative 
inquiries, the terms reliability and validity are considered vital standard for 
judging the quality of study; however in qualitative paradigms the terms 
consistency, dependability, credibility, conformability, neutrality, transferability 
and applicability are considered necessary criteria for judging the quality.68 In 
order to be more specific with the terms, ‘dependability’ is used in qualitative 
research interchangeably which is narrowly related to the concept of ‘reliability’ 
in quantitative research.69  
The following table 3.4 shows the different criteria of judging the trustworthiness 
of a study in qualitative and quantitative studies. Clont70 and Seale71 also validate 
the notion of dependability in qualitative research with the notion of reliability in 
quantitative research. The reliability and uniformity of data can be attained only if 
the stages of research are followed appropriately from identifying a research 
problem to find its solution by conducting a thorough investigation.72 Therefore, 
the investigation of trustworthiness is critical in order to confirm reliability in 
qualitative research.  
Stenbacka73 claims that though reliability issue relates to measurements therefore, 
it is not relevant in qualitative research. She further argues that in evaluating the 
quality of qualitative studies the issue of reliability is irrelevant. Therefore, the 
study conducted considering reliability would not be considered a good study. 
Lincoln and Guba74 bring the usage of both terms together by arguing that though 
validity and reliability are interconnected and there can be no validity without 
                                                            
67 Marilyn Healy and Chad Perry, ‘Comprehensive Criteria to Judge Validity and Reliability of 
Qualitative Research within the Realism Paradigm’ (2000) 3(3) Qualitative Market Research  118 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid (n 67) 120 
70 Jean Clont, ‘The Concept of Reliability as it Pertains to Data from Qualitative Studies’ (1992) 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the South West Educational Research Association 
Houston TX 
71 Clive Seale, ‘Quality in Qualitative Research’ (1999) 5(4) Qualitative Inquiry 465 
72 Trudy Campbell, ‘Technology, Multimedia and Qualitative Research in Education’ (1996) 30(9) 
Research on Computing in Education 122 
73 Ibid (n 63) 552 
74 Ibid (n 66) 290 
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reliability, therefore to establish one of them should be enough to judge the 
quality of a study.  
In qualitative studies, the notion of validity is described by various terms. 
Creswell and Miller75 argue that it is the researcher’s perception that affects the 
validity of a study. Consequently, numerous researchers have established their 
own ideas of validity in the form of terms such as, rigor, quality and 
trustworthiness; and they chose among them which they consider fit for their 
respective study.76  
The tradition of validity and reliability in quantitative studies originated this 
concern in qualitative studies too in order to reflect interpretivist (qualitative) 
conceptions.77 In qualitative studies, the criterion to evaluate quality is substituted 
by the idea of trustworthiness,78 in order to establish confidence in the findings; 
instead of validity and reliability.79 If the concerns of trustworthiness, validity, 
reliability, quality and rigor are intended to distinguish good quality and bad 
quality research then the measurement of these notions will be significant for 
research. The quality of a research ensures the generalisability of its result which 
ultimately justifies and enhances the validity or trustworthiness of the research. If 
the validity or trustworthiness of a study can be verified and enhanced; its results 
will be more generalisable and will be declared more credible. 
Some qualitative researchers reject the notion of validity due to their 
philosophical perspectives which are normally acknowledged in more quantitative 
research in the social sciences. These qualitative researchers promote diverse 
principles for assessing the value of research. For example, Lincoln and Guba80 
projected four measures to evaluate the truth of qualitative research and presented 
                                                            
75 John Creswell and Dana Miller, ‘Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry’ (2000) 39(3) 
Theory into Practice 124 
76 Deirdre Davies and Jenny Dodd, ‘Qualitative Research and the Question of Rigour’ (2002) 
12(2) Qualitative Health Research 279 
77 Ibid 
78 Nahid Golafshani, ‘Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’ (2003) 8(4) 
The Qualitative Report 597 
79 Ibid (n 75) 127 
80 Ibid (n 66) 292 
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them as a substitute to the conventional quantitative measures. According to them 
their alternative four measures better reflected the fundamental norms involved in 
qualitative studies. The following table shows their proposed criteria. 
Table 3.4: Different Terms Used for Judging the Trustworthiness in Qualitative 
and Quantitative Research81 
Conventional Standards for 
Assessing Quantitative Research 
Alternative Standards for Assessing 
Qualitative Research 
Internal validity Credibility 
External validity Transferability/Applicability 
Reliability Dependability/ Consistency 
Objectivity Conformability/Neutrality 
 
Qualitative research is based on the presumption that every researcher comes with 
a distinctive viewpoint to his/her study. The researcher can have a record and 
document the processes for examining and re-examining the data during the 
study; and another researcher (can be a friend or supervisor) can corroborate his 
findings, and this procedure can be recorded. The researcher can also 
describe adverse instances that contradict prior observations. In the end, data 
audit can be conducted to investigate the data collection and analysis measures 
and draws conclusions about the prospective prejudice. 
3.6.2 Trustworthiness of this Study 
The researcher submits that the notions of validity and reliability are quite 
confusing (as discussed above), as some researchers consider these terms valid for 
quantitative studies only, however others consider them valid for qualitative 
studies as well. Even those who consider the validity and reliability important for 
qualitative studies are divided in two groups: those who think these terms (validity 
and reliability) as it is important for qualitative studies; and those who consider 
them with different terminologies such as credibility, dependability and so on and 
                                                            
81 Adapted from <www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualval.php> accessed 20 June 2015 
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so forth. However, the basic idea according to this researcher is same, and that is 
to establish the scope, significance and trustworthiness of research.  
The researcher further submits that the truth of a research can be established by 
making a good research design of a study showing a consistent research process 
followed by findings/recommendations which could be generalised and could 
contribute in existing knowledge. Moving a step further, in order to check the 
rigour of those recommendations, they can be peer reviewed by another researcher 
who can be a supervisor as well.82  
This process has been followed throughout in this study. A research problem 
having a significant scope (established in chapter one) has been identified in order 
to conduct this study. The valid and credible sources have been used to collect 
data. The whole study including its results/recommendation has been passed 
through peer reviewed process that is double checked by my supervisor 
throughout this journey in order to check its rigour and trustworthiness. 
Sources used in this study are comprised of provisions of CCG, which 
demonstrate the ‘will’ of regulators and authorities. Similarly, sources include 
governmental policies, decisions promulgated by the government of Pakistan 
(GOP), reports published by GOP and international organisations such as UN, 
IFC, UNEP FI, and OECD, SECP’s policies, reports and decisions, official 
documents, companies’ annual reports. Therefore, any factors of researcher’s bias 
or credibility of data collected through these methods is unlikely.  
The application of aforementioned un-rebutted tools of legal research sufficiently 
validates the contemporary research. To investigate the impact of CCG on the 
corporate sector of Pakistan, the working and effectiveness of BODs and the role 
of IIs has been explored in the country. The outcome of this study provides 
recommendations which can be proved as guidelines to the SECP and government 
authorities to modify the CCG and to provide protection to IIs. This research may 
also be proved as a parameter for companies and investors to make considerable 
                                                            
82 Ibid (n 67, 71) 
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changes in their working strategies which would ultimately improve the CG 
practices in Pakistan. Every finding and recommendation provided in this study is 
supported by valid evidence which confirms the credibility of this research work.  
3.7 Ethical Consideration 
The sources used in this research are publicly available on the official websites of 
investee companies and the government institutions such as, SECP, OECD, FRC, 
KSE, and LSE. Therefore, there was no need to have some special ethical 
considerations regarding the privacy and anonymity of documents. Furthermore, 
as this study is not empirical in nature, hence, there are no ethical considerations 
required to be considered related to the privacy of persons or of data. Moreover, 
the sources and data used in this study is properly referenced and acknowledged 
according to the regulations which fulfil the ethical requirements of this research.  
3.8  Conclusion 
This chapter has specified the means through which the objectives of this study 
have been addressed. It has presented the methods and methodologies employed 
in this study in detail. It has explained the research philosophy, research approach, 
research strategies and a brief description of research design of this study. This 
chapter further described and validated the data collection and analysis techniques 
and processes that have been utilised during the course of this study. 
In short, this study is socio-legal. It employs qualitative method of research using 
exploratory and descriptive approach with interpretative philosophy and inductive 
research approach. Data is collected through both primary and secondary sources. 
Analysis of data is conducted through content analysis and interpretative methods. 
The rationale behind choosing some particular methods and methodology is 
explained and justified in detail in this chapter along with the explanation and 
justification of reasons for rejecting others. The truth and rigour (validity and 
reliability) of this study, data collection and analysis is also established in this 
chapter. 
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The next chapters from four to seven are core chapters of this thesis. Each chapter 
deals with a research objective of this study. The next chapter deals with the first 
objective of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE FRAMEWORK OF PAKISTAN’S 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has presented the research methodology deployed for this 
study. This chapter deals with the first objective of this thesis. Its aim is to analyse 
the code of corporate governance (CCG) of Pakistan, identify its weaknesses and 
make recommendations to develop a new more effective and efficient CCG for 
the listed companies of Pakistan considering the particular corporate environment 
of country. For this purpose, the current chapter first provides the development 
and nature of corporate governance (CG) in Pakistan in order to understand that 
how old CG principles are in Pakistan and how CG works in Pakistan. Then, it 
moves on to examine the provisions of CCG, identifies its weaknesses and 
provides recommendations. In the end, a brief conclusion is presented in section 
4.5. The following figure presents the plan of this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                    Figure 4.1: Plan of this Chapter 
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4.2  Corporate Governance Framework of Pakistan 
The corporate sector of Pakistan had also seen a number of corporate disasters 
like rest of the world; NICL, PTCL, PR, NPP, PIA,1 Mehran Bank and other 
several finance companies have destroyed the life-savings of thousands of small 
investors.2  Nationalised banks have disregarded billions of rupees by way of bad 
loans, in the recent past.3 These scams are similar to those occurring across 
borders especially in the US.4 The prey in majority of cases being the common 
men led to a public outcry over companies’ management and regulations.5 
Resultantly, financial experts decided to discover the solution similar to medical 
profession: ‘prevention is better than cure’.6 Thus the term CG evolved. 
The principal source of CG in Pakistan is Company Law. Pakistan’s company 
law7 is based on colonial company law8 announced before independence for 
British India.9 The first CCG in Pakistan was formulated by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) in 1998. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) issued this CCG in 2002. The Companies 
Ordinance of 1984 and the Banking Companies Ordinance of 1962 also covers the 
principles of CG. Presently, CG consists upon two bodies: the SECP and the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP),10 as discussed in section 1.2. 
                                                            
1 They all are discussed in section 1.2.1 
2 Adnan  Ibrahim, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Analysis of Current Challenges and 
Recommendations for Future Reform’ (2006) 5(2) Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 323 
3 Waqar Ghani and Junaid Ashraf, ‘Corporate Governance, Business Group Affiliation, and Firm 
Performance: Descriptive Evidence from Pakistan’ (2005) Centre of Management and Economic 
Research Working Paper Series 05-35, Lahore University of Management Sciences 19 
4 Syeda Shabbir, ‘The Role of Institutional Shareholders Activism in the Corporate Governance of 
Pakistan’ (2012) 1(2) Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1, 3 
5 Steven Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University 
Press New York 2008) 6 
6 Ibid  
7 The Companies Ordinance 1984 (the Ordinance 1984) 
8 The Indian Companies Act 1913 
9 The subcontinent including Pakistan, India and Bangladesh; Nazir Shaheen, Practical Approach 
to the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (4th edition, Federal Law House Rawalpindi 2011) 2 
10 Shahnawaz Mahmood and Nadeem Shaukat, The Company Law (Legal Research Centre 
Pakistan 2010) “See generally” 
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The SECP was established in 1997, is the primary regulator and responsible for 
the implementation of CCG. The SECP is mainly an autonomous body works 
under the control of Ministry of Finance (MOF) and controls the corporate matters 
of companies, non-banking financial institutions and capital markets. The MOF 
holds the power to select the commissioners of SECP, who are normally best 
experts engaged in business sector and large number of them originate from 
private division.11  
The SECP implements the listing rules for the three stock exchanges of Pakistan: 
the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), the Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE), and the 
Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE). As the clauses of CCG are integrated in the 
listing rules, the SECP guarantees the adoption of those requirements.12 The SBP 
is Pakistan’s national bank and is in charge of controlling the banking and 
financial sector of Pakistan. The SBP is empowered to implement CG standards in 
banks.  
However, along with the defiance of CCG, banks have to observe additionally the 
Prudential Regulations of the SBP and the Banking Ordinance of 1962. 
Nevertheless, guidelines for banks are more hard and detailed in contrast to those 
for other listed companies and are beyond the scope of this research. To put it 
plainly, the elements in charge of the execution and administration of CG in 
Pakistan are MOF, SECP and SBP.13 
The CCG consists upon the principles of best practices intended to provide a 
mechanism in order to direct and control companies listed on stock exchanges of 
Pakistan. The objective of CCG is to protect stakeholders’ interests and promote 
market confidence which ultimately improve the performance of companies. For 
this purpose, the CCG got the experience of other jurisdictions in formulating CG 
models, particularly from common law countries having similar tradition like 
                                                            
11 Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspective 
of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance 13, 15; The information is also available on the website of SECP <www.seco.gov.pk>  
12 Haroon Hamid and Valeria Kozhich, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: A 
Perspective on Pakistan’ (2006) 1(1) Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 1, 3 
13 Ibid 
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Pakistan’s,14 such as the UK and South Africa.15 In this respect, the proposals of 
the King’s Report (South Africa), the Code of Best Practice of the Cadbury 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of CG published in December 1992 (UK), 
the Report of the Hampel Committee on CG published in January 1998 (UK), and 
the Principles of CG published by the OECD in 1999 were significant 
documents.16 
Corporate entities are principally controlled by the SECP under the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969, the Companies Ordinance, 1984, the SECP Act, 1997, 
and the several other rules and regulations made thereunder. Moreover, in 
addition to the SEC, special companies might additionally be controlled by special 
laws and by other regulators.17  
Thus, listed companies are also regulated by their respective stock exchange at 
which they are listed; banking companies are also regulated by the SBP; 
companies involved in providing telecommunication facilities are additionally 
controlled by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA); companies 
involved in the generation, transmission or distribution of electric power are 
further controlled by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA); 
and oil and gas companies are also controlled by the Oil and Gas Regulatory 
Authority (OGRA). 
This list is just for explanation and not comprehensive. Moreover, each company 
has its own constitution in the form of Memorandum of Association (MOA) and 
Articles of Association (AOA), according to which that company is bound to 
operate its business. There is general specimen of MOA and AOA is provided by 
SECP on its website, companies can adopt that as it is or may adopt it by making 
some changes according to their respective businesses. 
                                                            
14 Rashid Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960-1970 (Cambridge University 
Press 1982) 5 
15 Although South Africa has a hybrid legal system which is a mixture of three systems: the civil 
law (inherited from Dutch), the common law (inherited from the Britain) and the customary law 
(inherited from indigenous Africans). 
16 Ibid (n 12) 4 
17 Ali Cheema et al., ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Ownership, Structure and Control’ 
(2003) Lahore University of Management Sciences Paper Series 11, 13 
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4.3 Pattern of Shareholding in Pakistan  
This section describes the nature of corporate framework in Pakistan. The 
following figure shows the shareholding patterns in Pakistani companies, and the 
length of arrows points out the higher and lower number of shareholding. 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Figure 4.2: Shareholding Patterns in Pakistan18 
The corporate structure of Pakistan is exceptionally concentrated, with families-
owned companies/enterprises (FOEs) and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
Families are prevailing in the corporate framework both in private and public 
companies of Pakistan.19 By more than 50 per cent20 of privately owned 
businesses are controlled by two individuals the vast majority of whom are 
spouses keeping in mind the end goal to accomplish the basic condition of 
individuals for a privately owned business under the Companies Ordinance 
1984.21  
Families and certain group of people grasp more than 75 per cent of shareholding 
in the listed companies of Pakistan which is more than the lowest prerequisite in 
order to take decisions in the meetings.22 This limit is dissimilar from the UK 
                                                            
18 Developed by the researcher 
19 Awais Gulzar and Zongjum Wang, ‘Corporate Governance and Non-Listed Family owned 
Businesses: An Evidence from Pakistan’ (2010) 1(2) International Journal of Innovation, 
Management and Technology 124, 125 
20 Ibid (n 3) 
21 Ibid (n 3) 
22 Moin Fudda, ‘Corporate Governance in Family-Owned Companies in Pakistan’ (2014) CIPE 1 
<www.cipe.org/publications/detail/corporate-governance-family-owned-companies> accessed 10 
March 2015 
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where it is mandatory requirement that 25 per cent shareholding must be held by 
the general public under the listing rules with the end goal of an active and 
dynamic market. However, there is no such condition in Pakistan and families and 
some certain groups hold majority of shareholding to have controlling authority in 
their hands. The combined voting might permit minority shareholders or 
individual investors to choose directors to the board of directors (BODs) however 
due to the concentration of large portion of shareholdings in selected hands do not 
let minority representatives to be elected on the BODs.23 
The families own the majority of listed companies and strengthen their control 
either specifically by owning the larger part of shares or by indirect methods such 
as pyramiding, cross-shareholding or interlocking management. According to the 
antitrust legislation,24 interlocking directorship/management is not unlawful if the 
respective companies do not have a competition among themselves.  
The researcher asserts that the families hold the majority of shareholdings in order 
to keep control of companies which generates a liquidity issue in the business 
market. Cross shareholding, Pyramiding and interlocking are complex phenomena 
hard to understand for common investors. These families likewise keep up their 
control by naming their relatives as executive and non-executive members on 
BODs or at least some persons in their confidence and these individuals usually 
do not have required capabilities and experience. These family members take 
most of the significant policy decisions without formally setting off to meeting of 
the BODs or of the investors. This concentration of control is kept up for the sole 
purpose of getting secretive advantages and to keep trade stream out their own 
particular hands and to control the BODs and administration of the company.25  
                                                            
23 Ibid (n 19) 
24 In Pakistan the Antitrust Law is called ‘The Competition Act of 2010’ which although does not 
contain exact provision on interlocking- management; however section 3 of the Act prohibits any 
act, practice or abuse of power which restricts or distorts fair competition in the relevant market. 
25 Attiya Javid and Robina Iqbal, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Corporate Valuation, 
Ownership and Financing’ (2010) PIDE Working Papers 2010: 57, 12 
<http://pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-57.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015 
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The state is the biggest partner after families. The SOEs are both listed and non-
listed. Similarly, among the best forty listed companies at the KSE, fourteen are 
owned by the state. The SOEs represent 52.8% of the aggregate capitalisation of 
the main forty companies listed on KSE.26 The SOEs are politically driven and 
each government in the wake of coming into power holds the control of these 
companies. The administration, management and directors of BODs of these 
companies stay in such positions at the delight of the state. The criteria for the 
appointments on BODs is political alliance of the individuals instead the 
experience, skills, abilities and qualification. 
The researcher submits that the FOEs and SOEs are significant foundations for 
corporate development in Pakistan but control maximisation is a big hindrance for 
this development. The strong control by families and state of public companies is 
a genuine administration issue.27 They oppose changes and development of CG 
principles additionally intimidates to delist their companies. However, there was 
considerable delisting after the proclamation of the CCG in 2002. Many smaller 
companies and FOEs do not have awareness regarding the probable advantages of 
developed CG.28  
The SECP established Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) for the 
purpose of enhancing awareness among business community about the advantages 
to adopt and implement CG principles in their respective companies. The PICG 
has trained 450 individual so far to perform this task, among them 240 have been 
given certification of CG. The PICG also encourages business schools to include 
CG in their syllabus as a subject and teach CG principles and their benefits to 
business students.29 However, there are a lot still needs to be done on this, as these 
measures are still just in theory, we cannot see their considerable practical impact 
on business community so far. 
                                                            
26 Ibid (n 11) 15 
27 The examples of such control resulting in bad governance is provided in section 1.2.1 
28 IMF Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 
29 Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspectives 
of Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance’ (2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance 17, 20 
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Moreover, dispersed ownership30 is a rare and recent phenomenon in Pakistan. 
The state in the twentieth and early twenty first century divested its shareholdings 
to the general public. This trend attracted some FOEs and multinational 
companies31 who issued shares to the general public. This created a public 
shareholding in the corporate market. However, its ratio of shareholding is very 
small compared with the shareholdings owned by family members in FOEs, the 
state in SOEs and management in multinational companies. The government is 
now planning to divest twenty six per cent of its shareholding in eighty SOEs and 
twelve per cent will be issued to the employees.32 This will further increase the 
ratio of dispersed ownership in the corporate structure. 
The multinational companies (MCs) are the third significant partner in the 
business sector of Pakistan. Among the main forty listed companies at KSE, there 
are five MCs which constitute seventeen per cent capitalisation in the top forty 
listed companies at KSE.33 The existence of foreign companies in the corporate 
sector of Pakistan is a good indication for the economic development of the 
country, as these MCs are a noteworthy cause of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Pakistan.  
Moreover, MCs are more concerned about the implementation of CG principles in 
their businesses and are well-known about being transparent about their dealings, 
and show high standards of governance. The top MCs working in Pakistan are 
Unilever, Proctor & Gamble, Nestle, Chartered Bank, Siemens, Toyota, Pepsi 
Cola International, Mobilink and ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries).  The 
business of ICI is industrial, decorative, refinish and speciality chemicals. Their 
                                                            
30 John Cubbin and Dennis Leech, ‘The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of 
Control in British Companies: Theory and Management’ (1983) 93 The Economic Journal 355 
31 The multinational companies are those companies who are registered as domestic company as 
subsidiary companies of overseas holding companies according to the companies ordinance 1984. 
32 Ibid (n 12) 5 
33 Cheema et al., ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Issues of Ownership, Control and the Law’ 
in Farooq Sobhan and Wendy Werner (eds), A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance in 
South Asia: Charting a Road Map for Bangladesh (Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka 2003) 
“See generally” 
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slogan is colouring Pakistan and they give preference to health, safety and 
environmental betterment.34 
The existence of MCs in Pakistan and their governance standards give incentives 
to local business community to improve governance standards in their respective 
companies and to take CCG seriously. This additionally inspires and influences 
the state to play its part in improving the whole CG framework with a strong 
regulator. The researcher submits that the FDI can further be increased if CG is 
improved. These companies can be a good precedent for local companies for 
governance observation. The MCs are from those countries which have firm 
disclosure requirements and established governance frameworks, consequently 
these MCs can be as a model and source of inspiration for local companies in 
regards to disclosure, transparency, administrative and other governance issues.35 
The researcher further asserts that the banks and institutional investors (IIs) are 
other substantial shareholders in Pakistan’s corporate sector but they have a minor 
role in CG. The IIs are represented on BODs and banks give proper representation 
to IIs on their BODs. However, the role and representation of IIs is limited in 
Pakistan and they are not playing their role in the growth of CG. There is a need 
for the role of IIs to be activated and maximised, as they can play a considerable 
part in developing the CG norms in the country being experienced, highly skilled 
and being influential due to their large shareholdings. They can convince the 
BODs and management about adopting the good CG principles through a number 
of ways.36 
4.4  The Critical Analysis of the CCG of Pakistan and Recommendations for 
its Improvement 
Good governance helps in achieving the confidence of investors and the 
governance practices influence the investment decisions of both local and foreign 
                                                            
34 The information is collected from the website of ICI <www.ici.com.pk> accessed 1 June 2015 
35 Ibid (25, 33) 
36 It is one of the objectives of this thesis to explore the role of IIs in promoting CG in Pakistan and 
is discussed in chapter seven in detail. 
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investors. Companies have to adopt enhanced CG standards in order to compete 
globally. This is one of the major reasons to make capital markets transparent, 
safeguarding the interests of shareholders and drawing foreign investment. The 
CG is significant for both purposes; business prosperity and accountability. 
Therefore, the SECP endeavours to elevate the CG standards of the country.37 The 
first major step in this was the compilation and issuance of the first CCG in 
2002.38 
The CCG established a structure adjusted to deal with the complexities of the 
Pakistan’s corporate sector and furthermore compiled the CG best practices as 
exemplified in different noticeable international models of CG.39 The adoption of 
CCG was obligatory for listed companies aside from two that were voluntary. The 
following table shows the mandatory and voluntary provisions of the CCG 2002. 
 
             Table 4.1: Mandatory and Voluntary Provisions of the CCG 200240 
Clause Description Nature 
(i) Representation of INEDs, including those 
representing minority interests on the BODs of 
listed companies. 
Voluntary 
(V) 
(v) Election/ nomination of a broker on the BODs V 
(ii) Filing of consent by directors Mandatory  
(M) 
(iii) and (iv) Qualification and eligibility for directors M 
(vi) Tenure of office of directors M 
(vii), (viii) and 
(ix) 
Responsibilities, powers and functions of 
BODs 
M 
(x), (xi) and 
(xii) 
Meetings of BODs M 
(xiii) Significant issues to be placed for decision by 
BODs 
M 
(xiii) (a) Related Party Transactions M 
                                                            
37 Mr Muhammad Ali, The former Chairman of the SECP. 
38 As discussed earlier. 
39 Ibid 12; Qaiser Yasser, ‘Corporate Governance and Performance: A Case Study for Pakistani 
Communication Sector’ (2011) 2(3) International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 1 
40 <http://www.secp.gov.pk/cg/codeofcorporategovernance_2002.pdf> accessed 20 November 
2015 
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(xiv) Orientation courses M 
(xv) Appointment and removal of CFO and 
Company Secretary (CS) 
M 
(xvi) and (xvii) Qualification of CFO and CS M 
(xviii) Requirement for CFO and CS 
to attend Board meetings 
M 
(xix) The directors’ report to shareholders M 
(xx), (xxi), 
(xxii) and (xiii) 
Frequency of financial reporting M 
(xxiv) and 
(xxv) 
Responsibility for financial reporting and 
corporate compliance 
M 
(xxvi) Disclosure of interest by a director holding 
Company’s shares 
M 
(xxvii) Auditors not to hold shares M 
(xxviii) Corporate ownership structure M 
(xxix) Divestiture of shares by sponsors/ controlling 
Interest 
M 
(xxx), (xxxi), 
(xxxii), 
(xxxiii) and 
(xxxiv) 
Audit Committee M 
(xxxv) and 
(xxxvi) 
Internal Audit M 
(xxxvii), 
(xxxviii), 
(xxxix) and 
(xI) 
Appointment of external auditors M 
(xIi) Rotation of external auditors M 
(xIii) Appointment of a partner or employee of the 
external auditors in a key position within the 
listed company 
M 
(xIiii) Management letter issued by external auditors M 
(xIiv) Attendance of external auditors at AGM M 
(xIv) and 
(xIvi) 
Compliance with the CCG M 
 
The table shows that all provisions of CCG 2002 were mandatory except two; 
however this researcher submits that voluntary provision relating to the 
representation of INEDs should be mandatory in nature not voluntary. The reason 
is that the objective of appointing independent director on BODs is to monitor the 
actions, strategies and decision-making of BODs. However, in Pakistan the office 
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of independent NED director is considered simply as an honorary position. That’s 
why perhaps required importance is not given to this office.  
Secondly, although the CCG was included in the listing requirements for listed 
companies and most of its provisions were mandatory, the compliance could not 
be seen satisfactorily primarily due to non-serious attitude of government,41 
vested interests of families owning large number of companies42 and many other 
factors.43  
Therefore, the researcher argues that, the strong enforcement mechanisms of the 
country are much necessary. The issuance of CCG is a big step and good effort on 
the part of SECP for enhancing good governance practices in the listed companies 
of Pakistan; but there is no use of this CCG if it cannot be implemented in its true 
spirit. Thirdly, it seems that while drafting the CCG, other corporate laws of the 
country have not been considered or cross-checked, because some provisions of 
the CCG overlaps with other corporate laws. 
For example, the CCG 2002 puts this mandatory obligation on the chairman of the 
listed company to guarantee that the minutes of the BODs meetings are 
documented appropriately.44 On the other hand, section 173(1) of the Ordinance,45 
puts this responsibility on company itself to maintain proper record of the minutes 
of AGM proceedings, but do not clarify that what does it mean by ‘company’ as 
company is a legal entity which is run by different offices, and the provision of 
Ordinance does not clarify that which office of the company is responsible to 
perform this function.  
However, the CCG 2012 uses the word ‘The Chairman’ to perform this function.46 
This confusion causes a problem to carry out the most important task of recording 
minutes of BODs meetings. Secondly, to follow the provisions of Ordinance is 
                                                            
41 As established in section 1.2.2 
42 See section 1.2.2 
43 These factors are identified in section 5.3. 
44 Clause (xii) of the CCG 2002 
45 Section 173(1) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
46 Clause (viii) of the CCG 2012 
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mandatory and in case of violation the violator/s has to pay penalty; on the other 
hand compliance with the CCG is also mandatory. In such situation, insiders 
(executive directors) consider it their discretion to use these provisions for their 
benefits. The regulators and policy makers should consider about such 
overlapping provisions seriously, as meetings of BODs decide the fate of a 
company and thus, shareholders’ destiny is also decided by them. Therefore, there 
should be a consistent procedure clearly defined in all corporate laws and 
principles to record the meetings of BODs appropriately. 
Moreover, according to the Ordinance47 an individual cannot be a director of a 
listed company who himself or his/her partner is involved in the trade of 
brokerage as a member of the stock exchange. Conversely, the CCG 200248 does 
not debar such person to be a director of a listed company if he gets immunity 
from SECP. However, the new CCG 2012 is silent on this matter. In such 
situation, the CCG itself providing opportunity to the individuals having vested 
interests, they can get exemption from SECP and can be involved in company’s 
matters.  
Here the counter argument can be that, the SECP is the regulator of CCG, 
therefore SECP may not provide an exemption if it thinks that such exemption 
will be harmful in the interests of shareholders. The answer to this argument can 
be seen in two ways; one such person having bad intentions can get exemption by 
using their political and other connexions as it is the MOF who appoints 
commissioners of SECP and secondly, how SECP can take stand and refuse to 
give exemption if it provides relaxation itself in the CCG. In this situation where 
does lie the position of Ordinance, whose violation initiates procedures in court of 
law? The researcher submits that law and rules should be free from such 
ambiguities and the policy makers in Pakistan should consider this seriously if 
they wish to develop CG practices in true sense.  
                                                            
47 Section 187(j) of The Companies Ordinance 1984 
48 Clause (v) of the CCG 2002 
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Furthermore, the Ordinance provides that,49 any stakeholder (director, CEO or 
executive) of a company50  retaining equity securities more than ten per-cent as 
favourable holder of a listed company is under obligation to prepare a report of 
any profit s/he gets from the trade of these securities within six months. 
Moreover, such person is additionally under obligation to declare that gain to the 
company and indicate this to the Registrar51 and the Commission.52 However, the 
CCG53 provides that such person making any gain shall immediately notify the CS 
in writing and will furthermore provide the documented record of the cost and 
amount of shares within four days of such transaction. Then it is the responsibility 
of the CS to document and present it before the BODs in its next meeting.  
In this case, the CCG provides clearer and stricter provisions to be carried out; 
however, the Ordinance is giving relaxation by providing a long time of six 
months to disclose about any gains made by the stakeholder of a company. Six 
months is quite enough time for a person to make gains on the shares of a 
company and then dispose of its record. These overlapping provisions of the 
Ordinance and the CCG creates misperception as to follow the Ordinance is 
mandatory for all companies and breaking of this involves application of penalty 
(as mentioned above also) however, the SECP additionally demands thorough 
adoption of the CCG from listed companies. Consequently, the owners of the 
business chose and adopt the provision according to their benefits which does not 
set a good example for virtuous CG practices. 
Such conflicting and ambiguous provisions of laws make their implementation 
even more difficult. There should be uniform laws to be followed by every 
company to make them more effective and efficient and to assess the ratio of their 
implementation and enforcement. As to measure the proper implementation of 
laws come later, first the laws itself should be effective enough that companies 
                                                            
49 Section 224 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
50 Including directors, officers, major shareholders etc. 
51 Registrar means the Registrar performing the function of registering companies under the 
Companies Ordinance 1984. 
52 Here Commission means the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. 
53 Both CCG; clause (xxvi) of the CCG 2002 and clause (xxiii) of the CCG 2012 
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could follow them without being confused and picking the provisions of their own 
choice. 
Nevertheless, though the CCG has not been implemented fully, the performance 
of corporate sector has improved due to its introduction in terms of accountability 
and transparency. However, the policy makers should apply regulatory impact 
assessment (RIA) more rigorously which will improve accountability on the part 
of regulators as well and it will also improve transparency.54 
The CCG 2002 was replaced with the CCG 2012, which has also been included in 
the relevant Listing Regulations. The revised CCG emphasise the importance of 
independent directors on the BODs and makes one independent director 
mandatory however, 1/3rd independent directors of the total members of the BODs 
is preferred.55 However, the researcher argues that this number of independent 
directors should be increased on BODs to at least fifty per cents to ensure stricter 
monitoring of BODs in order to achieve more accountability and transparency. 
Secondly, PICG should also work on creating awareness among business 
community that the purpose of appointing NEDs on BODs is not just to honour 
your friends and family with directorship rather NEDs should independent 
individuals who could monitor the actions, strategies and decision-making of 
BODs. 
Moreover, the total number of directorships that an individual can have at a time 
is reduced to seven from ten, however there is no limit of having directorship in 
the listed subsidiaries of a listed holding company56 The researcher submits that 
the underlying idea of this reduction in the number of directorships may be to 
decrease the work load on a director so that s/he could do justice with his/her 
responsibilities towards companies. For this purpose, this number should be 
reduced more as holding the office of director in seven companies is still over-
                                                            
54 Rasul Rais and Asif Saeed, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) of SECP’s Corporate 
Governance Code in Pakistan’ (2004) CMER Working Paper No. 05-39 
<http://saber.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/LUMS_Rais_2005.pdf> accessed 20 June 205 
55 Clause (i) (b) of the CCG 2012 
56 Clause (ii) of the CCG 2012 
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burdening. A person cannot do justice with any one of company’s maters if he has 
too many responsibilities of various companies.  
This interlocking directorate is quite an old phenomenon and common among 
corporations.57 However the statutory attempts have been taken to minimise this 
practice. Companies may gain benefits that reduce environmental uncertainty 
through interlocking i.e., horizontal organisation which links competitors; vertical 
harmonisation which associates an organisation with contractors of inputs or 
receivers of outputs; skill and higher reputation.58 However, antitrust legislation 
surmises that establishing and maintaining uncertainty in a marketplace via 
competition is a social good however, decreasing this uncertainty by way of 
interlocking could be a profit-enhancing strategy for the benefit of firms and their 
shareholders.59  
The antitrust legislation in Pakistan is called ‘The Competition Act of 2010’. 
Section 3 of the Act forbids the misuse of any leading position through the acts 
that limits or misrepresents competition in the respective market. However, the 
application of this Act does not seem to be effective so far, as the practice of 
interlocking management prevails and misused in Pakistani companies 
particularly in family owned businesses.  
The researcher argues that, a person being a director of so many companies can 
never be unbiased or honest with the affairs of any single company. Consequently, 
the assets of general public and investors are on high stake in such a company. 
This practice can be diminished by two ways; first, by introducing legislation or 
making amendment in the CCG and reducing the number of directorship a person 
can hold; secondly, by making IIs influential via increasing their role in CG which 
                                                            
57 Michael Jacobs, ‘Combatting Anti-Competitive Interlocking: Section 8 of the Clayton Act as a 
Template for Chile and Similar Emerging Economies’ (2013) Fiscalia Nacional Economica 
Working Paper, www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Clayton-Act-Section-8.pdf accessed 
10th January 2015 
58 David Schoorman et al., ‘Interlocking Directorates: A Strategy for Reducing Environmental 
Uncertainty’ (1981) 6(2) The Academy of Management Review 243 
59 Ibid  
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can be done through giving them proper participation and representation in the 
BODs that they could monitor the policies and acts of such directors. 
Moreover, the new CCG introduced the evaluation criterion of BODs to ensure 
the accountability of BODs for their policies and actions. However, it is left on the 
BODs of each company to formulate a framework for its assessment within two 
years from the issuance of this CCG. The researcher submits that instead of 
leaving this on each company’s BODs, the SECP should devise a general 
evaluation mechanism for the BODs and put it on its website for the guidance of 
each company. The companies should evaluate the workings, strategies and 
effectiveness of their BODs according to those criteria and explain that in their 
annual reports. However, companies can make changes on those general criteria 
set by SECP according to the distinct and changed requirements of their business 
by formally getting permission from SECP on the basis of ‘one size not fit all’ 
principle. 
Furthermore, the office of the Chairman has been alienated from that of CEO.  
The Chairman shall now be nominated and selected amongst the NEDs of a listed 
company.60 The directors of listed companies will now be bound to get 
certification under director training program (DTP) obtainable by any local or 
foreign institution that fulfils the conditions defined by the SECP.61 The CCG 
further asserts that, the BODs will determine the mechanisms for appointment, 
remuneration and conditions of employment and removal of the Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO), CS and the Head of Internal Audit (IA) of listed companies 
instead of CEO.62 The Head of IA will not be removed without the consent of the 
BODs and endorsement of the Chairman of the Audit Committee.  
The CCG63 further provides that, there should be a defined and fair mechanism 
concerning directors’ remuneration and its disclosure in the annual report of listed 
                                                            
60 Clause (vi) of the CCG 2012 
61 Clauses (xi) of the CCG 2010. The criteria are available at the website of SECP, 
www.secp.gov.pk accessed 10th June 2014 
62 Clause (xii) and (xiiii) of the CCG 2012 
63 Clause (xvii) of the CCG 2012 
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companies. The chairman of the audit committee will now be an INED, who will 
not be the chairman of BODs. Audit Committee will consist upon NEDs.64 The 
secretary of Audit Committee will either be the CS or Head of IA and the CFO 
will not be elected as the secretary to the Audit Committee.65 The task of IA might 
be subcontracted by a listed company to a specialised services company or be 
executed by the IA staff of the holding company.66 
The some provisions of the CCG have been reviewed on the basis of lessons 
learnt from the everyday issues and concerns related to the listed companies. The 
underlying idea is to ensure that it imitates changing governance apprehensions, 
economic conditions, practices and international standards. However, the 
researcher argues that this CCG still has two folds problems. One some of its 
provisions do not help to solve governance issues rather increase those problems, 
again for being confusing and overlapping with the Ordinance like the previous 
CCG 2002;67 and secondly, the enforcement problem regarding implementing the 
CCG in its true sense also remains the same as was with the previous CCG 2002. 
However, the positive sign as a result of the issuance of CCG is that the people 
have started to acknowledge CG principles and the importance of good 
governance.  
For example, regardless the voluntary requirement for the appointment of INEDs, 
numerous companies both listed and non-listed have chosen as INEDs. Though, 
the individuals ready to serve as INEDs are hard to discover in light of the fact 
that compensation is not equivalent with their roles and responsibilities. Despite 
the fact that there are competent applicants, there is minimal impetus for them in 
such a position without being paid accordingly. A proper remuneration plan is 
essential to draw in qualified and competent individuals who will to tackle the 
obligations and responsibilities of this office.68 
                                                            
64 Clause (xxiv) of the CCG 2012 
65 Clause (xxx) of the CCG 2012 
66 Clause (xxxi) of the CCG 2012 
67 As mentioned in previous paragraphs 
68 Ibid (n 2) 326; Corporate Governance Country Assessment (Pakistan), June 2005, by World 
Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Corporate Governance; Robert 
McGee, ‘Corporate Governance in Transition and Developing Economies: A Case Study of 
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Moreover, the new CCG requires from every single listed company to distribute a 
declaration69 along with their annual reports to clarify their position regarding the 
adoption and compliance with the CCG. The declaration should be certain and 
anticipated that would be sustained by the vital evidence by the company making 
such declaration. Every single listed company shall guarantee that the declaration 
of compliance with the CCG is looked into and affirmed by statutory auditors, 
where this declaration can be confirmed equitably, before its publication. 
Statutory auditors should guarantee that any nonfulfillment of the requirements set 
out by CCG is identified in their annual report. However, in a particular situation 
in which the compliance with the CCG becomes unworkable, SECP is authorised 
to grant exemption from the compliance in such situation by properly recording 
the reasons of non-compliance.70  
These provisions show that SECP is striving to make the compliance with the 
CCG better. The researcher submits that, the CCG contains many strong 
provisions too and as a result the business community has started to give 
importance to good governance standards. However, there are some basic 
problems in the CCG which should be considered and removed while formulating 
the new version of the CCG (which has been discussed above).  
In summary, the clauses of CCG should not be in conflict with other corporate 
laws particularly because the compliance of CCG is mandatory; when the two 
mandatory laws/rules conflict with each other the implementation of them 
becomes difficult. The second important thing is the awareness about the 
advantages to adopt CG principles, the PICG should introduce more effective 
measures to increase this awareness among business community, as it has been 
noted that new business men having less or no knowledge and qualification 
consider CG principles cumbersome and they are scared of these.71 It can be 
achieved by organising regular seminars and workshops on the significance of CG 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Pakistan’, Working Paper, August 2010, Florida International University 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665112> accessed 10-01-2015 
69 In the form as specified in Appendix ‘B’ of the CCG 2012 
70 Clauses (xI), (xIi) and (xIii) of the CCG 2012 
71 The researcher had a conversation with a CS of a construction company in Pakistan and realised 
this fact. 
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principles their impact on maximising shareholder wealth and on companies’ 
performance.  
Rating agencies can also play their role in this matter by issuing annual rating list 
of companies showing the higher compliance with the CCG. The IIs can also play 
their role in this. In addition to this, CG subject should be included in the 
curriculum of business schools and it should also be taught to law students at LLB 
level along with the subject of company law. Thirdly, the misconception about the 
office of INEDs should also be removed (as identified above too); the people 
consider this office as honorary that executive directors can appoint any outside 
director as NED to honour him with directorship.  
There should be a proper and stricter mechanism for the appointment, 
qualification, roles and responsibilities of INEDs. There should also be attractive 
and defined remuneration package for INEDs as we have seen above it is hard to 
find INEDs due to no pay. The awareness is required on both sides; the business 
community and the INEDs regarding the responsibilities of this office that the 
purpose of appointing INEDs on BODs is to monitor the policies and strategic 
decision making of BODs to safeguard the interest of shareholders. As the 
researcher believes that the sole aim of CG is to protect shareholders interest and 
improve companies’ performance.  
Lastly, the regulators should revise the CCG every year or at least in every two 
years considering the environment of corporate sector of Pakistan. As the speed of 
reform is very slow, the first CCG was issued in 2002, and the second revised 
CCG issued after ten years in 2012 and now it has been three years the last CCG 
is not amended and revised. The researcher believes that by amending and 
revising the CCG regularly considering the needs and changing environment of 
business community will help in improving the corporate sector of Pakistan to 
large extent. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The current chapter has examined the CG framework of Pakistan. It has 
investigated both CCG issued so far for the corporate sector of Pakistan and has 
identified their weaknesses. This chapter has also presented recommendations to 
consider while formulating the next and revised CCG for Pakistan which is one of 
the objectives of this thesis. The underlying idea was that in order to reform 
corporate sector of Pakistan and to improve CG practices in the listed companies 
of Pakistan both ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ should be effective and 
efficient. This chapter has analysed the ‘law in books’ (the CCG) and the next 
chapter investigates the ‘law in action’ (the enforcement mechanisms of Pakistan).  
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 
5.1 Introduction 
This study aims to explore measures to improve corporate governance (CG) in the 
listed companies of Pakistan. For this purpose, the previous chapter has analysed 
the code of corporate governance (CCG) of Pakistan and suggested 
recommendations to consider while issuing the new and revised CCG which can 
improve the CG practices in listed companies.  
This chapter relates to the second objective of this thesis and investigates the 
enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan relating to the implementation of CCG. As 
in the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms and without implementing the 
CCG properly, there is no use of updating and issuing CCG. The idea of viable 
implementation and execution of laws as opposed to just the procurement of law 
in theory are not new.1 Academics of corporate law have been debating this matter 
for a long time. The enforcement of laws is essential in a period of globalisation 
and competition where cross-border investment has expanded.2 This phenomenon 
identifies the significance of enforcement for local investors as well as to draw in 
foreign investors.  
                                                            
1 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12 
2 Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan’ (2002) 3 
European Business Organisation Law Review 812 
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A legal system becomes strong and works successfully if the framework to control 
and enforce these laws is also effective and efficient.3 The principle of checks and 
balances is inevitable for a sound legal system. Weak and overlapping laws and 
political forces abolish the institutional development of a state. Therefore, a strong 
and healthy environment is required for the booming of institutions. The 
appropriate implementation and execution of corporate laws is the obligation of 
the courts and the capital market.  
Therefore, this chapter investigates the issues relating to enforcement of CG 
generally and investigates specifically the enforcement mechanisms of CG in 
Pakistan. The current chapter further examines the factors which are responsible 
for the unsuccessful implementation of CG in Pakistan and recommends measures 
to improve the enforcement procedures in Pakistan by investigating the role of 
judiciary and capital market in Pakistan. As the judiciary and capital market are 
responsible to protect the shareholders’ rights and to enforce corporate laws, rules 
and regulations. This chapter additionally explores the ways to reform judiciary 
and capital market of Pakistan in order to make them more effective and efficient 
for the enforcement of corporate laws and the CCG. The following figure shows 
the plan of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    Figure 5.1: Plan of this Chapter 
                                                            
3 Ibid  
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5.2 The Convergence of Laws and their Implementation 
The convergence in CG is becoming the norm in current years in almost every 
country due to the era of globalisation and competition.4 In this process the 
countries although adapt CG features from foreign countries by necessities 
however, their feeble implementation system could not enforce those laws and 
therefore do not create required outcomes.   
La Porta, Lopez-ed-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) have examined in point 
of interest the safeguard of investors and declared them the principal cause for the 
growth of business sector and CG principles. They additionally emphasised that 
the implementation and execution of laws can only be better in the presence of 
effective laws, especially relating to rights of investors.5  
Therefore, in the first phase of reform, the ‘law in books’ is important regardless 
of the fact that there is lack of strong enforcement system. For example, EU 
concurrence in eastern and central EU states recommends that the elements of 
overseas CG can play no less than a positive part on plans of change and their 
enforcement.6 However, the law in action can be guaranteed by upgrading the 
capability of enforcement institutions in the second stage of reform.7 This implies 
that the countries who adapt CG principles from other jurisdictions should 
develop their implementation and execution frameworks keeping in mind the end 
goal to make the transplanted laws more operational and successful.  
The procurement of only good laws cannot supplement powerless implementation 
frameworks; such as, developing jurisdictions transplanted laws from developed 
economies, yet frail implementation systems permitted the seizure of investors’ 
interests. That is the reason for the powerful arrangement of CG in which rights 
                                                            
4 John Coffee, ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Complications’ (1999) North-western University Law Review 641, 642 
5 LLSV, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52(3) The Journal of Finance 1131; 
LLSV, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) Journal of Political Economy 1113 
6 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens, ‘Enforcement and Corporate Governance’ (2004) World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3409, 41 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625286&download=yes> accessed 10 May 
2015 
7 Robert Cooter, ‘Expressive Law and Economics’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 585, 587 
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must be ensured and implemented. In short, the amalgamation of both good laws 
and an appropriate and successful implementation framework supplement one 
another. Enforcement cannot be fruitful without good laws, and likewise good 
laws cannot ensure the protection of shareholders in the absences of strong 
enforcement mechanism.8 
The issue of implementation is more extreme in transition economies like 
Pakistan instead of advanced jurisdictions. There have been a few changes during 
the previous couple of years in Pakistan with the collaboration of International 
financial institutions (IFI).9 The initial step in this respect was the formation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). The SECP introduced 
new laws and regulations in order to protect shareholders’ interests.10 
Numerous State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were privatised and the state offered 
some of its shareholdings to the common business community. This practice 
motivated additionally FOEs and therefore, FOEs also offered a small portion of 
their shareholdings to the common public. These changes brought on a blast in the 
share trading system however, the stock market collided in 2005 resulting into 
loss of individual and scattered investors by depriving them from their life 
savings. The regulator could not control and stop this crash and failed to recognise 
and penalise the offenders.11 The fragile enforcement system of Pakistan frizzled 
and the incompetent judicial mechanism could not offer a solution to affected 
persons. 
The issue is additionally serious because of the absence of legal ability to uphold 
the right of shareholders and individual investors. Inefficiency, corruption, 
nepotism, feudalism judicial expenditures and additional common postponements 
are the fundamental issues confronting the legal system of Pakistan. The regulator 
                                                            
8 Katharina Pistor et al., ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ (2000) 8(2) Economics of 
Transition 356, 358 
9 Asim Khawaja and Atif Mian, ‘Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in an Emerging 
Stock Market’ (2005) 78 Journal of Financial Economics 203, 205 
10 Faryal Salman and Kamran Siddiqui, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: From the Perspective 
of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (2013) 12(4) The IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance 13, 14   
11 Ibid (n 10) 15 
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additionally is not sufficiently productive to guarantee shareholders’ interest. 
Although SECP is an independent body however, many representatives of SECP 
are not competent, and need learning about, and ability in, the corporate matters 
due to their political appointments.12 Moreover, the other responsible institutions, 
for example, institutional investors (IIs) are likewise not operating adequately 
according to the required standards.13 
5.3 Reasons of Weak Enforcement Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
in Pakistan 
The primary source for the enforcement of rights in Pakistan is the general courts, 
which have failed to resolve corporate disputes.14 In addition to this, the capital 
market has also neglected to execute laws. A few activities were attempted by the 
regulator in this manner however they could not deliver ideal outcomes because of 
the personal stakes of the individuals who did not appreciate and accept even 
partial change.15 Along these lines, the researcher argues that it is necessary to 
upgrade the capability and efficiency of judiciary and to reform the business 
sector according to the existing business environment of Pakistan. The factors 
which are responsible for unsuccessful implementation of CG in Pakistan are 
discussed below. 
(a) Non-Serious Role of the Government 
The first and foremost factor responsible for the unsuccessful implementation of 
laws is the non-serious role of government. The government should introduce 
reforms and take strong legislative measures to build up a suitable and supportive 
atmosphere for the investors especially IIs so that they could work securely, 
progressively and actively. But sadly, it is not the priority of the government of 
                                                            
12 Jaweria Ather, ‘Ensuring Capacity, Integrity and Accountability of Regulators and Supervision’ 
(6th Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, Organised by OECD, Seol 2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_2649_37439_33962850_1_1_1_37439,00.html> 
accessed 10 May 2015 
13 Sikander  Shah, ‘Mergers and the Rights of Minority Shareholders in Pakistan’ (2005) Centre 
for Management and Economics Research (CMER) Working Paper Series No. 04-31, Lahore 
University of Management Sciences, Lahore Pakistan 
14 Evidence is provided in section 1.2.1. 
15 Families and states owning majority of listed companies of Pakistan using their political powers. 
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Pakistan (GOP); rather government official break laws and set examples that CG 
issues are not important. The major corporate and corruption scandals in SOEs 
discussed in section 1.2.1 are the evidence of mala fide on the part of government.  
The second sad factor is that due to political instability in Pakistan governments 
do not focus on the updating of laws and on their enforcement mechanisms; rather 
focus on completing their tenure, coming into power again and make only short-
term decisions for their personal benefits.  
For example, instead of providing health facilities in government hospitals (where 
dozens of patients die every year due to the non-availability of required machinery 
including oxygen masks, monitors etc.), and in schools (where children do not 
have desks to sit, books to read, water to drink, fans in summer, and qualified 
teachers to teach them) which are the basic needs; the current government is 
investing billions of rupees on show case projects like Metro bus, Orange line 
train just in some kilometres of one city, distributing laptops among some 
students; and many more such type of waste projects. High rate of corruption and 
the absence of effective system of check and balance are also the contributing 
factors in this regard.16 
The government’s preference is not to upgrade and enhance the skills, experience 
and qualification of directors of SOEs; instead the political alliance of individuals 
is key for selection on the BODs, and this is one of the serious considerations for 
the failed enforcement of CCG in its true form. Numerous SOEs are working as 
both listed and non-listed companies. These SOEs are controlled politically and 
each government retains control of these companies subsequent to coming into 
power,17 for example, the Nandi-Pur Power Project (NPP) as examined in section 
1.2.1.  
The executives and directors of the BODs stay in such positions at the delight of 
                                                            
16 The researcher’s own observation. 
17 Ibid (n 10) 15 
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the new government.18 Such practices should be discouraged as these do not let 
CG practices to develop. Laws should be manufactured in a way that directors and 
management could not be changed and appointed at the pleasure of anyone. 
Financial press and rating agencies can play their part in this regard by 
highlighting such companies and by lowering their ratings. In addition to them, IIs 
can also play their role in diminishing such mal-practices. 
(b) Family-Owned Enterprises (FOEs) 
The second contributing factor for the non-adoption and implementation of CCG 
is that the corporate sector of Pakistan is vastly concentrated with FOEs. The 
leading companies in Pakistan including automotive, textile, agriculture sector 
and tobacco have been controlled by families through generations via cross 
shareholdings and pyramid structures.19 However, this family controlled trend has 
started to be changed due to the entrance of educated people graduated from best 
foreign universities who comprehend the serious negligence of not adopting CG 
principles and the awareness among big corporations.20  
The role of multinational companies cannot be denied in this regard. Multinational 
companies follow CG best practice principles, their standards, reputation, working 
strategies and increasing financial outcomes attract local companies too. 
Resultantly, a healthy trend of changing the family dominance among 
corporations is shifting.  
The basic scruple in majority of FOEs is a fear that relinquishing control and 
making the board of directors (BODs) diverse would not be favourable for their 
interests. To transform this misconception, proper education should be given to 
                                                            
18 Imtiaz Khan, ‘The Role of International Organisations in promoting Corporate Governance in 
Developing Countries – A Case Study of Pakistan’ (2012) International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 2, 6 
19 Waqar Ghani and Junaid Ashraf, ‘Corporate Governance, Business Group Affiliation and Firm 
Performance: descriptive Evidence from Pakistan’ (2005) Centre for Management and Economic 
Research Working Paper Series 05-35, Lahore University of Management Sciences, 19 
20 Ibid  
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the owners, directors, officials and all stakeholders on the advantages of 
diversified BODs21 (this issue is investigated in this thesis in chapter six).  
(c) The Lack of Focus on Equity Culture  
The reduced concentration on the equity culture and less active stock market is 
also an important cause responsible for the non-adoption and weak enforcement 
of CG principles in Pakistan.22 The growth of equity culture in Pakistan was 
dispirited badly due to extraordinary return on government bonds in the early 
eighties and relaxed admittance to bank loans in the nineties.  This practice of 
debt financing (bank loans) is still prevailing which is a colossal hurdle in the 
growth of equity culture and resultantly, equity market has to lean towards big 
companies. The big family companies are usually contented with and wants to 
retain their position in business sector and unluckily do not let their control to be 
weaken by offering shares to general public.23  
(d) Inactive Financial Press (FP) 
Inactive FP is another important element responsible for the unsuccessful 
implementation of CCG in Pakistan. The Pakistani FP does not highlight and 
discourage the non-compliance, and neglects to give the extra level of 
implementation required for good CG. The FP generally assumes a critical part in 
advancing CG principles, particularly where conventional enforcement 
mechanisms are missing and inadequate.  
                                                            
21 Awais Gulzar and Zongjun Wang, ‘Corporate Governance and Non-Listed Family Owned 
Businesses: An Evidence from Pakistan’, (2012) 1(2) International Journal of Innovation, 
Management and Technology 124, 128; The Corporate Governance Guide, Family-Owned 
Companies (Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Pakistan, Centre for International Private Enterprise, 2008); Arshad Hasan, ‘Impact of Ownership 
Structure and Corporate Governance on Capital Structure of Pakistani Listed Companies’ (2009) 
4(2) International Journal of Business Management 2    
22 Ibid  
23 Zulfiqar Ali and Safdar Butt, ‘The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Cost of Equity: 
Empirical Evidence from Pakistan Listed Companies’ (2009) The Lahore Journal of Economics 
139 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1732509> accessed on 10 May 2015; Jawad Iqbal and Salman 
Shehzad, ‘Relationship of Cost of Governance and Firm’s Profitability’ (2010) 16,17 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530726> accessed 10 May 2015 
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Therefore, a dynamic FP that stays with shareholders side by side for 
improvements is basic to individual investor security. The view of business class 
of Pakistan is that the FP of Pakistan is yet emerging and is not as dynamic as it 
ought to be. No less than two daily English papers are generally streamed in the 
market. While main local and foreign corporate growths are extensively covered 
in these papers, however a typical objection is the viability of the Pakistani FP in 
affectively seeking after corporate issues.24    
The television is preferred to dynamic prevention as compared to the FP. 
Numerous financial news stations have showed up in Pakistan in the previous 
couple of years. The latest participant is CNBC Pakistan. These systems can play 
a noteworthy role in improving compliance with the CCG by highlighting the 
companies not following CCG and by providing information on the markets.25  
(e) Problems With the Implementation of CCG 
The researcher highlights that the problems with the implementation of CCG in 
Pakistan are two fold, as the provisions of the CCG are in two different forms, 
some are voluntary in nature and some are mandatory (see section 4.4). In short, 
Pakistan’s CCG is a combination of soft law and hard law. Therefore, the 
solution to these issues should also be in two different ways.  
The researcher further highlights that in this situation another question can be 
raised that why the CCG in Pakistan is mixed with hard law and soft law; should 
it be only in the form of soft regulations as in the most other countries; or should 
it completely be in the form of hard law.  
The answer is that the existing form of the CCG of Pakistan is completely 
suitable in Pakistan’s corporate sector according to its culture. The argument is; a 
complete hard law is already present in the form of Companies Ordinance 1984, 
therefore no need of another hard law. The other argument is that the CCG are 
                                                            
24 Haroon Hamid and Valeria Kozhich, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: A 
Perspective on Pakistan’ (2006) 1(1) Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 1 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=976499> accessed 10 May 2015  
25 Ibid  
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considered to be for the guidance of the companies for better CG and they are 
mostly in the form of soft law as in the UK, and some other countries. However, 
a complete soft law cannot work effectively in Pakistan. The reason is the lack of 
awareness among shareholders, stakeholders and the general community of the 
potential benefits observing the CCG.  
Moreover, the similar example of the combination of hard law and soft law is 
already prevalent in South Africa in the form of ‘apply or explain’ approach. The 
King III code of South Africa, as with King I and King II, is also built on this 
principle. According to this, it is necessary for directors to ‘apply’ their code or 
‘explain’ the reasons if they do not do so. The underlying idea is that this 
language expresses the intent of the King code more appropriately from 
inauguration. However, the problem with the Pakistan’s CCG, is that there is no 
such provision which could clarify how to comply with the provisions and to 
which extent those provisions are mandatory.26 
Therefore, the researcher contends that, the first step, in order to make the CCG 
effective in Pakistan’s corporate sector, there should be some mandatory 
provisions as they are, so that those provisions could be implemented forcefully 
and other provisions to be left voluntary and regulators should take such measures 
to enforce them. These two aspects are discussed below. 
The implementation of CCG is a main issue.27 The CCG of Pakistan has a number 
of provisions which require binding obligation (see section 4.4), which encounter 
the control of families and the state. Consequently, those families and state are 
hesitant to adopt the CCG completely. The compliance with the CCG is a 
condition for companies to be listed on stock exchange but this condition is not 
being fulfilled as a component of listing regulations.  
                                                            
26  Institute of Directors Southern Africa, ‘King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009’ 
<http://www.ngopulse.org/sites/default/files/king_code_of_governance_for_sa_2009_updated_jun
e_2012.pdf> accessed 20 June 2015 
27 Ruth Aguilera and Alvaro Ceurvo-Cazurra, ‘Codes of Corporate Governance Worldwide: What 
is the Trigger? (2004) 25(3) Organisation Studies 417 
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The researcher finds no proof of any move being made by authorities for non-
adoption and non-implementation of CCG. The yearly reports of significant 
number of companies demonstrate that these reports only cover and contain 
generalised information about the company.  The researcher observes that there is 
an absence of comprehension of the potential advantages attached to adopt and 
implement the CCG. There is only box ticking as opposed to substantial adoption 
of the CCG in its actual form.  
The review of annual reports of many listed companies confirms that a large 
portion of public listed companies are either family-owned or state-owned which 
do not let the CCG to be implemented appropriately. This view is also endorsed 
by the director of SECP.28 The directors of BODs consist upon either relatives in 
case of family-owned companies and individuals having political affiliations in 
case of SOEs.  
Similarly any relative is usually appointed as INED. For this purpose, some shares 
are issued in the name of major children and declare them as INEDs just to satisfy 
the condition of CCG by claiming those kids independent.29 The researcher asserts 
that the reason of this may also be an assumption in the business community of 
Pakistan that they consider the office of independent director just an honorary 
position and do not realise that, the actual purpose of this office is to monitor the 
policies and strategic decision-making of BODs. 
The researcher further submits that there must be some mechanism which could 
evaluate the accuracy of disclosure made by companies in their annual statements 
and impose fine on the non-compliance of mandatory provisions of the CCG as 
well as for providing the false statement in annual report.  External auditors can 
be appointed for this purpose.  
                                                            
28Rasul Rais and Asif Saeed, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment of SECP’s Corporate Governance 
Code in Pakistan’ Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) Paper Series, CMER 
Working Paper No. 05-39 (2005) 13; Mahwesh Mumtaz, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan-
Adopt or Adapt? Paper presented at a conference in Lahore on 3-4 June 2005 organised by the 
SECP and Lahore University of Management Sciences 
29 Ibid (n 10) 15; For example the textile companies of Pakistan such as, Al-Karam Group of 
Companies, Chenab Group, Nagina Group and many more. 
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The CCG 2012 in its clauses (xI), (xIi) and (xIii) provides the procedure to 
comply with the CCG and disclose it in yearly reports according the form 
specified in Appendix B of the CCG. However, the CCG does not provide that if a 
company does not follow this procedure and commits non-compliance then what 
action can be taken against that company. The only thing comes in researcher’s 
mind is delisting, as SECP has included the compliance with CCG as listing 
requirements. But this act of delisting is very harsh particularly for a stock market 
which has only a few large companies listed on it.  
Therefore, the researcher contends that the introduction of pecuniary penalties 
may fulfil this purpose. Secondly, in these circumstances the influence of 
investors particularly IIs might be the most prompt reaction to resistance to adopt 
CCG, through which they can exert pressure significantly on their investee 
companies due to their large shareholdings and can look for confirmation from the 
administration to adopt and implement CCG in their investee companies. 
Moreover, rating agencies and media can also play a significant role in 
pressurising non-complying companies which will also create a healthy 
environment of competition.  
Furthermore, another serious issue related to the implementation of CCG is the 
penalty structure. As mentioned in previous sections, the compliance of CCG is 
part of listing regulations (LR) and therefore, non-compliance with CCG 
considered as the infringement of LR and the only punishment in case of violation 
of LR is delisting, which is not appropriate and very strict specially in case of 
partial compliance. As LR neither clarifies the difference between the full and 
partial violation of CCG nor provide separate mechanisms to tackle these 
situations. 
The regulator is additionally not willing to enforce this penalty in the form of 
delisting due to some reasons.30 Firstly, the number of listed companies is already 
very less and delisting will further reduce this number. Secondly, delisting 
damages the shareholders who are usually not responsible for such violation. 
                                                            
30 Ibid (n 10) 17 
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Therefore, the penalty mechanism should be revised and alternative penalties 
should be introduced instead of delisting such as, in the form of fine in order to 
make enforcement effective and appropriate.  
However, the penalty should be commensurate with the quantum of non-
compliance. It could be measured in two ways: one according to the capital 
(wealth) of a company and secondly, the loss which occurs particularly to 
shareholders as a result of non-adoption of CCG. The scholars of corporate law 
also believe that the absence of penal provisions in the CCG of Pakistan limit their 
enforcement.31  The argument is that instead of de-listing, the inclusion of penal 
provisions in CCG may make it more effective in developing good CG in 
Pakistan. A more dynamic controlling mechanism, balanced between unnecessary 
intrusion and no monitoring, may guarantee better defiance with the CCG.  
5.4 The Role of Judiciary in Corporate Governance  
Companies take decisions on the basis of majority vote.32 However, there is 
possibility that a few individuals might gain advantage through illicit ways or by 
utilising their overwhelming influence at the expense of minority votes. Such 
activities might be legitimate and inside their mandates and their directives 
however the result of these acts might be the seizure of the interests of minority 
and individual shareholders, which is unlawful.  
For example, utilising voting powers to settle on choices whose goal is to crush 
out or weaken minority shareholders’ voting right. Besides, utilising their 
predominant position to elect directors or different administrators whose aim is to 
give benefits to relatives and friends. In addition to this, making contracts with 
different companies or privately owned businesses in which the interests of 
shareholders having large shareholdings are involved.  
                                                            
31 The World Bank, ‘Report on the Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Corporate 
Governance’ (2005) Corporate Governance Country Assessment of Pakistan 4 
32 For example the BODs finalise a decision if majority of directors vote in favour.  
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Therefore, the issue of differentiating between lawful acts and lawful ways to 
accomplish illegal acts is constantly left to the courts to decide. This 
interpretational role33 of the court highlights the significance of judiciary; and the 
incompetence of the legislature to anticipate likely future problems maximises this 
judicial role.34 This role highlights the influential role of the courts and secondly, 
the decisions of courts directly affect future decisions, as they become point of 
reference called precedent and these precedents are mandatory to be considered by 
inferior courts, and influential for equal and foreign courts for future decisions.35  
The native courts in common law countries like Pakistan might get assistance by 
the decisions of even overseas courts.36 However, the capability of judges to 
interpret those choices and relate them to their particular situations might be 
challenging for an inefficient and inactive judicial mechanism.37 The issue could 
be even more serious in case of specialised matters such as corporate matters.  
The judges in the courts in Pakistan do not generally have appropriate knowledge 
and skills to deal with corporate and other business issues.38 They keep case law 
unclear and ambiguous purposefully as they do not have expertise to deal with 
analytical as well as legal perceptive.39 The researcher submits that weak and 
inefficient legal framework in Pakistan is one of the basic issues concerning to 
implementation and enforcement, which is one of the major, cause of a weak CG 
system, and an obstacle in pulling foreign as well as domestic investment. 
                                                            
33 This interpretational role of courts is discussed below (section 5.4.2). 
34 Jonathan Macey, ‘Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law 
Review 1698, 1700 
35 Faqir Hussain, ‘The Judicial System of Pakistan’ (2011) 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/thejudicialsystemofPakistan.pdf> accessed 
20 June 2015 
36 Ibid  
37 Inefficiency of Pakistan’s judicial mechanism is discussed below. 
38 The World Bank (ibid 31) 
39 Living Armytage, ‘Pakistan’s Law and Justice Sector Reform Experience-Some Lessons’ (2003) 
Centre for Judicial Studies, 13th Commonwealth Law Conference in Melbourne 
<http://www.educatingjudges.com/Hyperlinks/PakistanADBProjectLessonsLearned.pdf> accessed 
15th October 2015 
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5.4.1 Corporate Judicature in Pakistan 
The judicial framework of Pakistan experienced and went through three different 
phases of historical growth, to be specific, Hindu Kingdom, Muslim Rule and 
British Colonial organisation. The fourth and current phase is a result of 
independence of Pakistan as an independent and Free State. Therefore, the 
framework has grown through a series of change and improvement. The historians 
and critics of Indian history are unanimous on this.40 During this process of 
development, the judicial framework of Pakistan has been influenced by both 
foreign and local doctrines and norms. As a result, the organisation, structure, 
hierarchy and the procedures to take decisions in judiciary of Pakistan are inspired 
and influenced by those foreign and local practices.41  
Hence, the present legal framework of Pakistan is not completely derived from 
foreign countries as normally considered; it has also obtained native norms’ 
flavour. Furthermore, although the framework is not completely appropriate for 
the necessities of our kin or fulfil the indigenous conditions, its constant adoption 
and practice has made it coherent to people. It is asserted that the reality of 
expanding number of individuals making resort to courts for resolving their 
disputes shows the acceptance and legitimacy of the system.42  
However, the researcher argues that, this is not the criteria by which the efficiency 
and effectiveness of a system could be judged, i.e. that a large number of people 
are going to courts taking their grievances when there is no alternative forum 
available to them. In reality, the judicial framework of Pakistan has been 
unsuccessful in delivering justice.43 
                                                            
40 Osama Siddique, ‘Approaches to Legal and Judicial Reform in Pakistan: Post-Colonial Inertia 
and the Paucity of Imagination in Times of Turmoil and Change’ (2011) Development Policy 
Research Centre (DPRC) Working Paper 4, LUMS Lahore 14 
<http://dprc.lums.edu.pk/components/com_publications/attachments/DPRC-WP4-Siddique.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2015 
41 Ibid  
42 Ibid (n 40) 
43 The evidence and examples of this fact are provided in section 5.4.2 
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The Constitution of Pakistan44 cherished the latest version of the judicial structure 
of Pakistan.45 The corporate judicature is set out according to the Companies 
Ordinance 1984, the SECP Act, 1997 and the Constitution of Pakistan. The 
persons having grievances relating to corporate matters can file a complaint or a 
petition in two mediums: the SCEP and general courts.  
The appropriate medium for filing a complaint regarding corporate matters is the 
SECP, and can hear complaints in two conditions: when the SECP is declared as 
the appropriate medium for filing a complaint and; when the provisions of the 
Ordinance46 are violated and no forum is declared to initiate a complaint and the 
punishment for the infringement is just fine. The second medium is general courts 
in two conditions: when the court is stated as an appropriate medium and; when 
the punishment for infringement is imprisonment with or without a fine.47 
The Ordinance states that in situations where the punishment is a just fine, the 
officials of the SECP retain the authority to entertain these cases relying on the 
amount of fine.48 A revision application against the decisions of assistant registrar, 
deputy registrar, joint registrar and additional registrar can be filed to the 
Registrar of Companies.49  
Likewise, a revision application against the decision of a registrar and any other 
official authorised by the SECP can be filed with the commission.50 The 
commission retains the authority to revise any decision of any officer of the 
SECP, and the decision of the commission will be ultimate and absolute.51 
Likewise, the commission and registrar retain the authority to review their own 
                                                            
44 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
45 Part VII, Articles 175-212, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 
46 The Companies Ordinance 1984 
47 S. 476 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 (the Ordinance) 
48 Part II of the Ordinance. 
49 S. 477 (1) (a) of the Ordinance 
50 S. 477 (1) (b) of the Ordinance; Commission means the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan 
51 S. 484 (1)  of the Ordinance 
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decision and that order will be final.52 An aggrieved person can also file an appeal 
to the High Court (HC) in spite of review, revision or appeal by the SECP.53  
The SECP may inaugurate Appellate Benches authorised to entertain an appeal 
within the SECP.54 If the decision is taken by the commission consisting upon one 
commissioner, in that case the right of appeal is to the Appellate Bench consisting 
upon commissioners (more than one), and this Bench will not include those 
commissioner who had made the original decision. An appeal against an order of 
the Appellate Bench will be to the courts according to the Part II of the Ordinance 
within 60 days.55  
The following figure shows the structure in case of different penalties for 
aggrieved parties that where to lodge a complaint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
52 S. 484 (2) of the Ordinance 
53 S. 485 (1) of the Ordinance 
54 S. 33(2) of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 1997 (the SECP Act, 
1997) 
55 Ss. 33-4 of the SECP Act, 1997 
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   Figure 5.2: Pakistan’s Penalty Structure in Relation to Corporate Matters56 
The Ordinance outlines the judicature of corporate matters.57 It confers authorities 
to the HC in corporate matters. The Chief Justice (CJ) of the relevant HC has 
power to give direction to company benches to deal with corporate cases. The 
central government might additionally authorise any civil court to deal with the 
cases comes under its jurisdiction. The appeal structure is similar for corporate 
cases as for general matters.  
The appeals against the decisions of civil and criminal courts will go to a district 
court and session court correspondingly. An appeal against the order of the district 
court or the session court will go to the HC, and against the decision of the HC to 
                                                            
56 Developed by the researcher according to the Companies Ordinance 1984 
57 Sections 7-10 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
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the Supreme Court (SC). Though, an appeal relating to the issues of winding-up is 
restricted to the SC.58 
Moreover, the Ordinance states that the cases that come under the Ordinance will 
be dispensed with by the courts under summary proceeding and will be decided 
within 90 days. The cases will not be adjourned for more than 14 days at a time or 
more than 30 days as a whole, but for adequate reason.59  The intention of 
Ordinance is to discard corporate cases speedily however; the courts do not take 
after these procurements in practice. Courts do not consider the binding form of 
the law and view it as being of just guiding principles.  
This demonstrates the non-serious approach of the courts in regards to dispose of 
corporate matters speedily. Another cause behind why cases are not managed 
rapidly might be the load on the courts which makes it difficult for them to 
dispose of these matters inside the time span fixed by the Ordinance. The 
researcher submits that, this may be the case everywhere, but it is necessary to 
resolve this issue by increasing the number of judges so that the cases could be 
disposed of quickly, as due to this undue delay aggrieved parties have to suffer a 
lot in terms of time, money and also psychologically and emotionally.  
The following figure shows the structure of corporate Judicature in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
58 Ss. 7-10 of the Ordinance 
59 S. 9 of the Ordinance 
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          Figure 5.3: The Structure of Corporate Judicature in Pakistan60 
5.4.2 The Judicial Problems in Pakistan 
The leaders of the nation have truly traded off the autonomy and uprightness of 
the courts for various reasons. Pakistan obtained independence in 1947 yet, ruled 
by dictators for many years,61 and these dictators attempted to control the 
judiciary so as to grow their tyrannical administration. They made Provisional 
Constitutional Orders (PCOs) for the purpose of controlling the judges of superior 
courts. These acts prompted the devastation of judiciary as an institution. 
                                                            
60 Adapted from Imtiaz Khan and developed according to the provisions of the Companies 
Ordinance 1984 
61 First Martial law was from October 1958 to March 1969; the second was from March 1969 to 
December 1971; third was from July 1977 to August 1988; and the fourth was from October 1999 
to August 2008. This period consists upon more than 33 years out of 68 years of independence of 
Pakistan till to-date December 2015.   
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In addition to this, the judiciary could not be separated from the Executive in spite 
of the provisions of the Constitution 1973.62 The political influence on the 
judiciary is another major cause which is not letting the Judiciary of Pakistan to be 
established as a strong and independent institution. For instance, the Constitution 
of Pakistan provides comprehensive guidance relating to the composition, 
jurisdiction, powers and functions of the courts. The Constitution requires the 
separation of judiciary from the executive and its autonomy.63 It confers the 
responsibility to protect, preserve and protect the Constitution on superior 
courts.64 The Constitution also provides the procedures for the appointment, 
qualification and remuneration of judges.65  
The Constitution further elaborates that the remuneration of judges and different 
managerial expenses of the apex courts will be paid by the Federal/Provincial 
Consolidated Fund.66 It means that the issue of judges’ remuneration and other 
expenditures of apex courts can be discussed in the legislature but cannot be voted 
upon. Furthermore, the Constitution additionally offers the mechanism for the 
dismissal of the superior courts’ judges.67  
According to this mechanism, the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), comprising of 
the senior judges of the SC and HC, on a reference made by the President or on its 
own, can remove a Judge due to misbehaviour, delinquency or physical or mental 
incapacity. Therefore, the independence of the apex judiciary is essential and the 
provisions of the Constitutions ensure this independence and impartiality of the 
apex courts. 
However, the SC and HCs have been given financial autonomy recently; as a 
result of a ruling given by the SC in the case of Government of Sind v Sharaf 
Faridi.68 The Court said that the independence of judiciary and its separation from 
                                                            
62 Article 174 clause (3) of the Constitution 
63 Preamble and Article 2A of the Constitution 
64 Article 178 and 194 read with the 3rd Schedule 
65 Article 177, 193 and 205 read with Schedule 5. 
66 Article 18 to 21 
67 Article 209 of the Constitution 
68 Government of Sindh v Sharaf Faridi PLD 1994 SC 105 
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the Executive requires exclusion of Executive control on financial matters of the 
judiciary. Therefore the CJ of the SC and the HC should have authority to re-
assign the funds in the allocation of budget without the endorsement of Ministry 
of Finance (MOF). In addition to this, the CJ should be authorised to re-assign 
funds from one head to another and also to generate/abolish posts in the judiciary 
as well as to upgrade and downgrade those posts. 
The SC gave this ruling while interpreting Article 175(3) of the Constitution, 
according to which the judiciary should be separated from the Executive gradually 
within 14 years of the commencement of the Constitution. The Court ruled that in 
the light of this provision of the Constitution, the roles and responsibilities of 
magistracy should be alienated and the judicial magistrates must be positioned 
under the administrative control of the HC. The Court gave the deadline of 23rd of 
March 1994 to carry out this order. However, this date was extended to 23rd 
March 1996 as a result of a review petition before the SC. Consequently, 
amendments were made in law and the judicial magistrates positioned under the 
administration of HC. 
Later, in the cases of Al-Jehad Trust v Federation69 and Asad Ali v Federation70 
the SC further interpreted numerous provisions of the Constitution and elucidated 
the mechanisms and qualifications for appointment of the SC, HC and the CJs of 
the respective courts.71  
Prior to these amendments, the CJ of Pakistan was used to select a board for the 
judges of the SC and recommend that board to the President and the President was 
to choose an appropriate judge from that board. Likewise, to appoint judges of the 
HC, the concerned CJ of that HC used to select a panel and forward that to the 
President through the Governor of the Province and CJ of Pakistan. The reference 
                                                            
69 Al-Jehad Trust v Federation PLD 1996 SC 324 
70 Asad Ali v Federation PLD 1998 SC 33 
71 The Constitution 19th (Amendment) Acts 2010  
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of the CJ was obligatory on the President to follow, otherwise the President used 
to record strong reasons for not accepting the recommendation of the CJ.72 
This mechanism has now been changed through the 19th Constitution (19th 
Amendment) Act 2010, the intention of which is to strengthen the parliamentary 
system instead to strengthen the judiciary and improve the relations between 
federation and provinces. The Parliament approved two forums for the selection 
of judges of superior courts including, SC, Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and HC. 
One, Judicial Commission (JC), supervised by the CJ of Pakistan and consisting 
upon senior judges of the SC, CJ and senior judges of HC and Attorney General 
(AG) of Pakistan, Federal and Provincial Law Ministers and the agents of the 
Federal and Provincial Bar Councils. The JC proposes names for every post. This 
proposal is sent to the Parliamentary Committee (PC) for ratification. The PC 
consists upon eight members, four from National Assembly and four from Senate. 
The names ratified by PC are sent to the President, through the Prime Minister 
(PM) for appointment.73 
This amendment was challenged in the SC and inspected by a seventeen-member 
bench, which decided unanimously to forward a reference to the PC with definite 
proposals to develop the procedure of appointment of judges. The Parliament 
cordially accepted the reference and approved several proposals through 
embracing the Constitution (19th Amendment) Act, 2010.  
According to the 19th amendments, judges of the SC are appointed through the JC 
comprising upon the CJ of Pakistan as Chairman, four senior most judges of the 
SC, one former CJ or judge of the SC, selected by the Chairman with the 
consultation of four member judges for a period of two years, the AG of Pakistan, 
the Federal Law Minister and a senior advocate of the SC, nominated by the 
Pakistan Bar Council (PBC).74  
                                                            
72 Chapter 1, Article 175A; Chapter 2, Articles 177; Chapter 3, Article 193 
73 Article 175A of the Constitution after 19th amendment. 
74 Article 175A Clause (2) of the Constitution. 
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After the approval of a name for the judge of the SC by JC, it is forwarded to PC 
comprising upon eight members having equal representation of government and 
opposition and both houses of the Parliament. The PC if approves the name within 
two weeks, that name is sent to the President through the PM. However, the PC 
retains the authority to disapprove the name recommended by JC by 3/4th 
majority, and in that case the decision of PC is forwarded to the JC via PM and 
then JC forwards another name for appointment.75  
However, a mechanism of accountability is inevitable for the judicial autonomy. 
The Constitution provides this mechanism in the form of Supreme Judicial 
Council (SJC). The SJC consists upon the CJ of Pakistan as Chairman, two most 
senior Judges of the SC and two most senior CJs of HCs. The Registrar of the SC 
acts as the Secretary of the SJC. On the reference from President or via suo moto 
action, the SJC examines the matter and forwards its judgement to the President. 
If the SJC decides that the respective Judge is not able to accomplish his duties or 
is guilty of misconduct, and hence should be fired, the President can order the 
dismissal of that respective judge.76 
The researcher believes that there was no need for this amendment (19th) in the 
Constitution; this amendment is done only to control the judiciary and establish 
the authority of Parliament over Judiciary which is also the dominance of 
Executives over Judiciary.  
There are a number of corruption cases involving top ministers, politicians and 
even on current and former PMs, but we have not seen the judiciary taking action 
against them. While, the CJ of Pakistan takes suo moto action on petty matters, he 
does not take any action on big corruption cases. This is the case only of superior 
judiciary in Pakistan which is even much better than the lower courts. The state of 
lower courts is even worse and how can we expect justice, independence and 
impartiality from the lower courts of a judicial system where superior courts are 
not independent and cannot do justice. 
                                                            
75 Article 175 A of the Constitution 
76 Article 209 of the Constitution 
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Furthermore, inefficiency of the judiciary is another problem.77 The judicial 
procedure is complicated, which causes delays in deciding cases. In addition to 
this, the incompetence of judges to handle technical cases, less number of judges, 
lack of facilities and support staff also cause inordinate and unreasonable delays.78  
Some steps were taken by the foreign institutions to reform the judiciary in 
Pakistan, but due to the mala fide of rulers those steps could not succeed. The first 
step was taken by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2001 under the ‘Access 
to Justice Program’,79 the aim of which was increasing the number of judges in 
the courts.  
The second step was taken by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in 2009 with the aim of ‘Strengthening Justice with 
Pakistan’ which included US$90 million.80 The aim of this initiative was to 
maximise judicial competence, transparency, accessibility, independence, 
accountability, efficacy, protection of private businesses and foreign investment.81 
These initiatives could not be successful because of the lack of consensus 
regarding the terms and conditions of the applicability of these steps between the 
GOP and USAID. The failure of international organisations and the GOP to 
improve the judicial structure of Pakistan is additionally a key factor which did 
not let the judiciary to be and perform as a strong and independent institution.  
Moreover, the absence of enforcement power with respect to judiciary in Pakistan 
is one of the primary causes of corruption in every public and private sector of 
country. This absence of enforcement power influences each segment of country, 
including corporate sector. The shareholders’ rights, particularly the minority and 
individual shareholders’ rights, are more terrible in a powerless legal framework, 
                                                            
77 Ibid (n 40) 
78 Ibid (n 40) 
79 ADB Completion Report, ‘Pakistan Access to Justice Programme’ (2009) 1 
<http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2009/32023-01-pak-pcr-pdf> accessed 10 June 
2015 
80 USAID Program, ‘Strengthening Justice with Pakistan’ (2009) 9 
<http://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=1a353d985a6979255fe8491f0d59c8b
2&tab=core&_cview=1> accessed 10-01-2015 
81 Ibid 
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and the frail enforcement framework influences the entire economy of the state. 
Therefore, judicial reform is inevitable to make the laws enforceable, as without 
implementation and enforcement there is no use of any law.   
5.4.3 Reforms in the Judicial System of Pakistan 
The safeguard to shareholders’ interests can be ensured by the courts, government 
organisations and other market contributors,82 and to attract foreign investments, 
foreign investors need protection against expropriation of their assets.  
The judiciary is regarded as the primary forum in securing the rights of investors. 
One view in this regard is that the burdens on judiciary could be reduced if other 
institutions are strong enough to ensure investor protection. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the fact that other supporting institutions are made strong, the 
significance of the judiciary stays at its place. The interpretation of law and other 
legal matters require judicial involvement. Hence, improving the system but 
disregarding the weaknesses in the judiciary might not create ideal results. 
Nonetheless, improving the judicial system is a challenging and lengthy procedure 
which requires the support of politicians and other groups having vested 
interests.83 Political and financial restrictions can influence these endeavours,84 
because of the reason that the interests of large business groups and the politicians 
are associated.85  
Another hurdle in this step could be those families who hold and control a number 
of companies are politically powerful as well.86 They confiscate minority and 
individual investors as well as the companies.87 Consequently, they do not 
welcome reforms whose purpose is to expand shareholders security by improving 
                                                            
82 LLSV, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 28 The Journal of Finance 24 
83 Leora Klapper and Inessa Love, ‘Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Firm 
Performance in Emerging Markets’ (2004) 10 Journal of Corporate Finance 723 
84 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens, ‘Enforcement and Corporate Governance’ (2004) World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3409,  37 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625286&download=yes> accessed 15th 
October 2014 
85 See section 1.2.1 
86 Discussed in section 5.3, 4.3 and 1.2.1  
87 Ibid  
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enforcement frameworks; as the reformed judicial system can reduce their control 
of expropriation; hence, they do not favour reform programmes with the help of 
political influences.  
Though, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) endeavoured to change legal 
framework of Pakistan, however their endeavours could not be productive 
because of political contrasts between the GOP and the IFIs. The obvious 
intention of these obstacles by the GOP is to protect the particular groups who 
have vested interests; as an improved, just and efficient judicial system could be a 
risk for the politicians being corrupt.  
Pakistan is ranked high by Transparency International (TI) in corruption for 
several previous years. TI ranked the department of Police, Civil Servants, 
Political Parties and Parliament as the most corrupt institutions in its report 
published in 2013.88 There are a number of corruption cases that can be cited but 
they are beyond the scope of this thesis. It is obvious that, an autonomous and 
transformed judicial system can be risky for corrupt individuals and groups 
holding public offices; hence, they do not allow the legal system to be improved.  
In such a situation, the scholars of CG propose a different option to the judicial 
enforcement mechanism.89 As per them, one choice may be to reform and enhance 
firm-level administration by embracing contracts with more disclosure, protecting 
shareholder rights, and implementing CCG. They contend that companies with a 
well and long established CG mechanism may not require resort to a judicial 
enforcement mechanism. However, the counter argument to this option is that, 
this substitute to the judicial enforcement mechanism might not be a good choice 
because of the reason that corporate clashes cannot be discounted due to just 
existence of rights of shareholders, disclosure and the acceptance of CCG in the 
MOA and AOA of companies.  
                                                            
88 Transparency International <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=pakistan> 
accessed 15 May 2015 
89 Leora Klapper and Inessa Love, ‘Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Firm 
Performance in Emerging Markets’ (2004) 10 Journal of Corporate Finance 723 
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The reason could be the process in which corporate choices are made and 
companies are worked, the likelihood of contention among the parties 
permanently exists. If there is an occurrence of a debate, the parties might have 
option to an impartial forum. The well-established governance mechanism has 
also to face corporate conflicts, a sound judicial enforcement mechanism is 
necessary to enforce the laws. Private implementation may be a viable instrument 
however it would rely on public enforcement.90  
Therefore, this thesis argues that both of these mechanisms company-level 
governance mechanism and strong judicial enforcement mechanism are required 
simultaneously for the better implementation of CG practices in the listed 
companies of Pakistan; as firm-level administration can be viable just when there 
is an entrenched judicial or institutional mechanism of enforcement. 
Moreover, the judicial organisation and framework is another major problem with 
enforcement of CG in Pakistan. The judges in general courts are appointed by a 
competition exam. The candidates can appear in exam after two years of 
completion of their LLB.91 The majority of candidates appear in exams have their 
qualification as LLB, only few have LLM degrees. The CG subject is not included 
in the curriculum of LLB in Pakistan’s law colleges; that’s why they lack required 
skills and knowledge to entertain technical cases related to corporate matters, 
insider trading, mergers, and acquisitions, takeovers, listing rules and securities 
laws.  
One approach to deal this problem may be to give training to the newly appointed 
judges in these fields; but this procedure would be lengthy and costly as the price 
of this procedure will be high when calculated against the potential advantages 
that this procedure might produce. The reason is that just a few judges are 
required to deal with corporate matters; therefore it is not prudent to spend a huge 
                                                            
90 Ibid (n 40) 
91 On the other hand, the minimum requirement for a person to apply to be a judge in England is 
five years of practice; however in practice the people who apply for a judicial seat usually have 15-
20 years of experience in the legal field. Such practice should be established in Pakistan as well in 
order to enhance the competency of judges. 
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amount of money, time and effort on such training. As there is no need to train all 
judges in corporate matters.   
Therefore, to establish the separate specialised corporate courts would be a better 
idea. This idea is already in debates among the corporate academics of Pakistan. It 
will require less time and money, as once these courts will be established they will 
continue to work like this. In this way the efforts are required only once; while in 
other case judges will have to train every time on their appointment, secondly 
which judges should be trained, only few or all, it is very confusing and 
troublesome.  
The establishment of separate special corporate courts will advance the 
enforcement framework relating to corporate matters. The CG framework can 
operate efficiently if the regulatory bodies have not to depend on the general 
courts due to many reasons; the most significant is the over-burden of general 
courts. The judges of corporate courts can be trained accordingly in order to 
provide them with basic knowledge of corporate matters.92 The part of general 
courts in corporate matters will be reduced only to deal with a legal fault which 
can be resolved by filing an appeal before general courts. 
The practice of establishing special courts for the purpose of enhancing 
enforcement capability has already taken place in various jurisdictions.93 The 
Financial Court in China, Commercial Courts in Malaysia, the Financial 
Reporting Council (RFC) in Hong Kong, the CG Office in the Philippines Stock 
Exchange, the Enforcement Division in Bursa Malaysia, the Audit Oversight 
Boards in South Korea and Malaysia, the economic courts in Russia,94 labour 
courts in Germany95 and the tribunals in India are examples of special 
                                                            
92 Ibid (n 2) 815 
93 OECD, ‘Corporate Governance in Asia 2011: Progress and Challenges, Corporate Governance’ 
(OECD Publishing 2011) <http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/product/2611011e.pdf> 
accessed 10 May 2015 
94 Karen Halverson, ‘Resolving Economic Disputes in Russia’s Market Economy’ (1996) 18 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 59, 60 
95 Erhard Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to Neighbouring 
Germany’ (1998) 46(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 23, 25 
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enforcement frameworks within existing institutions in different parts of the 
world.  
Moreover, the Federal securities law in the US also anticipates administrative 
courts to improve the enforcement framework.96 The establishment of special 
courts might solve the enforcement issues or possibly uplift the capability to 
enforce corporate laws.  
This practice of establishing specialised courts and tribunals is already in place in 
Pakistan in different fields under different laws. For example the federal 
administrative courts and tribunals already working in Pakistan are; Banking 
Courts,97 Anti-Terrorism Courts,98 Accountability Courts,99 Drug Courts,100 
Special Courts of Emigration Offences,101 Labour Courts,102 Court of Special 
Judge (Customs, Taxation and Anti-Smuggling),103 Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunals,104 Environmental Appellate Tribunals,105 Insurance Appellate 
Tribunals,106 Service Tribunals,107 Special Courts (Control of Narcotics 
Substances),108 Federal Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib),109 Federal Tax 
Ombudsman,110 Federal Insurance Ombudsman,111 Commercial Courts112 and 
Integrated Utility Courts.113 Moreover, the provincial administrative courts and 
                                                            
96 John Coffee, ‘Privatisation and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market 
Failure’ (1999) 25 The Journal of Corporation Law Studies 29 
97 Under the Recovery of Finances Ordinance 2001 and The Offences in Respect of Banks 
Ordinance 1984 
98 Under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 
99 Under the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance 1999  
100 Under the Drugs Act 1976 
101 Under the Emigration Ordinance 1979 
102 The Industrial Relation Ordinance 2002 
103 Under the Customs Act 1969 
104 Under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 
105 Under the Pakistan Environment Protection Act 1997 
106 Under the Insurance Ordinance 2000 
107 In accordance with the Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
under the Services Tribunals Act 1973 
108 Under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 
109 The Establishment of the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order 1983  
110 Under the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2000 
111 Under the Insurance Ordinance 2000 
112 Under the Import and Export (Control) Act 1950 
113 Under the Gas Utility Companies Act 2010 
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tribunals already existing in Pakistan are; Revenue Courts,114 Consumer Courts, 
Rent Tribunals,115 Family Courts,116 Services Tribunals,117 Anti-Terrorist 
Courts118 and Drug Courts.119 
The administrative courts, tribunals and the ombudsmen120 are working to provide 
assistance to people in various matters, and are performing better than the 
traditional judiciary.121 Therefore establishing corporate courts would help to 
expedite the enforcement framework in corporate matters which lead towards 
prevailing of CG practices and improve the corporate sector of Pakistan; as 
dealing with corporate matters requires expertise and special knowledge; hence, 
hiring specialists would reduce delays, expense and will prevail justice.  
The researcher further submits that, establishing separate corporate courts may 
help considerably in enhancing the implementation and enforcement of corporate 
laws but it cannot make a big difference due to many other issues which need to 
be dealt along with establishing special corporate courts. As mentioned above, 
there are already several special administrative courts and tribunals working in the 
country which shows the efficiency of system; then why justice cannot be seen to 
be done and general society do not have trust in judiciary.  
There are many other reasons for this which have been identified above122 
therefore measures need to be done to resolve these problems as well. For this 
purpose, this thesis argues that judiciary should be a strong and an independent 
                                                            
114 Under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 
115 The Punjab Rented Premises Act 2009 
116 Under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 
117 Under the Punjab Services Tribunal Act 1974 
118 Under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 
119 Under the Drugs Act 1976 
120 The Islamic Countries Society of Statistical Sciences (ICSSS), ‘Citizen Report Card Study 
(CRCS) on the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) Pakistan’ (Transparency International Pakistan 
(TIP) <http://fto.gov.pk/userfiles/TIP%20Report%20-%20A%20Summary.pdf> accessed 05-01-
2015; The Nationwide daily Urdu newspaper Jhang reported on 15-12-2011 that the FTO was the 
most effective accountability office in the public sector; TIP mentioned in the Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2011 released on 1st December 2011 that the FTO was the cleanest institution in 
the public sector. 
121 TIP has reported the Pakistani Judiciary as the fourth most corrupt institution after Taxation, 
Police and Land Administration Departments in its ‘National Corruption Perception Survey 2011’ 
<http://www.transparency.org.pk/report/ncps2011/ncps2011.pdf> accessed 10-01-2015 
122 In sections 5.4, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 1.2.1 
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institution; therefore it should be separated from the Executive according to the 
Constitution.  
This thesis challenges the 19th amendment of the Constitution which is done to 
limit the judicial authority of superior courts and control the judiciary by the 
Executives. The appointment, qualification and remuneration of superior courts’ 
judges should be done according to the constitution as was before the 19th 
amendment not through the Executives.  
Likewise, the removal of a judge should also be by SJC according to the 
Constitution without any interference or influence of the Executive. As if 
judiciary could not be separated from the Executives it can never be independent 
and cannot do justice. How could judicial system be just if it could not prevail rule 
of law? Therefore, in order to get a reformed and independent judicial system it 
should be free from any political influence. 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that, some ethics and code of conduct should also 
be formulated for the retired judges of superior courts, that they should not be 
involved during or after their retirement in any political matters. The former CJ of 
Pakistan Mr Iftikhar Chaudhary has established his own political party after his 
retirement and has formally started politics. During his tenure as a CJ of Pakistan, 
he decided some important cases and gave historical judgements. The people of 
Pakistan had great respect for him and started trusting judiciary due to him. But 
sadly, after his retirement several news channels revealed his and his son’s 
involvement in many corruption scandals with government, his relations with 
political parties and now finally he launched his own political party.  This practice 
is wrong. A judge should always be a judge and behave like a responsible person. 
Judges should not be allowed to participate in any political practices. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter four that the commissioners of SECP are 
appointed by the government. The large listed companies are either under state 
control or family-owned, and those families also have strong political relations. In 
such environment the appointment of independent commissioners is also difficult. 
Therefore, the policy makers should devise a mechanism independent from 
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political influence for the appointment and removal of the commissioners of 
SECP which is an important institution of corporate sector of Pakistan. 
Last and probably the most significant concern is to enhance judicial efficiency 
and capacity. This thesis argues that it can be done by increasing the number of 
judges. The argument is that, with increasing the number of judges the burden of 
courts will be balanced which serve two purposes; one it can enhance the judicial 
efficiency and capacity when the courts will have reduced number of cases for 
each judge to handle on daily basis. They will have more time to give each case 
and as a result the quality of judgements will also improve.  
Secondly, it will also reduce unemployment. However, the more important issue 
in this regard is the appointment procedure of judges. Judges should be appointed 
through a fair mechanism on merit; otherwise only increasing numbers by 
appointing more judges will not serve the purpose; as quality is more important 
and it should not be compromised for the sake of quantity.   
5.5 The Role of Capital Market in Corporate Governance 
The capital market of Pakistan is also an important area of concern for effective 
enforcement in corporate matters. The market is not as efficient as required,123 and 
fails to punish companies performing badly and to their directors responsible for 
bad performance of companies. A market with frail enforcement framework 
permits market control and seizure of minority and individual investors by 
overwhelming business groups having large shareholdings. In the absence of a 
reformed and efficient market the principles of CG cannot grow.  
The market reform was started with the establishment of an authorised and 
independent regulator the SECP (as discussed in chapter one and four).  The 
launch of SECP was the major breakthrough in this respect. However, the 
disappointment of business sector to uphold shareholders’ security and penalise 
                                                            
123 Ghani and Ashraf (n 19) 19 
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bad performing companies remained the major worry. As a result, some reforms 
were undertaken in the stock markets.  
During the first phase of reform, the central depository company (CDC) was 
established for the supervision of significant securities under the Central 
Depositories Act, 1997 and the Central Depository Companies (Establishment and 
Regulation) Rules, 1996.  
In the second stage of reform, the stock market was demutualised and transformed 
from a company limited by guarantee to a company limited by shares and opened 
it for public trade. According to the rules, the stock market was to be corporatized, 
and integrated by the end of 31 December 2006,124 which has not been done yet 
due to the slow legislative process in Pakistan.   
During the third phase of reform the insider trading’s rules were modified. The 
new meaning and description of insider trading was introduced in the securities 
law.125 The sentence for insider trading was changed from imprisonment and fine 
to just fine in order to transform criminal liability to civil liability. The reason of 
this conversion was that, the form of proof required in criminal matters is much 
severer in contrast to civil matters, as evidence beyond doubt is required to prove 
a criminal offence, which might not be possible to get in most of corporate cases 
and white-collar crimes.  
In a further step, the CCG was issued and made it part of the listing requirements 
in 2002 and revised in 2012; however it could not be adopted and implemented by 
companies in its true sense.126  
The researcher contends that the steps taken by the regulators to reform corporate 
sector are encouraging but these reforms are not sufficient to develop the market 
and improve CG, there is a lot needs to be done. For this purpose, one way could 
be the phased implementation of CCG. For this purpose, the stock market can be 
                                                            
124 S. 32E (1) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 
125 The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 
126 As identified in section 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and in chapter four. 
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distributed in divisions. Every division may have its own requirements depending 
upon the nature of the listing as done in the UK. This can avoid the resistance 
from family-owned businesses and other interested groups. The idea of dividing 
Pakistan’s stock market in two segments is already in debates among corporate 
academics; however this thesis advocates the idea of dividing Pakistan’s stock 
market in three segments, as it will create a more competitive environment which 
will result into the better compliance with the CCG.127 
The following sections discuss some options through which the capital market of 
Pakistan can be reformed in order to make the compliance of the CCG better to 
achieve good CG standards. 
5.5.1 Lessons from London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
The example of dividing stock market into different fragments is already in place 
in several countries, of which the LSE presents a vital model. The LSE is divided 
into diverse divisions, named as the premium listing and the standard listing. The 
large UK and overseas companies, including the European Economic Area (EEA), 
might have any of these two listings, as well as global depository receipts 
(GDRs).128 It relies on the decision of the issuer/regulator and, in this manner the 
requirements must be satisfied as required for the respective listing.129 
The companies who trade equity shares and closed and open-ended investment 
entities can have premium listing, while the standard listing incorporates the 
issuance of shares, depository receipts, debts and securitised derivatives.130  
Premium listing does not signify ‘first listing’ or ‘sole listing’ instead, it implies 
that companies who wish to have premium listing are bound to fulfil the most 
elevated benchmarks of regulation and disclosure requirements in Europe. 
                                                            
127 The detail of this point is mentioned below. 
128 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk>; <http://www.fca.org.uk/> and 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/pages/default.aspx> accessed 10 January 2015 
129 Financial Services Authority, ‘A Review of the Structure of the Listing Regime’ (Discussion 
Paper 08/1, January 2008 London)11 
130 LSE, <http://www.londonstockexchnage.com/companies-and-advisors/main-
market/companies/primary-and-secondary-listing/listing-categories.htm> accessed 10 May 2015 
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Meaning thereby, they are bound to follow the gold standards of the UK: termed 
as ‘super-equivalent requirements’ that are higher than the ‘directive-minimum’ 
standards. Companies having premium listing are possibly qualified for the FTSE 
UK Index Series, which comprises the well-established and famous FTSE 100 
Index.131 
Similarly, the standard listing does not signify a second listing; however, it 
specifies that the company has preferred to follow EU co-ordinated requirements 
in contrast to the UK super-equivalent standards necessary for a premium listing. 
Companies having standard listing are required to follow the ‘directive-minimum’ 
requirements.132 Since April 2010, it is essential for companies who opted 
standard listing to obey the EU Company Reporting Directive (EUCRD) which 
necessitates, that a CG declaration should be revealed including key elements of 
internal control and risk management frameworks be defined among other things, 
according to the standard listing and GDR.133 
The conditions for standard listing are prescribed in the Prospectus and Disclosure 
and Transparency Rules (DTRs). Moreover, the company has to adopt 
additionally the Consolidated Admissions and Reporting Directives (CARD) 
standards and; publish its disclosure statements via the Regulatory Information 
Services (RIS) in the UK.134 
The GDRs are debatable securities that describe companies’ equity allotted by a 
depository bank in the interest of a company, which is usually a foreign company. 
The objective of issuing GDRs is to raise capital, expand investment, enrich the 
image of company internationally, assist mergers and acquisitions, and to escalate 
the publicity of its goods and services. GDRs are usually required to be acquired 
by professional investors such as IIs in the primary market. The brochure 
                                                            
131 Ibid  
132 Ibid (n 130) 
133 FSA website: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/UKLA/pdf/listing-regime-faqs.pdf> 
accessed 10 May 2015 
134 Ibid  
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evidently provides that ‘the securities can just be traded by shareholders who have 
experience and skills to deal with investment issues’.135 
The GDR is a professional market; its securities are not incorporated in the FTSE 
UK index series. These listings are usually offered to foreign companies and 
which necessitates ‘directive-minimum’ requirements. However, the UK 
companies can also have listing under GDR, if their original listing is premium.136 
Similarly, he Specialist Fund Market (SFM) is a specialised market of the LSE 
and deals with institutional, skilled, knowledgeable and expert investors.137 
Moreover, the Professional Securities Market (PSM) and the PLUS Quoted 
Market (PLUSQM)138 are also essential fragments of the LSE and worked inside 
the choice of their position as a Recognised Investment Exchange. The PSM 
facilitates companies to elevate capital via listing of specialist securities, 
comprising debt and depositary receipts, to professional investors.  
In addition to this, LSE also has international market for smaller emerging 
companies called the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). An extensive variety 
of companies, involving, venture capital, new emerging and conventional 
companies join AIM looking for entrance to develop capital.139  
The PSM and PLUSQM are non-listed and non-regulated markets. The companies 
who are allowed to do business but are not included in the official list can trade on 
AIM and PLUSQM. These both markets do not require compliance with the UK 
CCG, instead required to comply with sub-directive standards. 
The researcher submits that the stock market of Pakistan can be reformed by 
dividing it into different segments along the lines of the UK. It can be distributed 
into three portions with primary, secondary and third listing.  
                                                            
135 Ibid (n 133) 
136 Ibid (n 133) 
137 LSE website (n 30) 
138 PLUS market group is a UK electronic stock exchange based in London for small Cap 
companies that was acquired by ICAP and rebranded as ICAP Securities and Derivatives 
Exchange (ISDX). 
139 LSE Website: <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm> accessed 10 May 2015 
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The primary listing might have condition to adopt international CG standards, 
more disclosure standards, full and strict obligatory adoption and implementation 
of CCG. The secondary listing might require adopting only local CG standards, 
less disclosure standards and voluntary adoption and implementation of CCG. 
However, the third listing could be for smaller and new companies as is the UK’s 
PSM and PLUSQM non-listed and non-regulated; and companies falling under 
this category have to follow sub-directive standards.  
This division of stock market will not affect families and other groups who do not 
like reforms as it weaken their control. Families and interested groups who have 
objections about the adoption and implementation of CCG because of their 
personal stakes will not be specifically influenced by this sort of change. They 
might continue their listing on the secondary market and might shift to the 
primary market when they realise the probable advantages of primary listing with 
its developed higher standards. This might be useful in adding to the business 
sector and developing CG standards in Pakistan. 
The primary market can be alluring for multinational and large local and foreign 
companies. These companies can set standards for other companies listed on 
secondary market and signal to investors about their willingness to adopt CG 
highest standards. This might additionally encourage other companies listed on 
secondary market to shift towards primary listing. This practice will assume a 
noteworthy part in encouraging companies to shift from secondary to primary 
listing and in other words to follow the higher disclosure requirements and CG 
standards.  
Family-owned, SOEs and new listed companies can choose to have secondary 
listing which will require less disclosure and voluntary adoption of CCG. New 
and small companies may choose to stay on third listing which will require 
voluntary compliance with CCG instead the only requirement to follow the MOA 
and AOA of their companies and ensure no harm to potential shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Subsequently, when the business of such companies starts 
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growing and they realise the potential benefits of stricter compliance with CCG, 
they can shift towards secondary or primary listing. 
The division of stock market into segments will provide companies with exposure 
and advantages attached to the adoption of CCG and will create an environment 
of competition. Compliance with fewer requirements may induce management of 
family-owned businesses and SOEs to consider about shifting to the stricter 
compliance with CG standards. Reputation and increased shareholder confidence 
might be the incentives for primary listing. The PICG, credit rating agencies, 
financial press, print and social media and IIs can play a considerable role in this 
regard.  
The rating agencies and press by praising and increasing the ratings of companies 
listed on primary market for stricter compliance. The IIs will prefer to invest in 
companies listed on primary market being professionals who understand the 
benefits of compliance with CG principles which will provide incentives to other 
companies listed on secondary markets to switch on primary market even to third 
market companies. This shift will enhance shareholders confidence and guarantee 
them the dedication of companies towards the adoption of higher governance 
standards.  
It will additionally enhance the share price of companies. Shareholders’ security 
will be enhanced and higher CG standards will be guaranteed. Minority 
shareholders might consider it advantageous to invest in primary market being 
ensured about the protection of their funds, while IIs might make their 
investments in both markets because of having knowledge and expertise in 
investing. Likewise, they can also force their investee companies towards stricter 
compliance. Such environment will also influence block-holders such as families 
and state functionaries to switch towards stricter compliance when they will see 
the tangible and substantial benefits of stricter compliance.  
Moreover, the creation of such a competitive environment through dividing the 
stock market will also reduce the burden of regulators in making their efforts to 
improve the implementations and enforcement of CG principles for the corporate 
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sector of Pakistan, by providing them incentives to switch towards stricter 
compliance. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the implementation and enforcement mechanism of 
CG in Pakistan. The factors responsible for the unsuccessful implementation of 
CG principles in Pakistan have been identified in this chapter. The current chapter 
established that, the protection of shareholders’ interests is paramount in good CG 
systems and essential for the growth of a market. Corruption, inefficiency, cost, 
excessive and unreasonable adjournments in deciding cases, absence of expertise 
and capability on the part of judges and most importantly the political interference 
in every institutions of the country including judiciary and the capital market are 
key hurdles to effective enforcement of CG rules and regulations and 
shareholders’ rights in Pakistan.  
This chapter formulated recommendations to reform and improve the role of 
judiciary in relation to enforcement of corporate matters and the implementation 
of CCG in Pakistan. The current chapter also provided measures to reform the 
capital market of Pakistan through which the adoption and implementation of 
CCG could be improved in the corporate sector of Pakistan.  
The next chapter deals with the third objective of this thesis and explores the role 
of BODs in promoting CG practices in the listed companies and develop a board 
effectiveness model for the listed companies of Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CORPORATE BOARD IN PROMOTING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the measures to improve the implementation and 
enforcement of corporate governance (CG) principles in Pakistan. The current 
chapter relates to the third objective of this thesis, which is to examine the role of 
board of directors (BODs) in promoting CG practices and to develop a ‘board 
effectiveness model’ for the listed companies of Pakistan. This chapter examines 
the effectiveness of BODs in generating shareholder value in Pakistan and to 
examine characteristics that affect good CG practices. This investigation is 
significant because of the fact that, a sound and strong internal framework of CG, 
for example BODs and internal controls help in aligning the interests of directors 
and shareholders,1 and the corporate board is seen as a central part of any internal 
CG structure.2  
                                                            
1 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Cost and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305; Eugene Fama, 
‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88(2) The Journal of Political Economy 
288; Netter et al., ‘The Rise of Corporate Governance in Corporate Control Research’ (2009) 15 
Journal of Corporate Finance 1 
2 Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch, ‘A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance’ (1992) 
48(1) Business Lawyer 59; Kose John and Lemma Senbet, ‘Corporate Governance and Board 
Effectiveness’ (1998) 22(3) Journal of Banking and Finance 371; Igor Filatotchev and Brian Boyd, 
‘Taking Stock of Corporate Governance Research While Looking to the Future’ (2009) 17(3) 
Corporate Governance-An International Review 257 
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The main role of BODs is to ensure the performance of a company’s 
management.3 This normally implies five functions: direction (advice), executive 
action (strategy), service and resource support (resource dependence), supervision 
(monitoring) and accountability.4 However, in order to safeguard the interests of 
shareholders, corporate boards should be effective and efficient in performing 
their responsibilities.5 The previous studies evidenced6 that effective and efficient 
workings of BODs are impacted by several aspects, such as board diversity, 
composition and size amongst others. Therefore, this chapter examines the 
effectiveness of BODs by investigating three attributes the diversity, size and 
composition of BODs.    
By doing this, the researcher intends to explore: how corporate boards in Pakistani 
companies can be made more effective and efficient to promote CG principles and 
to improve the activism of institutional investors (IIs) which ultimately benefit 
corporate performance of companies; how does CG practices affect investor 
perception, corporate strategy and performance; what are the important CG 
attributes that influence performance of directors in order to meet shareholder 
expectations; and what is the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) 
in creating shareholder value.  
Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that this chapter would be a meaningful 
contribution to knowledge as there is no such work done previously to investigate 
the effectiveness of BODs and their role in promoting the CG practices in 
Pakistan. The following figure shows the plan of this chapter. 
 
 
                                                            
3 Ibid  
4 Rossouw et al., ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa’ (2002) 37(3) Journal of Business Ethics 
289; Niamh Brennan, ‘Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there Any Expectation Gap?’ 
(2006) 14(6) Corporate Governance 580 
5 Michael Jensen, ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution: Exit and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems’ (1993) 48(3) The Journal of Finance 831 
6 David Yermack, ‘Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors’ 
(1996) 40(2) Journal of Financial Economics 185; Nina Baranchuk and Philip Dybvig, ‘Consensus 
in Diverse Corporate Boards’ (2009) 22(2) The Review of Financial Studies 715 
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                                   Figure 6.1: Plan of this Chapter 
 
6.2  Diversity in Corporate Boardrooms 
6.2.1 The Theoretical Link between Diversity in BODs and Corporate 
Performance of a Company 
Board diversity is characterised7 as the different properties signified among BODs 
regarding board operations and decision-making, comprising age, gender, 
ethnicity, culture, religion, independence, knowledge, educational and 
professional background, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry 
experience.  
There are two differing views in regards to the effect of diversity of BODs on 
maximising shareholder wealth and performance of companies: one group 
advocates that more diverse corporate boards are better; and other group 
advocates corporate homogeneity and uniformity better for corporate boards. 
                                                            
7 Nicholas Van der Walt and Coral Ingley, ‘Board Dynamics and the Influence of Professional 
Background, Gender and Ethnic Diversity of Directors’ (2003) 11(3) Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 219 
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The proponents and exponents of more diverse and less diverse BODs generally 
argue on the basis of agency, resource dependence, signalling and stake-holding 
theories.8  
Agency theory advocates that BODs having varied backgrounds rather than 
homogenous groups having similar socio-economic backgrounds enhances 
independence of BODs and directors’ monitoring.9 It creates variety in ideas, 
perspectives, experience, and business knowledge to the decision-making process 
in boardrooms.10 This can facilitate for better assessment for the difficulties of the 
corporate outer atmosphere and business sector. It can likewise build 
innovativeness and developments in meeting rooms because of divergent qualities 
in intellectual capacities, which can likewise encourage powerful and influential 
decision-making.11  
Moreover, resource dependence theory specifies that diversity in BODs helps to 
associate a company to its outside atmosphere and secure skills, business contacts, 
good reputation and acceptability.12 Additionally, more diverse corporate boards 
may signal positively to potential job applicants.13 This will help to attract 
educated and skilled persons from the circles from where the candidates for BODs 
are generally recruited. This can also generate healthy competition within the 
company’s internal labour sector.  
This will also help ethnic minorities and women to apprehend that they are not 
omitted from the top positions in the company.14 Finally, BODs comprising on 
skilled and competent persons of various credentials can deliver a developed 
relation with companies’ partners, including consumers and the local community. 
                                                            
8 Goodstein et al., ‘The Effect of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Changes’ (1994) 15 
Strategic Management Journal 241; Carter et al., ‘Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and 
Firm Value’ (2003) 38(1) The Financial Review 33 
9 Jensen and Meckling (Ibid 1) 307 
10 Jensen and Meckling (Ibid 1) 307 
11 Carter et al. (n 8) 36 
12 Baranchuk and Dybvig (Ibid 6) 718 
13 Caspar Rose, ‘Does Female Board Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish 
Evidence’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 405 
14 The issue of Women on Board is addressed in detail in the next section. 
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This can enhance companies’ repute and business prospects.15 For instance, by co-
ordinating the differing qualities of a company’s BODs to the differing qualities 
of its clients and suppliers, it can essentially expand its capacity to enter 
competitive business markets.16 
Conversely, the advocates of organisation theory assert that differing attributes in 
BODs can affect the performance of companies negatively.  
Firstly, it has been advocated that BODs with more differing attributes might not 
as a matter of course result in more compelling control and decision-making 
process. The reason is that the members of diverse board might be elected as an 
indication of tokenism, and therefore their commitments might be limited.17  
Secondly, organisation theory designates that differing qualities in the BODs 
might altogether limit its endeavours to make definitive move and start vital 
changes, particularly in times of weak corporate performance and natural 
instability.18  
Thirdly, the members of diverse BODs might pass their individual and 
communities’ stakes and responsibilities to corporate board.19 The more 
prominent assorted qualities of these stakes will prompt the more noteworthy 
potential for clashes and factions to emerge.20 This can restrain meeting room 
consistency and execution of tasks.21  
The final argument is that the suggestion that company BODs ought to be 
established in order to imitate all their important partners and society in general is 
inconsistent with the idea of business.22 This is on account of, if board individuals 
                                                            
15 Shrader et al., ‘Women in Management and Firm Financial Performance: An Exploratory Study’ 
(1997) 9(3) Journal of Managerial Issues 355 
16 Ibid  
17 Rose (n 13) 406 
18 Goodstein (n 8) 243 
19 Barry Baysinger and Henry Butler, ‘Corporate Governance and Board Directors: Performance 
Effects of Changes in Board Composition’ (1985) 1(1) Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organisation 110 
20 Baranchuk and Dybvig (n 6) 725 
21 Goodstein (Ibid 8) 243 
22 Rose (n 13) 405 
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are not chosen on the basis of their capability to add considerably to the decision-
making procedure of BODs, ceteris paribus, will result in the creation of varied 
but comparatively ineffective larger BODs. This can impact negatively on the 
financial performance of companies.  
However, this researcher argues that, the notion of board ‘diversity’ is different 
than ‘larger’ boards. Therefore, if larger boards are comparatively ineffective, this 
cannot be related to board diversity. The researcher claims that diverse boards are 
more expected to enhance and improve a company’s corporate and financial 
performance due to their varying expertise and different dimensions of their 
backgrounds and knowledge in corporate matters. Board diversity can have a real 
impact on CG attributes such as monitoring, as it can bring more independence in 
BODs.  
The reason is that the idea behind making boards diverse is and/or should be to 
make combination to bring different experiences and backgrounds. Such boards 
can take more risks as they would have the ability to handle those risks, would 
monitor the strategic decision-making of BODs, in other words such boards would 
more able to make their evaluation and likewise, there would be less chances of 
expropriation of shareholders’ interests particularly of minority shareholders. 
Therefore, the diverse corporate boards can contribute meaningfully to promote 
CG of corporations. 
6.2.2 The Empirical Evidence on the Association between Diversity of 
BODs and their Outcome 
The diversity in BODs is one of the under researched board attributes,23 however 
it is now drawing attention of corporate scholars and business community to 
explore this attribute of board.24 This makes it a productive area for future studies, 
particularly in Pakistan where there is a dearth of board diversity studies. This 
section reviews the previous empirical studies to identify the effect of diverse 
                                                            
23 Ibid (n 6) 
24 Ibid (n 6, 13); Francoeur et al., ‘Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance and Top 
Management’ (2008) 81 Journal of Business Ethics 83  
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corporate boards on the corporate performance of their companies; and then 
explore how diverse corporate boards influence the listed companies in Pakistan 
in order to improve CG practices there. 
Using a small sample of 25 American Fortune 500 companies, a positive 
relationship was found between companies that utilise a higher rate of women in 
top administration, including Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), 
Return on Investment ROI and Return on Sales (ROS).25 However, this study 
received criticisms for its small sample, focusing mainly on large companies.26 
Nevertheless, it proves the fact that diversity in corporate boards has positive 
relationship with companies’ performance. 
Moreover, a positive relationship was also reported between board diversity27 and 
market measure of performance28 in another study utilising a bigger sample of 638 
American Fortune 1000 companies in 1997. This study proposes that US 
companies with greater percentage of females and ethnic minorities on their 
BODs produce greater financial and corporate performance. The companies 
having higher percentage of women officers reported that companies functioning 
in complex and difficult environments do produce positive and substantial unusual 
profits.29 
Likewise, utilising a cross-sectional sample of 117 South African listed 
companies in 2003, a noteworthy affirmative relation between the proportion of 
ethnic individuals30 on corporate boards’ and intellectual capital performance was 
reported.31 It is argued that if diverse boards perform better than their non-diverse 
counterparts, it should ultimately reflect in their financial bottom line.32 To 
                                                            
25 Roy Adler, ‘Women in the Executive Suite Correlate to High Profits’ (2001) Glass Ceiling 
Research, <http://www.glass-ceiling.com> accessed 20-02-2015 
26 Ibid (n 24) 
27 Measured by gender and ethnicity 
28 Ibid (n 13) 408 
29 Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983a) 26(2) Journal 
of Law and Economics 301; ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’ (1983b) 327 
30 Non-whites 
31 Swartz N-P and Steven Firer, ‘Board Structure and Intellectual Capital Performance in South 
Africa’ (2005) 13(2) Meditari Accountancy Research 145 
32 Ibid  
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capture the impact of possible changes in board diversity over time, the sample 
period used in this study is also longer: 2002-2006. The analysis in this study can 
also provide new valuable visions relating to the differing qualities of BODs and 
the financial performance relationship literature. 
In contrast, some studies reveal that board differing qualities effect adversely on 
financial and corporate performance. An investigation was held regarding the 
effect of board having divergent attributes on a company’s aptitude to start vital 
modifications in an aggregate of 335 American companies from 1980 to 1985.33 It 
was found that companies with varied boards usually pledge less policy 
alterations as compared to homogenous boards. This suggests that diversity in 
BODs generates clashes, which minimise the capacity of BODs to initiate vital 
reforms in appropriate time.  
A similar study was conducted on 200 American Fortune 500 companies in 1992, 
in order to find the association between two accounting measures of financial 
performance (ROA and ROE) and the proportion of female members of board.34 
The results of that suggest a significant and adverse connection between the 
companies’ performance and proportion of women on the board. It was argued 
that women on board might be underestimated; their existence might likewise 
have financial costs repercussions to the company.35 This implies they might not 
be making any significant commitments to the decision-making of corporate 
board; however receiving their financial emoluments regularly. This might have 
adverse effect on the financial performance of companies, and thus helps in 
explaining the negative female board members-financial performance link.  
However, the researcher submits that this may not be true in all circumstances. 
The study36 has not provided any particular evidence regarding women not 
making any meaningful contribution but receiving their pay. If that study talks 
about in any particular circumstance or time span during which women did not 
                                                            
33 Ibid (n 6) 
34 Ibid (n 15) 
35 Ibid (n 15) 
36 Ibid (n 15) 
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contribute, it can happen in men’s case as well. For example, if women are not 
capable to deal with company’s matters properly, all men may also not so capable. 
Only one reason can be understandable and that is during maternity leave. 
However, this is not justified to challenge the contribution of women on the basis 
of such particular time-span.37  Moreover, in the normal course of time women 
may handle corporate matters in more efficient way and contribute more than 
some men.  The results of some empirical studies38 show that the more diverse 
boards with higher proportion of women in top administration have positive effect 
on the performance of companies.  
The topic of women on BODs is currently a ‘hot’ debate and it is being 
considered in almost all parts of the world to increase the percentage of women in 
their corporate boards. For example, France, Italy and the UK are taking 
considerable actions for this and Spain, Norway and Australia have already made 
significant steps in this. Norway has already achieved its target and made 40% 
women representation compulsory in corporate boards. Norway has made this the 
mandatory disclosure requirement for all listed companies to disclose their board 
diversity; if a company do not follow this requirement that company has to face 
closure.39 
In 2004, the proportion of women in corporate boards of FTSE 100 companies of 
the UK was 9.4% which increased to 12.5% in 2010. However, the ratio of this 
increase is slow. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) report40 
claimed that according to this speed, it will take more than 70 years to the UK’s 
top FTSE 100 companies to achieve a gender balanced boardrooms. Considering 
the importance of more women on corporate boards recommendations were 
formulated in 2011 for the FTSE 100 companies of the UK along the lines of 
                                                            
37 This point has multiple dimensions to discuss and beyond the scope of this research, that is why 
cannot be discussed in detail here. 
38 Ibid (24, 15) 
39 Lessons from Norway in Getting women onto Corporate Boards, 
<http://theconversation.com/lessons-from-norway-in-getting-women-onto-corporate-boards-
38338> accessed 20 December 2015 
40 Report of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2008) 
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Norway, and a target was set to achieve 25% of women on boards by 2015.41 By 
March 2015, the ratio of women increased to 23.5% and it is hoped that the target 
will be achieved by the end of year 2015.42 According to Lord Davies,43 corporate 
boards perform better if they consist upon a range of backgrounds and 
perspectives. The responsibilities of BODs are to take strategic decisions, 
overlook risks and monitor governance; therefore it is imperative that BODs 
should have competent high calibre individual offering mix of skills, experiences 
and backgrounds.  
Therefore, the importance of women cannot be denied; in fact the ratio of women 
qualifying from universities with higher grades has increased remarkably and is 
increasing continuously, but sadly women are so under-represented in corporate 
boards and hence companies are missing out a widest range of possible talent. 
Therefore, time has come to acknowledge the importance of gender balance 
corporate boards on a belief that gender balance boards perform better than those 
who are not gender balanced.   
South Africa presents a motivating research background to discover the influence 
of diverse board’s on companies’ performance. It has an ethnically diverse 
populace (i.e., made up of people from almost every part of the world, including 
European Whites or Caucasians, Chinese, Indians, Mixed Race and Black 
Africans). An affirmative action laws meant to address the negative social and 
economic legacies of Apartheid have been introduced since 1994. Central to the 
affirmative action legislation is ensuring that non-whites, especially black men 
and women, are appointed to positions of significance in South African 
companies.44 The researcher submits that examining board diversity under this 
                                                            
41 Women on Boards February 2011, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-
women-on-boards.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015 
42 Women on Boards Davies Review Annual Report (2015),  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415454/bis-15-
134-women-on-boards-2015-report.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015 
43 Ibid (n 42) 
44  Institute of Directors Southern Africa, ‘South Africa is a Leader in Gender Diversity on 
Corporate Boards, Says New Study’ (2013) <http://www.iodsa.co.za/news/135560/South-Africa-
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context can arguably bring new insights that may enrich the board diversity-
performance literature.  
One of the most noteworthy internal CG concerns presently encountering 
companies in South Africa is board diversity and its effect on corporate 
performance.45 The South African Employment Equity Act 1998 stipulates that 
every firm with more than 100 employees should ensure that its labour force, 
including top management is constituted by a balance between non-whites and 
whites. Among the non-whites, black men and women are expected to be given 
special preference.46 
By contrast, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules do not fix any particular goals 
for companies. However, they suggest that each company should ponder whether 
its board is sufficiently varied in terms of skills (profession and experience) and 
demographics (age, ethnicity and gender). This can confirm that the alignment of 
South African corporate boards imitate the assorted South African background, 
and make them effective. They also encourage companies to observe the 
provisions of the Employment Equity Act.  
This indicates that King II anticipates that the diversity of board have affirmative 
impact on the corporate performance of companies. South African listed 
companies significantly enhance their intellectual capital performance by having 
ethnically diverse BODs.47 If diverse boards perform better than homogenous 
boards, then they are likely to generate significantly higher corporate and financial 
performance. King III does not speak about board diversity issue, so the 
recommendations of King II are prevalent in this regard. 
The CCG 2012 of Pakistan speaks about board diversity48 that, it is preferred and 
encouraged for BODs to be diverse having a balance of executive and INEDs 
                                                                                                                                                                  
is-a-Leader-in-Gender-Diversity-on-Corporate-Boards-says-New-Study.htm> accessed 20 January 
2016 
45 Ibid (n 13) 
46 Chapter II, Section 5, 6 of the South African Employment Equity Act 1998. 
47 Ibid (n 31) 
48 Clause (i) of the CCG 2012 of Pakistan 
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including a balance of male and female members representing the interests of 
minorities with their experience, skill and knowledge so that the company’s 
operations could be managed in more diligent and efficient way. However, these 
provisions are voluntary in nature not mandatory for corporations, and face 
similar problems in their implementation as discussed in chapter four and five. 
According to an estimate49 the ratio of women on corporate boards in Pakistan in 
2009 was just 4.6%, however, it is not clear on which companies’ boards this ratio 
of women was estimated. However, in 2010 the percentage of women on 
corporate boards of 303 public listed companies was only 13%.50  
Mr Zaffar Khan, former president, chairman and director of many high profile 
public listed companies of Pakistan said in one of his interview that during my 
work experience of over 30 years in different companies as a president, chairman 
and director, my experience to deal with such BODs having women representation 
is very limited. He said during the time when he was board member of Pakistan’s 
Central Bank, the chairman was a woman, and at Unilever Pakistan, the 
chairperson was a women and she was the only women on board. He observed 
that the corporate board run by women is tough driven, more disciplined and 
sharply focussed, even then the women representation on corporate boards is very 
limited.  
He also responded in an interesting way, that if I imagine being only one male 
member on board among all other female members, I will feel embarrassed, less 
confident and would not be able to show and use my skills and abilities properly. 
Therefore, the ratio of women on corporate board should be balanced with the 
ratio of their male counterparts. He also observed that the women coming to 
boards and having business degrees usually have more good grades than males. 
The researcher submits that, the time has come to change the mind set of male 
                                                            
49 Women on Boards: A Statistical Review by Country, Region, Sector and Market Index; 
Governance Metrics International; March 2009 
50 A Global Corporate Governance Publication Forum, ‘Focus Women on Boards: A Conversation 
with Directors’ 
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b51198804b07d3b2acabad77fcc2938e/Focus9_Women_on
_Boards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES> accessed 20 December 2015 
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dominated corporate boards and establish equilibrium of both genders in order to 
get the most of their skills, experiences and new talent which will transform 
Pakistani companies for the better. 
6.3  Size of BODs 
6.3.1 The Theoretical link between the Size of BODs and Corporate 
Performance 
Corporate board size is considered to be one of the most important board 
attributes.51 The existing literature provides a theoretical and empirical connection 
between performance of companies and size of their BODs with mixed results.52 
Agency theory declares larger board bad for the performance of a company 
however, smaller boards effective and good for improving companies’ 
performance, which ultimately affect CG practices.53 It is believed that smaller 
boards enhance their performance regarding oversight duties while; larger boards 
incline to accentuate graciousness and courtesy instead of truth and frankness in 
boardrooms.54 Another argument is that big board exacerbate agency problems 
which make board more symbolic and they neglect their monitoring and 
controlling duties.  
Another study55 supports this view as; the possibility of fraud and other 
irregularities increases with the increase of board size, which entails the necessity 
for enlarged monitoring with larger boards. Furthermore, when the size of 
corporate board increases above a maximum number of ten directors, it incurs 
extra expenses of having larger boards normally results in slow decision-making 
and requires deep monitoring of management’s actions. 
                                                            
51 Coles et al., ‘Boards: Does One size Fit All’ (2008) 87(2) Journal of Financial Economics 329 
52 Ibid (n 2, 6) 
53 Ibid (n 2); Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, ‘What Makes Great Boards’ (2002) 80(9) Harvard Business 
Review 108 
54 Ibid (n 39) 
55 Mark Beasley, ‘An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition 
and financial statement fraud’ (1996) 71(4) The Accounting Review 443 
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Firstly, this is because while BODs plan, organise, direct and control the business 
of the organisation, the size of the board has also got financial costs implications. 
That is, ceteris paribus bigger boards guzzle more pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
resources of a company by way of remuneration and privileges than smaller 
boards.  
Secondly, the bigger board not only lacks co-ordination but also comes under 
control of CEO easily due to free-riding and related director dodging.56 Therefore, 
the size of corporate board must fall between eight and nine directors preferably.57  
Thirdly, it is contended58 that smaller boards are expected to be more unified, and 
to have more effective negotiations. Therefore, all executives get the opportunity 
to frankly contribute and exchange their views within the specified time.59 It is 
worth remembering here that the proponents of smaller corporate boards mainly 
draw their inspiration from organisational theory, which posits that the groups 
become less effective when they grow in size due to the associated co-ordinated 
issues have a tendency to exceed the advantages picked up from having a larger 
group of skilled people to draw from.60  
Lastly, the larger boards experience the ill effects of higher agency issues and are 
far less influential than smaller boards.61 Thus, limiting corporate board size may 
improve efficiency. 
The opposite view confers that, the larger board relatively has more capability to 
monitor the acts of administration successfully as compared to the smaller ones.62 
The exponents of this view argue that, companies with development chances, 
                                                            
56 Jensen (n 1) 865 
57 Lipton and Lorsch (n 2) 67 
58 Ibid (n 8) 
59 Ibid (n 8) 
60 Ibid (n 2, 4); Ivan Steiner, Group Process and Productivity (Academy Press New York 1972) 
“See generally”; Jeffery Pfeffer, ‘Size, Composition, and Function of Hospital Boards of 
Directors: A Study of Organisation-Environmental Linkage’ (1973) 18 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 349; Richard Hackman, Groups that Work ( San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Canada 1990) 
“See generally” 
61 Alfred Yawson, ‘Evaluating the Characteristics of Corporate Boards Associated with Layoff 
Decisions’ (2006) 14(2) Corporate Governance-An International Review 77 
62 John and Senbet (n 2) 371 
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research, growth outflows, and profit instability are accompanied with smaller less 
autonomous boards however; larger companies have more autonomous boards. 
They declare larger board more independent than those of smaller board; and less 
independent board is expected to be incompetent and inefficient in executing its 
monitoring duties. Therefore, the outcomes of this study reject the view that 
smaller boards are always better. 
Likewise, empirical tests uphold the widespread opinion that larger and 
autonomous boards are better and more effective.63 The argument is posed that 
certain groups of companies get advantage from large boards having more insider 
demonstration, specifically; the companies which are diverse through industries 
having extraordinary influence are expected to have higher needs of advising.64 
Therefore, these companies are prospective to be benefited from larger board 
predominantly from external directors having appropriate knowledge and 
experience. The results of these empirical studies are consistent with these 
arguments. 
Firstly, larger boards are expected to be diverse in experience, business contacts 
and skills as compared to smaller boards, protect companies’ resources.65 
Similarly, larger boards decreases uncertainties and aids to secure critical 
resources, for example, contracts, finance and raw materials because of having 
more access to the external atmosphere of company.66  
Secondly, larger boards enhance managerial skills to make better and important 
decisions due to the heightened knowledge base on which business advice can be 
sought.67 Finally, a corporate board’s controlling capability is established to be 
                                                            
63 Coles et al., ‘Boards: Does One Size Fit All’ (2008) 87(2) Journal of Financial economics 329 
64 Renee Adams and Hamid Mehran, ‘Corporate Governance, Board Structure and its 
Determinants in the Banking Industry’ (2005) Working Paper Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.sfm?> accessed 20-02-2015 
65 Roszaini Haniffa and Muhammad Hudaib, ‘Corporate Governance Structures and Performance 
of Malaysian Listed Companies’ (2006) 33(7) Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 1038 
66 John Pearce and Shaker Zahra, ‘Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency Perspective’ 
(1992) 29 Journal of Management Studies 411 
67 Ibid (n 61) 79 
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certainly connected with the size of board.68 This is because a larger number of 
people with diverse knowledge will handle managerial decisions with higher 
consideration and monitoring.69 This can help balance the power of otherwise a 
dominant CEO. 
6.3.2 The Empirical Evidence on the Association between the Size of BODs 
and their Outcome 
Empirically, the confirmation relating to the connection between board size and 
company performance is conflicting. Yermac70 is one of the first to investigate the 
association between board size and performance of a company. He investigated 
this in a sample of 452 big US business organisations between 1984 and 1991. He 
reports an adverse liaison between corporate board size and performance.71 He 
demonstrates that his confirmation is robust to companies’ particular qualities like 
size, development probability, board structure, director possession and industry. 
Particularly, his results show that shareholders’ assessment of companies’ 
declines steadily over a scope of board sizes between four and ten. Beyond a 
board size of ten, he finds no connection between board size and market 
assessment. 
Likewise, US evidence72 and non-US evidence73 suggested that, on average, 
smaller boards tend to perform better than larger ones. This work was criticised 
for focusing purely on large companies, therefore, its outcomes cannot be referred 
                                                            
68 John and Senbet (n 2) 385 
69 Geoffrey Kiel and Gavin Nicholson, ‘Board Composition and Corporate Performance: How the 
Austrian Experience Informs Contrasting Theories of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 11(3) 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 194 
70 Ibid (n 6) 
71 Ibid (n 6) 
72 Nikos Vefeas, ‘Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance’ (1999a) 53 Journal of 
Financial economics 113; Nikos Vefeas, ‘The Nature of Board Nomination Committees and their 
Role in Corporate Governance’ (1999b) 26(1) Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 199; 
Shijun Cheng, ‘Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance’ (2008) 87(1) Journal of 
Financial economics 157; Cheng et al., ‘Board Size and Firm Performance: Moderating Effects of 
the Market for Corporate Control’ (2008) 31 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 121; 
73 Eisenberg et al., ‘Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms’ (1998) 48(1) 
Journal of Financial Economics 35; Richard Bozec, ‘Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and 
Firm Performance’ (2005) 32(9) Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 1921; Paul Guest, 
‘The Impact of Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from the UK’ (2009) 15(4) The 
European Journal of Finance 385 
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and applied to smaller companies working in diverse legal and social settings.74 
However, another work examined the association between board size and 
performance in a sample of 879 small and medium size Finnish companies from 
1992 to 1994; and described an adverse correlation between companies’ 
performance.75  
Moreover, a negative relationship was also found between the performance of top-
management and board size in a sample of 460 UK listed companies from 1988 to 
1996.76 Likewise, utilising a big sample of 2,746 UK listed companies from 1981 
to 2002, a statistically negative and substantial affiliation was reported between 
board size and their outcome.77 The outcomes of these studies normally provide 
empirical backing to the theory that smaller boards are more expected to have 
honest assessment of performance of top-management; actual monitoring and 
quicker decision-making.  
Lastly, a negative relationship has also been reported between board size and 
corporate performance, in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed companies.78 
Therefore, the researcher submits that this also offers empirical support to the 
conclusions of prior studies that larger boards are not just alleged unproductive by 
shareholders; however additionally consume more managerial perquisites than 
smaller ones. 
By contrast, a positive relation has also been identified79 between board size and 
companies’ performance, in a sample of 93 Nigerian listed companies from 1996 
to 1999; larger boards decrease ambiguities and ensures to safeguard acute assets 
of company for example, raw materials, finance and contracts because of having 
higher access to the outside environment of company. This suggests that conflicts 
                                                            
74 Ibid 
75 Eisenberg et al. (ibid 73) 37 
76 Dahya et al., ‘Outside Directors and Corporate Board Decisions’ (2005) 11 Journal of Corporate 
finance 37 
77 Paul Guest (ibid 73) 387  
78 Ibid (n 72) 
79 Ibid (n 4) 
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occur between shareholders and companies regarding their insight of the 
relevance of larger boards.  
Theoretically, bigger boards enrich awareness and skills to seek better advice, 
which enhances the ability of management to take better business decisions.80 
Similar evidence is also available for Australian, Swiss, and US listed companies, 
respectively.81 According to South African Companies Act 1973, all public 
companies should have at least two directors; however the JSE’s Listings Rules 
require at least four directors from listed companies.  
None of them sets a maximum number of the size of BODs. King II also does not 
provide the actual number of directors to constitute a board. However, it 
commences an overall norm that each board should reflect that its size makes it 
operative. This suggests that even though King II admits that a company’s board 
size may probably affect its performance, it leaves the option of determining the 
actual board size for the companies themselves to decide. A plausible explanation 
for not prescribing a specific board number may be to avoid a tacit conclusion that 
it is likely to embrace a “one size fits all” method to corporate management.82 
For example, using a sample of 84 South African listed companies in 1998, no 
noteworthy link between the effectiveness of worth auxiliary to a company’s 
intellectual and physical capital and board size has been reported.83 Similarly, no 
significant link was documented among board size and frequencies of listing 
postponement by the JSE during examination of 81 South African listed 
companies from 1999 to 2005.84 Therefore, it is suggested that board size may not 
be a vital driver of corporate performance in South African listed companies. 
                                                            
80 Paul Guest (ibid 73) 387 
81 Ibid (n 1, 2); Beiner et al., ‘An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm 
Valuation’ (2006) 12(2) European Financial Management 249 
82 Ian MacNeil and Xiao Li, ‘Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-compliance with the 
Combined Code’ (2006) 14(5) Corporate Governance: An International review 96 
83 Ho C-A and Williams SM, ‘International Comparative Analysis of the Association Between 
Board Structure and the Efficiency of Value Added by a Firm from its Physical Capital and 
Intellectual Capital Resources’ (2003) 38 The International Journal of Accounting 465 
84 Musa Mangena and Venancio Tauringana, ‘Corporate Boards, Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance in an Environment of Economic and Political Instability: The Case of Zimbabwe 
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The UK’s CCG 2014 also does not stipulate the actual count of directors that 
should constitute a board. However, it proposes that: the size of board should not 
be as large to be cumbersome rather it should be reasonable to fulfil the 
necessities of business; and if the composition of board needs to be changed it 
could be altered without unnecessary disturbance.85 
The CCG of Pakistan does not provide any specific number for BODs. However 
the common practice in listed companies of Pakistan shows the number of BODs 
ranging from 7 to 11, the most common number is from 9 to 10. For example, the 
Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL)86 has 9 members on its BODs; Nestle87 has 9, 
PIA has 11,88 Akzo Nobel89 has 7, Linde90 Pakistan has 9, Shell91 has 10, Pak 
Refinery Limited (PRL)92 has 10. The unfortunate and interesting thing, the 
researcher noticed relating to the BODs of these companies is that there is no 
female director in any of these companies’ BODs.  
The researcher argues that the size of BODs has an impact on the corporate and 
financial performance of companies as evidenced by above studies. However, the 
question whether larger boards have a positive impact or smaller boards have a 
positive impact is difficult to answer; because in this case first there is need to 
define a particular number that what number denotes smaller boards and what 
number denotes larger boards.  
Therefore, this thesis argues that the size of corporate boards should be according 
to the size and nature of business of a company. Neither it should be too small that 
it would become difficult for a company to carry out business and nor it should be 
too large that it would become rather burden in terms of cost. Therefore, the basic 
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idea at the time of constituting a corporate board should be to bring together best 
talent, range of skills, experience and different backgrounds so that the honest 
evaluation of managerial performance, effective managerial monitoring, high 
quality strategies, better handling of risks and faster decision-making could be 
achieved by that board. 
6.4 Board Composition 
6.4.1 The Theoretical Link between the Proportion of Board Composition 
and Corporate Performance 
Board composition means the number of NEDs as compared to executive 
directors on board. In this section, NEDs refer to the percentage of the number of 
NEDs to the total number of directors of a company and stated as a proportion. 
This section presents the two contrasting views with regards to number of NEDs 
on boards: those who support majority of NEDs and; those who support majority 
of executive directors on corporate boards; then presents this researcher’s analysis 
and conclusion that which view is better and could be better for the listed 
companies of Pakistan. 
The NEDs are external directors who supervise the decisions and policies of 
executive directors. Those who are advocates of more NEDs (outsiders) on the 
board normally argue by relying on agency, resource independence, information 
asymmetry and signalling theories. On the other hand, those who support more 
executive directors (insiders) on the board make their arguments on the basis of 
stewardship theory. 
The agency theory argues that, boards controlled by more executive directors are 
usually not responsible enough.93 Conversely, NEDs being independent are more 
likely to help in making independent decisions in board.94 They fulfil their 
monitoring duties efficiently and effectively and benefit the company assets in 
terms of expertise, experience, reputation and business contacts in order to 
                                                            
93 Eugene Fama (ibid 1); Sonnenfeld (n 53) 108 
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maintain their position and due to the presence of competitive business markets 
existed in and outside the company.95  
Another argument in favour of more NEDs is that, if upper internal management 
of a company gets control of the corporate board, the chances of expropriating the 
shareholders’ wealth increases because in such environment top management is 
more likely to hatch and conspire among them. Moreover, it also reduces healthy 
competition among managers for improved performance.96  
However, NEDs has the potential to handle and lessen this conspiracy because of 
having motivations to ripen and maintain their reputations as experts in 
controlling board’s decisions.97 It reduces the probability of internal managerial 
involvement. Similarly, by the addition of NEDs the capability of board can be 
enhanced as a market encouraged framework by less expensive relocation of 
control.98 Their independence helps NEDs to avoid politeness and courtesy at the 
expense of truth, frankness, and constructive criticisms of executive management 
in the boardroom without fear of victimisation.  
Moreover, the appointment of independent NEDs assists in decreasing 
information asymmetry by signalling the aim of executive directors reliably in 
order to deal with external potential investors equitably and consequently, to 
protect their investment.99 It also gives message to the market insiders’ intent to 
trust on decision experts and their gratitude of the significance of untying the 
controlling functions and decision-making.100 Therefore, proponents of this view 
believe that a higher percentage of NEDs on corporate boards will improve 
corporate performance. 
However, proponents of stewardship theory advocate the view that corporate 
boards having more NEDs might have negative effect on companies’ 
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performance.101 They argue that NEDs do not have enough knowledge regarding 
business therefore; they cannot understand the complex matters of company 
because they act as directors occasionally as part-timers and also act as directors 
of other companies’ boards;102 they cannot give enough time required to deal with 
their advisory and monitoring responsibilities. The researcher submits that this 
argument does not apply only on NEDs even executive directors hold positions of 
directors in more than one company. Therefore regarding these issues both 
executive and NEDs are on equal footing. 
However, managers are principally reliable persons and are good wardens of the 
assets assigned to them.103 In addition to this, executive directors spend their 
entire working lives in the company they manage; therefore they preferably 
comprehend the businesses in contrast to external NEDs and can take greater 
decisions for company.104 They believe that higher corporate performance is 
attached to the majority of internal directors because they certainly work to raise 
the profit of their shareholders.  
In view of this, decisions of a corporate board having large number of NEDs 
would be of inferior quality, which would lead to low performance of a company. 
The researcher negates this argument and submits that, not all executives always 
think about the higher corporate performance of a company, rather in the absence 
of an independent monitoring eye the chances of expropriation of shareholders’ 
wealth increase. 
Another argument in favour of executive directors is that, corporate boards having 
large number of external directors are more incline to supress strategic actions and 
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managerial initiative, which occur due to extreme supervision and lack of business 
knowledge.105 On the other hand, large number of executive directorship is related 
to great access to information, which ultimately results into high level decision-
making. This can have a positive effect on corporate performance. In fact, external 
directors do not generally have such access to informal sources of information and 
knowledge in company which internal directors have. Consequently, decisions of 
a board controlled by NEDs would not be of higher excellence which would 
prompt low performance of a company. 
6.4.2 The Empirical Evidence on the Impact of NEDs on Companies’ 
Performance 
The existing literature on the impact of large number of NEDs and company 
performance is contradictory. A few disclosure studies106 have presented 
significant association between the percentage of NEDs and intensities of 
deliberate disclosure to disclose financial information, due to the positive impact 
on the decisions of managers by NEDs.  
It has also been reported that the addition of NEDs on corporate boards proliferate 
a companies’ compliance with disclosure requirements which leads to more 
widespread financial disclosure, and provide investors more precise position of a 
company; therefore due to the existence of NEDs on corporate boards the CG 
values improve considerably.   
A number of studies on CG have also established a positive connection between 
the percentage of NEDs and foreign share ownership on a board. The reason is 
that foreign investors consider NEDs more active and operative in controlling 
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unscrupulous conduct of managers, and hence safeguarding the interests of 
shareholders.107 
In terms of compliance, external directors may affect the observance of CG 
principles due to their autonomous decision and to defend their reputation as 
directors. They can also have impact on the compliance of CG best practices in 
order to improve their employability in efficient and competitive business 
markets.108  
6.4.2.1 Appointment of INEDs 
After the occurrence of serious corporate disasters and loss around the world in 
the last couple of decades, progressive rounds of CG change have looked to 
enhance the CG of companies.109 The appointment criteria for INEDs have been 
identified as a basic component responsible for corporate disaster. Rules and 
regulations have been formulated in order to make the procedure more formal, 
thorough and to take advantage of a more expert group of people who are more 
illustrative of society.110  
The current number of directors is depicted as a little, identical group who are 
demographically identical and through a misty procedure of appointment self-
replicate.111 In spite of many years of change, the Walker Review112 completed in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis established that poor CG was the major cause 
of failures and that the appointment mechanisms for NEDs had been not changed. 
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The literature relating to the appointment mechanism endorses that it is a 
defective mechanism, occurring via referrals and the links of Chairmen. Though, 
the literature does not examine the appointment mechanism at individual level. 
The previous studies conducted to investigate the appointment procedures of 
NEDs are mostly quantitative by utilising secondary data, which do not uncover 
the truth about appointment process. Therefore, a qualitative study is required 
regarding the examination about appointment process of a NED, in order to 
expand understanding about the procedures included.113  
6.4.2.2 Percentage of NEDs and Corporate Performance 
Some empirical studies evidenced that boards dominated by NEDs deliver higher 
performance.114 In a study conducted utilising a sample of 311 UK listed 
companies from 1994 to 1996; a positive relationship was reported between the 
performance of corporations and the proportion of NEDs.115 Moreover, an 
investigation was held of a US sample of 744 autonomous NEDs’ resignations 
from 1990 to 2003 to determine the worth that market resides on the impartiality 
of board.116 And it was found that the declaration of impartial NEDs resignations 
result in 1.22% loss in a company’s market value. This shows that the 
independence of board is highly valued by investors because impartial boards are 
linked with higher monitoring of managerial conduct.  
Similarly, a momentous and positive relationship was identified between the 
proportion of external directors and the corporal and intellectual capital 
performance of a company in 84 South African listed companies in 1998.117 
Likewise, an adverse relationship was reported between the percentage of NEDs 
and the occurrences of company interruptions from the JSE in a sample of 81 
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companies from 1999 to 2005.118 This submits that South African registered 
companies which have greater proportion of NEDs are not usually expected to be 
deferred from the stock exchange. However, evidence is also available, which is 
entirely consistent with prior research that boards having large number of NEDs 
perform better for a sample of Tunisian and Zimbabwean listed companies, 
correspondingly.119 
However, some other studies found an adverse association of the percentage of 
NEDs with performance.120 In a sample of 25 Canadian companies from 1976 to 
2005, an adverse connexion was established between the proportion of NEDs and 
performance. Likewise, Nigerian companies with less NEDs performed better 
than those with more NEDs were found.121 This advocates that if NEDs bring 
objectivity, independence and experience to have impact upon the decisions of 
board, they may also throttle managerial initiative via extreme monitoring. A third 
view is that the existence of NEDs does not have influence on performance.122 
Such as, no link was found between board composition and performance for a 
sample of 142 US listed companies.123  
The King II and the JSE Listing Rules assert that the number of NEDs should be 
greater impartial from management for the purpose of protecting the interest of 
investors. This proposes that the King Code anticipates companies that employ 
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large number of NEDs have better CG practices as compared to those that employ 
less NEDs. Nevertheless, there have been a chain of corporate scams in South 
Africa in the past due to weak boards that failed to supervise the business affairs 
effectively and failed to ensure the engagement of senior officers in self-dealing 
e.g. Regal Treasury Bank.124  
Section 269A of the South African Companies Act 1973 entails the appointment 
of a minimum of two INEDs from every public company. King II and the JSE 
Listings Rules also necessitate South African listed companies to appoint majority 
of NEDs in their corporate boards. King II additionally necessitates that the large 
number of NEDs should be autonomous in order to make sure that the interests of 
minority shareholders are safeguarded satisfactorily. This shows that King II 
believes that companies whose boards are dominated by NEDs perform 
financially better as compared to those with less number of NEDs.  
Moreover, King III also postulates that corporate boards should maintain an 
equilibrium of executive and NEDs, but with a large number of NEDs. In 
addition, the board should certify an appropriate equilibrium of power on the 
board. There should not be any individual or group of individuals that could 
dominate the decisions of board. King III moves a step further and suggests that 
an independent non-executive chairman125 should monitor the board, who can 
deliver the required direction for an effective board. The condition is being an 
independent and this should be part of his annual evaluation. 
6.4.2.3 The NEDs within the UK Governance Context 
Corporate scandals such as Equitable Life, Maxwell Corporation and Polly Peck 
prompt comprehension regarding loss of confidence in auditors126 and director 
                                                            
124 Janis Sarra, ‘Strengthening Domestic Corporate Activity in Global Capital Markets: A 
Canadian Perspective on South Africa’s Corporate Governance’ (2004) Working Paper No. 118, 
The George Washington University Law School <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=628702> 
accessed 20-02-2015 
125 Not be the CEO of the company 
126 Nigel Macdonald and Aileen Beattie, ‘The Corporate Governance Jigsaw’ (1993) 23 
Accounting and Business Research 304 
 189 
 
remuneration.127 The Cadbury Committee (1992) was established to analyse 
economic statement and accountability mechanisms. The chief proposals as 
provided in the Code of Best Practice were to: enhance the number and influence 
of INEDs; distinguish the responsibilities of CEO and Chairman and; establish 
sub-committees, involving a nominations committee, to monitor the hiring 
procedure for directors.128  
The Greenbury Report (1995) was a reaction to apprehensions regarding 
directors’ pay.129 It was trailed by the Hampel Report (1998) which increased the 
part of NEDs further in conveying CG standards. This report suggested that 
minimum of one third of each board ought to be INEDs, and that committees 
involving nominations committee ought to be made to a great extent out of 
INEDs.130  
In 2002, Derek Higgs was named by the UK Government to review the part and 
viability of NEDs in encouraging accountability and the performance of 
company.131 This prompted a revised Combined Code (2003)132 consolidating 
some of Higgs’ proposals. This Combined Code incorporated and accompanying 
the suggestions regarding the appointment of NEDs presented below: 
1) Board composition to consist of fifty per cent NEDs; 
2) Proper and transparent techniques to be used for directors’ hiring; 
3) Summary rules were accommodated for the accountabilities of the 
nominations committee 
Taking after these changes, the number of executive directors was reduced and the 
number of NEDs on BODs expanded. The aggregate number of FTSE 100 
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directors remained 1116 in 2008, with 353 executive directors and 763 NEDs. 
This was the most elevated number of NEDs ever recorded.  
In 2008, after severe damage and disaster in the banking sector, a review of CG 
was established and this review uncovered the continued shortcomings in the 
governance of FTSE 100 companies. In spite of many years of changes and 
proposals little had changed in the appointment mechanism, the corporate 
directors remain a homogeneous group of people.133  
6.4.2.4 Board Composition within Pakistan’s Governance Context 
The above mentioned studies present differing opinions regarding the impact of 
more NEDs on corporate board and companies’ performance metrics. However, 
these studies have consensus upon one point namely, that appointment of NEDs 
increase boards’ independence and improve monitoring. That’s why the UK’s 
corporate boards are required to have number of NEDs larger than executive 
directors;134 however South African corporate boards are required to have fifty 
per-cent NEDs.135 However, the CCG136 of Pakistan requires the appointment of 
only one INED obligatory for companies and prefer one third of the corporate 
board to have INEDs, which is very less. 
Fundamentally, the board is responsible to ensure the achievement of a company 
by guiding and monitoring the affairs of company collectively; protecting the 
interests of its shareholders and significantly related stakeholders while 
considering the law, relevant regulations and commercial concerns. The 
Pakistan’s CCG requires from each listed company to appoint INEDs a minimum 
of one and preferably one third of the aggregate of the board (as mentioned 
above). 
The meaning of the word independent denotes that a person acting as director 
does not have any other link or affiliation, with the listed company, its associated 
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companies, subsidiaries, holding company or director whether pecuniary or 
otherwise.137 The criteria of impartiality are very strict according to the CCG 
which is inevitable for the companies working in an environment where most of 
the business is family and state owned.138  
However, the researcher submits that the number of NEDs should be increased in 
the listed companies of Pakistan to decrease the manipulation of power in the 
family owned companies, SOEs and political influences.139 The number of INEDs 
in Pakistani listed companies should be at least fifty per-cent, so that the decisions 
of the board and interests of shareholders could be properly monitored.  Holistic 
efforts are needed for this, as the number is available NEDs is not enough for 
demand and, if NEDs are available they are not willing to work as in companies 
because of less remuneration packages.  
The researcher further submits that the Regulators should take effective measures 
to offer attractive remuneration packages to hire independent NEDs and also take 
steps for the proper qualification and trainings of NEDs so that the demand could 
be met.  
Secondly, another important issue in this respect is to create awareness among 
business community regarding the role and position of NEDs. Generally, the 
mind-set in Pakistan’s business community is that the office of NEDs is an 
honorary office and they should not have to say more about companies’ policies 
neither it is important for them to attend all meetings of the board. This trend is 
more common among private, small and new companies due to the lack of 
knowledge and qualification.  
The PICG and SECP should take measures to educate the business community 
that the role of NEDs is as important as of executive directors, and it should be 
compulsory for NEDs to attend all meetings of the BODs. Their independence 
                                                            
137 Clause (i) (b) of the CCG 2012 of Pakistan. 
138 As discussed in chapter one, four and five. 
139 The evidence of power manipulation and political influences in SOEs and FOEs is provided in 
section 1.2.1. 
 192 
 
does not mean that they have no relation with company matters and have no 
knowledge about the company business; instead independence denotes that they 
can monitor the policies, decision-making and risk management of BODs 
independently, and during their presence executive managers become cautious 
about actions.  
A corporate board balanced with executive and NEDs can better protect the 
wealth of shareholders from expropriation and also helps to improve CG practices 
in company. The researcher further submits that, the awareness regarding the role 
of INEDs is also necessary to curtail the practice according to which family 
owned companies appoint their family members or major children as NEDs just to 
fulfil a requirement.  
Moreover, the CCG of Pakistan requires that,140 an individual can hold the 
directorship of seven companies at a time: however this restriction excludes of 
holding the directorships in the listed subsidiaries of a listed holding company. 
According to first part of this provision a person can be a director of seven 
companies at the same time and; according to second part there are no limits of 
number of listed holding companies for which a person can be director. The 
researcher’s view is that this provision must be amended, as a person being 
director of so many companies cannot do justice with any one of them. Rather, he 
will be biased and take and/or promote decisions of company based on his 
personal bias and interests rather keeping the company’s and shareholder’s stakes 
on higher grounds.  
This practice can be minimised in two ways: one the number of directorships a 
person can hold at any one time ought to be reduced and restricted in respect of all 
companies including, subsidiary and holding companies. Secondly IIs can also 
play a positive part in this respect by keeping an eye on the working and decisions 
of such directors.141 
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6.5  Role and Responsibilities of BODs 
The board is the central point of the CG mechanism in the company and a 
principal connection between company and stakeholders. The board’s supreme 
duty is to ensure the better performance of company in generating value for its 
shareholders.142 The researcher submits that, by performing its responsibilities 
properly with care, honesty and in favour of the company and shareholders, the 
board cannot only boost the performance of a company but also promote the CG 
norms and set standards for other companies to follow as well.  
It is the primary responsibility of directors to monitor the administration and 
performance of a company. They direct and control company for the sake of 
investors and their roles and responsibilities are enclosed in the statute. BODs are 
recognised as being responsible for a multitude of specific and general tasks, 
which include: advising and monitoring management; defending and guaranteeing 
the reliability of the audit; paying administration and the BODs itself; the hiring 
of new management and other board members, and finally; the success of the 
company.  
In short, the functions of board are to direct, advice, manage and monitor 
company affairs. These tasks rest on the shoulders of NEDs as internal directors 
usually had clashes of interest that could damage the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders.  
The researcher submits that, such practices are essential for the CG structure of 
Pakistan, where companies are run by directors for their own benefits or for the 
welfares of major shareholders who are families and SOEs. Resultantly, the stakes 
of minority shareholders remained unprotected. This problem can be resolved by 
two ways: one by making amendments in the CCG and introducing provisions 
which clearly define the roles of BODs and there should be left no room for some 
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groups to spoil the interests of weaker; secondly, IIs can play a positive part by 
monitoring the activities of directors and by raising their voice in AGMs.143  
The CG literature recommends several theories regarding BODs and the form of 
their involvement. Stiles and Taylor (2001)144 provide a summary of five diverse 
theoretical viewpoints: 
1) Agency theory, suggests that, the responsibility of BODs is to administer 
the management actions as a consequence of the parting of ownership 
from control, because managers might perform for their own benefits 
instead of the shareholders. 
2) Stewardship theory advocates that the stakes of managers’ and company 
are associated with each other. Therefore the quest for benefits and 
shareholder importance will ponder absolutely on the individual manager 
and the governance framework. The role of BODs is to assist and 
encourage. 
3) Resource Dependency theory places that the BODs connects the company 
to the outer atmosphere in order to guarantee assets and to safeguard its 
own interests. 
4) Class Hegemony asserts that companies are the agents of people and the 
part of BODs underlines the selection of correct persons regarding social 
position and impact. 
5) Managerial Hegemony proposes that operating a company is anticipated 
by CG and administration. 
These theories provide a diverse point of view.145 The literature regarding CG and 
the BODs has been ruled by the conventions of Agency Theory. Additionally, it 
has been suggested that BODs should be generally active and its members should 
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participate in decision making. However, little has been done to measure 
practically the participation of directors on the decision making process.146  
6.5.1 Board Working Through Management 
Boards can confer their powers to management in two ways: where the executive 
directors taking the important decisions, and the management’s involvement 
remains minimal; or the executive directors require top management to contribute 
in making major decisions regarding the governance of companies. Following 
diagram shows the procedure of board working through management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Figure: 6.2: Board Functions Working Through Management147 
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1) Monitoring, when NEDs monitor the activities of executive directors with 
the purpose of securing shareholders’ interests;148 
2) Strategy development, when NEDs take part in strategy formation and the 
distribution of assets and;149 
3) Conflict resolution, when NEDs are involved in setting out to board 
payment, procedures and the appointment and dismissal of board 
members.150 
These responsibilities of NEDs are sustained by a qualitative study of senior 
decision makers.151 However, the part of NEDs in listed companies concentrated 
more on monitoring and resolving clashing between parties.152 There was less 
focus on strategy growth. Similarly, another study evidenced NEDs’ participation 
in policy making for enhancing the skills and inspiration of the individual NEDs 
to deal with special conditions, for example emergency circumstances.153 In this 
more behavioural description of the role, the possibly inconsistent strains of 
performing essential in the NEDs’ part have also been acknowledged.154  
However, the focus was on the significance of companies deliberately choosing 
what is anticipated from their NEDs, by looking at the necessities of the business 
and the desires of its investors. Evidence was also found showing the 
dissimilarities regarding the perception how investors and chairmen saw the 
NEDs part and promote moving beyond a ‘one size fits all’ depiction of the role. 
Some studies155 also designate the following roles of NEDs: 
 An auditor role, when the environment is extremely synchronised; 
                                                            
148 Charlie Weir and David Laing, ‘Governance Structures, Director Independence and Corporate 
Performance in the UK’ (2001) 13(2) European Business Review 86 
149 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 1984) “See generally” 
150 Terry McNulty and Andrew Pettigrew, ‘The Contribution, Power and Influence of Part-time 
Board Members’ (1996) 4(3) Corporate Governance-An International Review 160 
151 Dixon et al., ‘An Investigation into the Role, Effectiveness and Future of Non-executive 
Directors’ (2005) 31(1) Journal of General Management 1  
152 Long et al., ‘The Role of the Non-executive Director: Findings of an Empirical Investigation 
into the Differences between Listed and Unlisted UK Boards’ (2005) 13(5) Corporate Governance 
667 
153 Andrew Pettigrew and Terry McNulty, ‘Power and Influence in and Around the Boardroom’ 
(1995) 48(8) Human Relations 1 
154 Annie Pye and Gillian Camm, ‘Non-executive Directors: Moving Beyond the ‘One-Size-Fits-
All’ View’ (2003) 28 Journal of General Management 52 
155 Ibid 
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 A consultant role, to guide on and assist policy making; 
 A tame pensioner, when active part is hardly required, only for 
independent presence; 
 A super NED, who meets the necessities relating to risk management and 
strategy development. 
Although, this structure needs to develop additionally however it provides an 
analytical approach that would facilitate business community and regulators to 
elucidate their anticipations of the NEDs part and facilitate the NEDs appointment 
procedure. There is no agreement in the existing literature regarding the role of a 
NED. It differs on the basis of companies’ background, expertise and incentives 
for individuals. This creates a challenge to nominations committees and the board 
for selecting a person as NED. 
In short, it can be concluded that, the BODs has four main tasks to perform, which 
are to audit, coach, steer and supervise. These four tasks depend on four key 
factors that are; board perspective, board behaviour, internal circumstances and 
external circumstances. It is expected that the board will be an auditing tool if 
administration is operative and irrelevant external factors are involved; an 
instruction tool if administration is unproductive and for short-term, a steering 
tool if board is involved in executive tasks for long-term, and a monitoring tool if 
board plays monitoring tasks and external factors are considerable. 
6.6  Board Structures 
This section considers and compares the two main systems of board structures that 
are most common in industrialised countries. The aim to include this section in 
this chapter is to investigate which form of board could be better for Pakistan. 
Though Pakistan already has one-tier system and the researcher agrees that one-
tier system is best suitable for Pakistan. However, a study156 has suggested that 
two-tier system could be better for Pakistan. 
                                                            
156 Syeda Shabbir, ‘The Role of Institutional Shareholders Activism in the Corporate Governance 
of Pakistan’ (2012) 1(2) Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1, 5 
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In terms of financial and corporate performance and board turnover of the largest 
companies listed on the stock exchanges, the one-tier and two-tier board systems 
are effective.157 Therefore, it is not conceivable to consign superiority to either of 
them. In the Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK and the US, the one-tier board 
system governs companies. A one-tier board system consists of executive and 
NEDs. The responsibilities of management and control are united into a single 
body. Normally, the single board is monitored by itself.  
In order to address this problem, independent outside directors were recognised 
and audit committees were introduced. A major disadvantage of the one-tier 
system is the power concentration of the CEO and the lack of feedback from other 
stakeholders. However, this disadvantage can be overcome by monitoring the acts 
of CEO through INEDs and IIs by giving them proper representation in the board. 
The diagram below presents the two different structures of BODs. 
In two-tier-board system, the companies are administered by an executive 
management board and a supervisory board. In this system, executives exert a 
minimal influence on stock prices and shareholders, but a considerable influence 
of other stakeholders, who are highly dedicated to the company and are ready to 
contribute officially to the governance matters of the company. The advantage of 
this system is a clear ‘checks and balance’ approach; however the disadvantage 
can be a power struggle at the expense of the competitive edge of the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
157 Cleopas Sanangura, ‘Behind the Board-room Door. The Effectiveness of Board of directors in 
Creating Shareholder Value and the effect of Shareholder Activism in Financial Service Sector in 
Emerging Markets: Corporate Governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe’ (PhD thesis, The 
Nottingham Trent University 2006) 
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                                  Figure 6.3: Types of Corporate Boards158 
The table below presents the strengths and weaknesses of both types of board 
systems. 
             Table 6.1: Merits and Demerits of One-Tier and Two-Tier Systems159 
Categories Advantages and 
strengths 
Disadvantages and weaknesses 
One-tier-
system 
Restricted information 
asymmetry, Frequent 
meetings,  
Direct access to 
information 
Responsibility of monitoring and  
strategy setting, 
Independence of NEDs 
Two-tier-
system 
Separation of control and 
management, 
No conflict of interest, 
Independence of the 
members of the 
supervisory board 
Co-determination (a structural weakness 
because of two organs of employee and 
shareholder representation), 
Limited involvement in strategic decision 
making, 
Information asymmetry 
                                                            
158 According to Heidrick and Struggles (2009) 
159 According to Jungmann (2006) 
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Based on above discussion, the researcher submits that, one-tier-board system 
prevalent in Pakistan is completely suitable. The argument is that, the only aim of 
‘supervisory board’ in two-tier system seems ‘check and balance’; which can be 
fulfilled (as discussed above) by enhancing the number of NEDs and giving the 
proper representation to IIs in the board and making them strong and active 
enough to monitor and challenge the activities of board members. However, 
introducing an entirely new two-tier system would not be suitable in terms of 
extra cost and time.  The new system will take much time and money to settle and 
operate in a framework in which the whole business community is not aware with 
it. 
6.7  Board Effectiveness Model 
Board effectiveness combines various factors such as: the appointment process of 
the BODs, how fair is it; frequency of meetings of BODs, how often board meets 
and gives proper time to the company matters; the director development, whether 
the trainings are given regularly to directors to familiarise them with the new 
CCG, related laws and their responsibilities according to the changing corporate 
world; the assessment of BODs performance; management decisions and; 
execution and implementation of management strategy throughout the whole 
company.  
This section examines these factors, their impact on the effectiveness on corporate 
boards and develops a ‘board effectiveness model’ for the listed companies of 
Pakistan. The following figure shows the model of board effectiveness for the 
listed companies of Pakistan developed by this researcher. 
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                             Figure 6.4: Board Effectiveness Model160 
 
6.7.1 Directors’ Appointment Process 
For the effectiveness of a corporate board the appointment process of directors 
should be fair and rigorous. For example, the UK CCG 2014161 provides a strict, 
formal and translucent mechanism for appointing directors to BODs such as; the 
selections should be made on merit, by considering the benefits of diverse board, 
including gender, to uphold a suitable equilibrium of experience, skill, knowledge 
                                                            
160 Developed by the researcher 
161 Section B of the Code of Corporate Governance of the UK 2014. 
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and independence on the board and within the company.162 A nomination 
committee is established to perform this task. The majority of nomination 
committee’s members should be independent NEDs.  
The chairman should be a NED and he should be the head of that nomination 
committee, but the committee should not be presided over by chairman when the 
meeting of committee is for the purpose of appointing a successor to the 
chairmanship. Moreover, NEDs should be hired for a particular time-period 
subject to re-election following statutory provisions regarding removal of a 
director. The term beyond six years for NEDs should be subject to laborious 
review specifically, and should consider the need for enlightened revitalising the 
board.  
The annual report ought to comprise a separate section explaining the work of 
committee, including the process it has used regarding the selection of BODs. 
This section should explain the policy of board regarding diversity, comprising 
gender, every assessable aims that it has set for executing the strategy, and 
development in accomplishing those aims. Lastly, the search consultancy of the 
director should also be explained in the annual report. 
South African King III has the mechanism of directors’ appointment163 on the 
lines of the UK: through nomination committee but subject to shareholder 
endorsement when required, a rigorous and formal process on merits. According 
to King III, shareholders are eventually accountable for the configuration of board 
and it is for their benefit to ensure that the board is constituted appropriately.164 
However, the CCG of Pakistan does not have any provision concerning the 
appointment of directors, which is another basic lacuna in the CCG of Pakistan.165 
                                                            
162 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 (2014) 
163 Principle 2.19 of King III Report. 
164 IOD, Draft Code of Governance Principles for South Africa – 2009 King Committee on 
Governance’ 21 <www.iodsa.co.za> accessed 20-02-2015 
165 Other weakness, lacunas and overlapping provisions of code and corporate laws of Pakistan 
have been identified in the previous chapter. 
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The CCG of Pakistan contains the clauses regarding the appointment and removal 
of CFO, CS and Head of IA166 but not for the hiring and firing of directors.  
The researcher argues that how is it possible that the policy makers ignore to 
formulate and add the mechanism for the hiring and firing of members of most 
important entity of a company; around which the whole business of a company 
depends. The directors are appointed on the basis of personal and political 
benefits in SOEs and in family owned companies the owners acts as directors and 
appoint their family members or major children as NEDs.167  
The Ordinance168 and the CCG169 contain provisions regarding the qualification of 
directors which do not specify a fair and rigorous appointment and removal 
mechanism instead the positions and circumstances which debars a person to act 
as a director; for example, an insane, minor, defaulter etc. 
Neither the Ordinance nor the CCG recommends any educational requirement for 
a person to be eligible for the office of directorship in Pakistan. Though, the office 
of directorship owes many important responsibilities, the person acting as director 
therefore, must be qualified, experienced and competent for the proper running of 
this office. Only learned directors having professional qualification and 
experience would be able to implement CG norms in listed companies in their true 
sense.  
However, non-professional and uneducated ignorant persons cannot be rationale 
and prudent directors. Such directors would be harmful for the investments of 
shareholders. Hence, there should be specific provisions in the CCG or in the 
Ordinance to prescribe specific and precise criteria to be fulfilled by the person 
wish to act as director.  
                                                            
166 Clause (xii) of the CCG 2012 
167 The researcher made this observation while going through the websites and annual reports of 
various companies of Pakistan, and during an informal conversation with a secretary of a 
company. 
168 Section 187 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 
169 Clauses (iii, iv and v) of the CCG. 
 204 
 
The PICG should make endeavours to train directors and make them aware 
appropriately with corporate laws and their implementation. The persons should 
be disqualified from being directors of a listed company who do not consider it 
important to attend trainings and do not pass examinations. The application of this 
rule of compulsory certification for the directors will be proved beneficial in 
reducing corporate disasters and will also help to support the professional and 
accountable part of directors.  
Moreover, the criteria of minimum qualifications should be same for the both 
investing and investee companies. More experienced and well educated directors 
will also help IIs to play their role in improving CG practices in listed companies 
by understanding and supporting their long-term policies for the betterment of 
shareholders and companies. 
The researcher further argues that, the provisions must be added in the CCG of 
Pakistan defining a rigorous and formal appointment procedure for directors both 
executive and non-executive considering the skills, experience, and diversity and 
most importantly independence of directors, as such provisions are included in the 
CCG of the UK and King III of South Africa.170 The argument is that, it is 
inevitable for a corporate board to be effective and it can only be done if the 
directors are to be appointed on merit undergoing a strict process based on their, 
knowledge, experience and abilities. 
6.7.2 Director Development  
The development of directors is essential for an effective corporate board. 
Therefore, the UK CCG 2014 requires171 all directors to undergo induction when 
they join board and should continue to take updated trainings regularly in order to 
refresh and maintain their skills and knowledge. It is the duty of the chairman to 
make sure that the directors update their knowledge, skill and acquaintance with 
                                                            
170 As mentioned in previous paragraphs 
171 Section B of the UK Code of Corporate Governance 2014 <https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf> accessed 
20 August 2015 
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the company regularly necessary to perform their role. The company is 
responsible to provide the required resources in order to keep directors’ 
knowledge and competences updated. It is necessary for directors to have proper 
awareness of the company and access to its procedures and staff in order to work 
effectively.172 
Similarly, King III implies that there should be a formal procedure to conduct 
trainings and ensure development of directors.173 All newly appointed directors 
should be educated regarding their roles, responsibilities, powers and potential 
liabilities; particularly those having no or limited experience. For this purpose, an 
experienced director may act as mentor to train new directors. Directors should 
receive consistent updates on relevant matters of company’s business, 
amendments in laws, regulations, policies and standards of the company, and the 
atmosphere in which company operates. Moreover, it should also be the 
responsibility of chairman to remove incompetent directors according to the 
relevant legal and other procedural requirements. 
The CCG 2012 of Pakistan has mandatory provision regarding directors’ 
training.174 The CCG makes it obligatory for all listed companies to take proper 
measures for arranging induction courses to acquaint their directors with the 
applicable laws and their responsibilities so that they could manage the 
companies’ affairs successfully on behalf of the shareholders. The CCG also 
makes it compulsory for directors of registered companies to have certification 
offered by institutions (domestic or foreign) that fulfils the standards prescribed 
by SECP under any director’s training programme.  
For this purpose, the CCG requires at least one director every year to be certified 
under this training programme starting from 30th June 2012 to 30th June 2016; 
after that it would be compulsory for all directors to be certified. However, the 
person having 14 years of education and 15 years of experience (either in local or 
foreign institution) would be exempted from having this training certification. 
                                                            
172 Ibid  
173 Principle 2.20 of King III Report 
174 Clause xi of the CCG of Pakistan 2012 
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Further, CCG of Pakistan also provides the criteria for institutions that provide 
directors’ training program and also provide the programme outline as well.175 
6.7.3 Frequency of Board Meetings 
Frequency of board meetings mean the number of board meetings often occur and 
these meeting are a contributing factor for making the corporate boards effective, 
as the directors ought to be able to assign adequate time to the company to fulfil 
their duties appropriately.176 The association between the regularity of board 
meetings and companies’ outcome is another internal CG matter that highlights 
the concern for policy-makers and researchers.177 There are two different opinions 
regarding this issue: those who are in favour of higher frequency of board 
meetings and;178 those who are not.179 
One view is that the frequency of board meetings shows the strength of a board’s 
actions, and the excellence of its monitoring.180 A contradictory view is that board 
meetings are not essentially valuable for shareholders as board meetings are 
expensive in terms of both time and cost.181 King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
task South African listed companies to set out a strategy for the aim, frequency, 
duration and conduct for the meetings of BODs and board subcommittees’ 
meetings. It is recommended by King II specifically that all corporate boards 
should meet regularly, at least once a quarter, and it must be revealed in their 
annual reports. This indicates that the higher occurrence of board meetings is 
expected to impact positively on company’s financial performance by King II.  
The researcher submits considering the both points discussed above that, instead 
of arranging numerous meetings of board, establishing a system responsive to 
particular challenges would prove more fruitful. For instance, the meetings can be 
                                                            
175 The Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan 2012 
176 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 (2014) 
177 Ibid (n 7) 
178 Ibid (n 2) 
179 Ibid (n 4) 
180 Vefeas (ibid 72) 116; Conger et al., ‘Appraising Boardroom Performance’ (1998) 76(1) 
Harvard Business Review 142 
181 Vefeas (ibid 72) 118 
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organised more frequently in case of crisis; such as when the replacement of CEO 
is required, shareholder’s interests are visibly in danger or combating aggressive 
takeovers and when risks are involved. As the sole idea is that the directors ought 
to give adequate time to the company in order to fulfil their duties appropriately. 
6.7.4 Supervisory Board 
There is a proposal regarding the establishment of a supervisory board in 
Pakistani companies like China.182 The CCG for Chinese listed companies 
requires the establishment of a ‘Supervisory Board’ in order to monitor the 
legitimacy of directors, performance of management’s responsibilities and 
safeguard the legal rights of company and shareholders.183   
Similar suggestions are also floating regarding Pakistan that, the CCG of Pakistan 
may also recommend setting out a supervisory board for the monitoring of 
managers, directors and auditors. The supervisory board ought to investigate the 
financial matters of a company. The members of supervisory board should be 
experts of corporate laws and this board ought to be administered through the 
regulations set out in articles of association (AOA) of a specific company. This 
board may act as a bridge between shareholders and company. 
The advocates of supervisory board further argue that, this board should have 
meetings with individual and institutional shareholders in order to resolve issues 
originating from conflict of interests. This board ought to be able to organise 
periodical meetings. The directors, managers and auditors should attend these 
meetings to discuss significant issues of company and to address questions raised 
by the board. The recommendations of this board should be considered seriously 
in AGMs. This board can help to develop CG practices, if the members of this 
board have direct access to regulatory authority to inform them about any abuse of 
law by the company or its directors. The exponents of supervisory board believe 
that it will increase transparency of financial statements and will help to eradicate 
corruption from management. 
                                                            
182 Ibid (n 156) 20 
183 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 2001 
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However this researcher submits that, supervisory board is not a suitable proposal 
for Pakistani companies. Firstly, to have a supervisory board would be an extra 
burden as it will enhance the cost, and there will be a long chain of management 
that could increase the problems rather to solve some. Secondly, establishment of 
a supervisory board can affect the relationship of shareholders especially 
institutional shareholders with companies and may not leave the room for their 
participation in the company matters as in Germany and China. All the functions 
which are proposed to be performed by supervisory board can be done effectively 
by creating a proper balance in the board members; for instance, by enhancing the 
number of INEDs and by giving a proper place to institutional shareholders in the 
board and likewise establishing a proper mechanism of check and balance. 
6.7.5 Evaluation of BODs 
The corporate boards need to be monitored regularly in order to improve their 
performance. To achieve this, the board should be assessed; this assessment 
would provide a valuable feedback which will help to improve its effectiveness, 
maximise its strong aspects and will focus on areas that require improvement. 
However, the procedures of assessment should be impartial and rigorous.   
For example, the UK CCG requires184 that the board ought to conduct a formal 
and harsh assessment of its individual directors, committees and of its 
performance annually. During this evaluation process, experience, balance of 
skills, knowledge, independence, diversity of board, including gender, working 
strategies of board, and other factors relating to its effectiveness should be 
considered. The chairman should supervise assessment process and take measures 
appropriate on the basis of the valuation of outcomes by identifying the powers 
and the weaknesses of the board. There should also be an individual assessment in 
order to get insight whether each director remains to add appropriately and to 
determine dedication to his responsibilities. 
                                                            
184 Section C of the Code of Corporate Governance of the UK 2014. 
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Similarly, King III185 also provides a detailed procedure for the assessment of 
board, its committees and individual directors in South African companies. 
However, CCG of Pakistan does not contain any such provision. Therefore, it is 
recommended that Pakistan’s CCG should provide detailed and obligatory 
provision regarding the regular evaluation of corporate board, its committees and 
the individual directors of listed companies.  
The reason is that this assessment and accountability is necessary for a corporate 
board to improve its performance, in order to safeguard the stakes of shareholders. 
The credit rating agencies, financial press and media can play their role in this by 
increasing and decreasing the rating of companies and highlighting and making 
comparisons of companies whose boards are conducting regular assessments or 
not. The IIs can also play an effective role in this regard by raising their voice in 
the meetings of BODs or highlighting the importance of this assessment during 
informal meetings and negotiations.186  
In short, it can be concluded on the basis of above discussion that, the 
effectiveness of corporate board depends upon its diversity, composition, process 
and independence. Moreover, board’s functions are directly related to its members 
therefore, board’s effectiveness depends on director’s effectiveness. The diagram 
below presents this relationship of board and directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
185 Chapter 2 Principle 2.22 of the King III Report of South Africa 
186 This point is discussed in chapter 7 (section 7.8.1). 
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          Figure 6.5: Relationship between Corporate Board and its Directors187 
The table below presents the attributes of corporate board structures which make a 
board effective improves its performance and has been examined above in this 
chapter by both theoretical and empirical studies. 
               Table 6.2: Attributes of Board Structure and Performance188 
Inputs Structures Developments Outcome 
Diversity of 
skills and 
experience 
Board size and 
frequency of meetings 
The board and management 
share a common vision of 
their goals and decide how it 
should go about achieving its 
goals 
Identifying the goals 
and principles of 
company; making 
strategies to achieve 
those goals 
BODs give 
proper time 
to perform 
their duties  
Quorum to attend 
meetings 
The board is fully aware 
with its responsibilities  
Monitoring the 
performance of 
company and taking 
required action in a 
particular situation. 
 Establishing formal 
subcommittees 
The board reviews and 
evaluate the working of sub 
committees regularly. 
Appointing and 
supervising the CEO or 
senior staff and 
directing management 
 Creating jobs for 
board members with 
written explanations 
Ensuring good 
communication and 
diminishing confusions 
between management and 
the board.  
Employing new board 
members; monitoring 
board performance to 
ensure its excellent 
working 
                                                            
187 Developed by the researcher 
188 Developed by the researcher 
 
Board effectiveness (BE) depends on board diversity (BD) + board composition 
(BC) + board process (BP) + board independence (BI) 
DE = DE + DC + DS + DI
BE = BD + BC + BP + BI
Director effectiveness (DE) depends on director experience (DE) + director 
competence (DC) + director skills (DS) + director independence (DI) 
 211 
 
 Trainings and 
orientation for newly 
appointed members of 
board 
The management and board 
can resolve their conflicts 
constructively. 
The board has sufficient 
information regarding the 
agenda of board meetings; 
and meetings are clearly 
structured; significant issues 
are highlighted to discuss on 
priority; it is evident who 
has obligation for following 
up activities decided by the 
board. 
Making sure that 
company meets its 
legal requirements e.g. 
submitting annual 
returns; ensuring 
accountability to the 
company’s 
stakeholders; 
representing 
stakeholders’ interests; 
taking charge when 
things go wrong and 
representing the 
company externally 
 
6.8  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the attributes of BODs which make corporate boards 
better and effective. It found that more diverse boards bring range of experience, 
skills and talent to the BODs and gender-balanced corporate boards work more 
efficiently, effectively and they are more disciplined and highly focussed. The 
current chapter established that by creating an effective system of check and 
balance can influence the directors’ performance in order to meet shareholders’ 
expectations. It can be done via enhancing the number of INEDs in Pakistani 
corporate boards from one to at least half of the board, and to give a proper 
representation to IIs in BODs.  
Directors’ appointment procedure should be transparent and on merit, independent 
from political influences. In order to enhance the competency of directors, they 
should have appropriate training at the start and during their job in order to be 
acquainted with new laws, policies and regulations. Their performance must be 
evaluated regularly together as BODs and individually.  
The current chapter developed the board effectiveness model for the listed 
companies of Pakistan and established that better performing corporate boards 
help in developing CG principles and practices in their companies. The next 
chapter examines the role of IIs in promoting the CG principles in the listed 
companies of Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS IN PROMOTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the role of board of directors (BODs) and its 
impact on corporate governance (CG) practices in their companies and developed 
a model for the effectiveness of BODs in the listed companies of Pakistan. The 
idea behind the development of board effectiveness model is that, more effective 
BODs help to improve not only companies’ financial performance and maximise 
shareholders’ wealth, but they improve and promote CG practices as well. 
Companies having better governing boards have better performance.  
The current chapter relates to the fourth and last objective of this thesis and 
investigates the part of institutional investors (IIs) in promoting CG practices and 
explore their role and measures by which they can contribute towards enhancing 
the compliance with code of corporate governance (CCG) and improve CG 
practices in the listed companies of Pakistan. 
To explore the role of IIs is important because of the fact that, they are large 
organisations who collect money from individuals and companies and invest on 
their behalf being experienced and expert of financial matters and corporate 
ventures. Their clients have confidence in their skills that due to their 
professionalism and owning large shareholdings they can have a better say and 
influence the companies’ strategies and monitor the decision-making of BODs. 
Secondly, in the course of recent decades, IIs have grown impressively in size and 
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are included in various parts of the economy;1 therefore the examination of this 
issue is crucial with a specific end goal to evaluate their impact. They can impact 
the kind of companies they put resources into, change share prices and switch in 
and out of assets, with noteworthy consequences on the values of shares and 
resultantly the economy as well.2  
Therefore, this chapter seeks to explore what role IIs can play in the listed 
companies of Pakistan in order to improve CG practices there. The following 
figure presents the plan of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Figure 7.1: Plan of this Chapter 
7.2 The Importance of Institutional Investors 
The IIs activism seems to be the ultimate means for steady improvement in CG 
standards, as well as a powerful tool for re-focussing short-term strategies towards 
more sustainable and viable business projects.3 The IIs are financial mediators 
                                                            
1 Syeda Shabbir, ‘The Role of Institutional Shareholders Activism in the Corporate Governance of 
Pakistan’ (2012) 1(2) Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1 
2 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors’ University of California 
Los Angles Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-20, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=79622> accessed 15 May 2015  
3 Konstantinos Sergakis, ‘EU Corporate Governance: The On-going Challenges of the 
‘Institutional Investor Activism’ Conundrum’ (2013) 4 European Journal of Law Reform 728 
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who give liquidity to short-term financial markets and do long term investments in 
the capital market.4  
A standout amongst the most critical components of the capital market throughout 
the recent thirty years has been the growth of IIs.5 This development has prompted 
the framework being depicted as money manager capitalism.6  
In 1980s in the UK the trend of privatisation prompted an inversion in this 
development of IIs by considerably expanding the quantity of minority 
shareholders and private investors. Nevertheless, the breakdown in the share 
values in 1987 prompted to a lack of trust of minority shareholders and private 
investors and thus the pattern of IIs’ predominance emerged again.7 
The IIs are associations that gather huge amounts of money and invest those 
amounts in companies. They can assume a self-assured part in advancing CG 
practices in the listed companies of Pakistan through effectively taking an interest 
in the undertakings of investee companies.8 However, this fact about IIs has not 
been much considered, researched and given required importance yet in Pakistan. 
The reason could be the convergence of share ownership in the hands of 
individual shareholders or block-holders (SOEs and FOEs). 
Shareholders are frequently portrayed as proprietors of companies,9 which imply 
that owning shares in companies is equivalent to being owners of any other 
property. Therefore, being proprietors of companies, they can train a wild 
corporate framework. They might be individual investors or IIs. IIs are considered 
to have superior opinion in the administrative undertakings of their investee 
company due to their large shareholdings in contrast to individual shareholders. 
Therefore, they can be influential as specialists of progress towards enhancing CG 
                                                            
4 Stuart Gillan and Laura Starks, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’ 
(2007) 19(1) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 55 
5 Helen Short and Kevin Keasey, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the UK’ 
in kevin Keasey et al, (eds) corporate Governance Accountability, Enterprise and International 
Comparisons  (John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2005) 61 
6 Ibid   
7 Ibid (n 5) 60 
8 Ibid (n 1) 3 
9 Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (England Blackwell Publishing 2004) 98 
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practices.10 However, individual investors cannot influence the investee 
companies’ affairs being in small numbers owning small shares.  
7.2.1 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership can be described as number of shares owned by financial 
and non-financial institutions called IIs.11 These incorporate both the public and 
private institutions. Generally institutions are characterised as shown in figure 7.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Figure 7.2: General Types of IIs12 
The aims of financial institutions are to advance proficient allotment of assets, 
reduce the fee of business contracts, and give liquidity to shareholders and 
productive monitoring of projects.13 IIs offer more prominent motivations to 
collect information due to the fact that trading happens on the premise of that 
information. This information is also described as the share price.14  
                                                            
10 Shahnawaz Mahmood and Haroon Sharif, ‘Institutional Shareholders and their Role in 
Promotion of Corporate Governance in Pakistan’  Working Paper  
<http://www.secp.gov.pk/IACCD/pub_iaccd/WORKING%20PAPER.pdf> accessed 1st September 
2014 
11 Ibid  
12 Developed by researcher 
13 Marcia Cornett et al., ‘The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Corporate Operating 
Performance’ (2007) 31 Journal of Banking and Finance 1771  
14 According to efficient market hypothesis 
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Moreover, IIs also provide ways for resourceful risk distribution and expansion. 
Thus, risk return inclinations of all types of investors can be fulfilled. While weak 
corporate performance will reduce share value which can bring about takeover 
and dismissal of administration. In this manner, efficient market framework 
comprising on IIs keep up administrative motivations to maximise turnover.15 
The unique qualities of the IIs incorporate considerable investment and diversified 
alignment.16 They invest and oversee assets in the interest of other shareholders. 
They retain the powers of voting on behalf of shareholders and have professional 
portfolio managers who bring more expertise in contrast to individual investors. 
As the financial institutions (IIs) hold large shareholdings, they can lessen the 
evading conduct of managers by monitoring their actions and convince them to 
increase shareholder wealth.17  
Nevertheless, IIs have been criticised for not putting adequate assets and efforts in 
monitoring the actions of corporate managers.18 They are normally either voting 
in favour of managers or declining voting. This unwillingness to vote against 
administration is due to the conflict of interest created by their different business 
relations with companies. 
7.2.2 Shareholders’ Engagement 
Shareholder engagement or shareholder activism is a path by which shareholders 
can declare their influence as owners of the company’s assets in order to have 
impact on the affairs of that company.19 Institutional shareholders’ activism is 
characterised as checking of execution and CG of their investee companies.20 
However, the extent of activism extends to the endeavours rolled out to realise 
                                                            
15 Admati et al., ‘Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing and Financial Market Equilibrium’ 
(1994) 102(6) The Journal of Political Economy 1097 
16 Ibid (n 5) 65 
17 Ibid (n 15) 
18 Almazan et al., ‘Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from 
Executive Compensation’ (2005) 34(4) Financial Management 5 
19 The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) <http://www.ecgi.org/activism/> 
accessed 20 June 2015 
20 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94(3) 
Journal of Political Economy 461 
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improvements in a company’s conduct and develop awareness regarding the 
benefits of adopting code of corporate governance (CCG).  
By and large, the activism of IIs fulfils two fold purpose, they purchase shares in a 
company being block-holder with a determination to influence and alter the 
policies and decision-making of not only of a company but also of a capital 
market for the purpose of corporate control.21 The part of IIs developed in the UK 
and the US, because of the decrease in the individual share ownership and growth 
in large shareholdings invested by financial institutions, in the twentieth century.22 
Today, IIs are assuming a crucial part in the CG of numerous advanced 
jurisdictions.  
On the other hand, Pakistan has a minimalist corporate culture, because of the fact 
that numerous companies are owned and managed by families.23 IIs are 
represented in only a small portion of securities market. Though, they have been 
noticed to grow remarkably and started to get importance in the corporate sector 
of Pakistan.24  
The critical element related to IIs activism is their noteworthy shareholding. This 
is tantamount in two ways: larger shareholding when contrasted with others or 
holding of more noteworthy than a basic sum as ratio of aggregate equity. This 
implies that influence of institutions on management increments and along these 
lines decreases the issue of combined action. On the other hand, small or 
individual shareholders have less or no motivating force to attempt the monitoring 
of directors’ actions as a result of the costs included in such activities and ‘free-
                                                            
21 Yiwei Dou, ‘Block Holder Heterogeneity and Financial Reporting Quality’ (2013) 
<http://mitsloan.mit.edu/events/asia-conference-in-
accounting/pdf/Blockholder_Heterogeneity_and_Financial_Reporting_Quality.pdf> accessed 10 
February 2015 
22 Anat Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, ‘The Wall street Journal and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a 
form of Voice’ (2009) 22 Review of Financial Studies 2445 
23 As discussed in previous chapters. 
24 It is evidenced below section 7.3. 
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rider’ issue.25 Therefore, IIs having large amount of holding can handle the cost 
incurred from monitoring. 
However, the conflicts of interest might prompt the passivity of IIs. For example, 
agency issues emerge because of the parting of ownership and control. The 
authority to run a company is delegated to directors by shareholders (owners). The 
directors are tending to take decisions on the premise of self-interest, for example, 
they may concentrate on short-term advantages to the detriment of long-term 
benefits which is not judicious. At the point when the board of directors (BODs) 
does not give weightage to the contentment of shareholders and does not act for 
their benefits, the activism on the part of shareholders becomes vital.26  
Moreover, the IIs are more vigorous in their activities when they synchronise and 
cooperate among themselves. Along these lines the advantages can be enjoyed by 
all and in the meantime expenses can be shared. This could be accomplished in 
two ways: every institution playing a lead part in monitoring of a company in 
which it has large shareholding or all IIs acting jointly. The first choice is by all 
accounts more reasonable because of the fact that the substantial shareholder will 
earn maximum profit and therefore it has sound incentives to be active.27 
7.2.3 Historical Growth of Shareholders’ Activism  
Shareholders’ activism is not a new notion. Its origins were already present in the 
corporate world however, were developing with slow speed.28 For instance in the 
USA, the concept of shareholders’ activism emerged in early nineties when the 
financial institutions, for example mutual funds, banks and insurance companies 
were effectively taking an interest in the corporate governance (CG) of the 
country. However, throughout the following three or four decades, laws were 
formulated with the intent of constraining the influence of those financial 
                                                            
25 Free-rider problem means that one shareholder bears the cost and has to do efforts; however the 
benefit is enjoyed by all shareholders.  
26 Ibid (n 22) 2447 
27 Moshe Pinto, ‘The Role of Institutional Investors in the Corporate Governance’ (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Hamburg and Bolonga 2005)  
28 Mark  Roe, ‘Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies’ 
(1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 7 
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mediators which resultantly prohibited them from having a dynamic part in the 
CG of country.29 
Later on, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)30 was set out in the US, 
with the aim of reinstating shareholders’ trust in capital markets by introducing 
the practices of disclosure which can provide more reliable evidence and strong 
principles of truthful dealing to shareholders and to the market. The SECA also 
allowed shareholders to present their particular suggestions for consideration on 
corporate ballots.  
The shareholders activism in the US from 1942 to 1970s was controlled and 
commanded by individual investors.31 The role of IIs picked up dominance in the 
1980s when the pension funds turned out to be effectively included in requesting 
assurance of their interests as stockholders. After few years, the overwhelming 
part and involvement of pension funds, insurance companies and banks is noticed 
as IIs.  
Similarly, in the UK the activism of IIs developed with the transformation of 
share ownership from individual investors to large institutions. The part of IIs was 
acknowledged by diverse CCG and reports issued over time.32 In 1991, the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) was set up in the UK. It serves as a 
platform to IIs to discuss their policies and organise their activities for the 
protection of shareholders’ rights. The ISC set out its ‘Statement of Principles’ in 
2002, defining the role and responsibilities of IIs. The reason for issuing these 
principles was to guarantee the use of best practices to the connection between IIs 
                                                            
29 Ibid 
30 Under the SEC Act 1934. 
31 Stuart Gillan and Laura Starks, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’ 
(2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=959670> accessed 1st September 2014 
32 Bob Wearing and Yuval Millo, ‘Activist Investors in UK Quoted Companies And The 
Implications for Corporate Governance’ 
<https://www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate%20governance/uk%20corpo
rate%20governance/tecpln10783%20activist%20investor%20report%20final%20reduced.ashx> 
accessed 15 July 2015 
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and their investee companies, in order to secure worth for beneficiaries33 for a 
longer period.34  
In Pakistan the situation is different being the concentration of large shareholdings 
in the hands of families and SOEs.35 However, this trend is changing now 
gradually and financial institutions are becoming influential investors along with 
the individual investors. For example, in a reported case of Pakistan,36 three 
companies filed a petition under sections 284 to 288 of the Ordinance,37 looking 
for assent of the court to a plan of course of action endorsed by their investors in 
general meetings.  
The investors had contradicted the plan of merger for substantial causes archived 
by audited accounts of the petitioner companies. The High Court held in its 
decision that if there should be an occurrence of merger of companies: “Directors 
cannot act self-assertively while propositioning such plan. Directors might have 
preference in choosing one of several appropriate strategies, which might precede 
them for attention, yet they have no preference to pick a strategy not in the light of 
a legitimate concern for shareholders.” 
In Pakistan, activism with respect to shareholders is in a developing process; they 
are inclined towards transient interests so as to increase fast returns while 
investors in advanced jurisdictions prefer long term investments.38 However, the 
researcher submits that, this is not true, IIs even in developed countries prefer 
short-term investments due to certain problem which they face while making 
investments such as, agency problems, free-rider problems, conflict of interest etc. 
The researcher further submits that, there is absence of an organised level of 
                                                            
33 Beneficiaries are shareholders on the behalf of them IIs make investments. 
34 Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, ‘The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and 
Agents – Statement of Principles’ 
<http://www.plsa.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/~/media/Policy/Documents/0039_IS
C_Statement_of_Principles_2007_0607.ashx> accessed 20 July 2015 
35 As discussed and evidenced in previous chapters. 
36 Kohinoor Raiwand Mills Limited through Chief Executive Versus Kohinoor Gujar Khan Mills 
and other (2002 CLD 1314)  
37 The Companies Ordinance 1984 
38 Ali Ibrahim, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Analysis of Current Challenges and 
Recommendations for Future Reforms’ (2006) 5(2) Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 323 
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shareholder activism in Pakistan, which can develop with the development and 
activism of IIs. The IIs can contribute towards stabilising the capital market in 
Pakistan and developing the CG principles in it. 
7.2.4 Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors: Problems in 
Collective Action 
The activism on the part of shareholders is a typical issue in dispersed ownership 
frameworks.39 Dispersed shareholding makes it difficult to direct and monitor the 
activities of management. In the frameworks of concentrated ownership, some 
block holders own the majority shareholdings and therefore, the minority 
shareholders do not own enough shares to influence the management of their 
investee companies in terms of adopting and implementing CG principles. 
Therefore, shareholder activism might likewise be a problem in these 
frameworks.40 
The quick changes in ownership structures, because of rapid share trading as well 
as the absence of harmonisation in combined activities are serious concerns. This 
researcher argues that, the concern of the fast change in ownership framework can 
be comprehended by IIs. The argument is that they hold shares in portfolio 
companies and issue units to their investors. Unit holders might alter their source 
yet shareholding remains steady in portfolio companies because of the specific 
nature of IIs. Therefore, they can influence the administration and BODs to 
develop CG of their investee companies.41 
Furthermore, the cost involved in taking action to influence the companies is 
additionally a major concern. If an individual investor or minority shareholders 
aim to discipline and impact BODs, it can be excessively costly for them if 
                                                            
39 Luca Enriques et al., ‘The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituencies’ in Kraakman et al. (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2009) 89 
40 Ibid  
41  Andreas Jansson, ‘Collective Action Among Shareholder Activist’ (PhD Thesis, Vaxjo 
University Sweden 2007); Edward Rock, ‘Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance’ (2015) 
Research Paper No. 14-37 <file:///C:/Users/BMRI/Downloads/SSRN-id2512303.pdf> accessed 10 
March 2016 
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weighed up against the probable advantage of such actions. Therefore, this might 
not be an appealing strategy for individual investor or minority shareholders since 
the benefits occur from such actions are shared with other investors too. However, 
IIs can be the solution to this issue due to their large shareholdings.42  
The cost of activism might be decreased if the action is taken through IIs, because 
in this way the expenses will be shared by all shareholders of IIs. They might 
agree to bear the cost acquired as this will be advantageous for them. Moreover, 
the action through IIs might have other advantages too. For example, the CG of 
investee companies will be enhanced which will be advantageous not just for the 
clients of IIs, but also for other shareholders of the investee companies. Moreover, 
the positive message will go to the market and other companies to develop their 
CG framework.43 
Furthermore, IIs can minimise directors’ threat of removal through the risk of 
hostile takeovers, as the successful bidder might remove them.44 While IIs 
activism might motivate directors to perform better for the improvement of the 
governance framework and emphasise on the long-term dreams of the company.45  
Though, the problem with such actions of IIs is that, they have to retain large 
shareholdings for a more drawn out period in order to influence the company’s 
BODs for the advancement of CG principles and mechanisms, and this act of 
retaining shares for longer periods might cause liquidity problem. Therefore, the 
liquidity has to be relinquished for the purpose of getting long-term advantages 
from IIs activism.46 
                                                            
42 Craig Doidge et al., ‘Can Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Governance Through 
Collective Action’ (2015) 1 
<http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/doidge_et_al_april_2015.pdf> accessed 04 July 2016 
43 Ibid; Iain MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ 
(2010) 5 (4) Capital Markets Law Journal 424 
44 Robert Romano, ‘Less is more: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism 
of Corporate Governance’ (2010) 18(2) Yale Journal on Regulation 174 
45 Junghoon Park, ‘Governance of and by Institutional Investors’ (5th Roundtable on Capital 
Market Reform in Asia, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Republic of Korea Tokyo, November 
19-20 (2003)) <http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/19388822.pdf> accessed 10 May 
2015 
46 Ibid (n 42, 45) 
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There are diverse opinions in terms of the impact of IIs’ activism on the outcome 
of their investee companies. Romano47 argues that, there is no affirmative impact 
of IIs’ activism on the outcome of investee companies empirically; instead, 
occasionally it has bad impact on the share values of respective companies.  
Park48 contends that IIs are not always considered expert and capable to solve the 
issues of the portfolio companies through such activism. He argues that, their 
involvement even weakens them regarding their principal responsibility for which 
they are established; for example, if a pension fund is engaged in such activism, 
IIs have been engaged with the management of investee companies in spite of 
focussing on the benefit of pensioners. 
The researcher argues that, this assumption regarding the activism of IIs might be 
right however the potential advantages of this activism might be more prominent 
as compared to the drawback of the agency issue. IIs retain the shares of various 
companies and likewise, must have impact on the governance of their investee 
companies. Therefore, in the event that they enhance the governance of 
considerable companies, the effect of the activism might be more prominent in 
contrast to the agency issues in their investee companies. 
Moving further, the researcher agrees with the Park’s view that the clash of 
interest or irreconcilable circumstances is likewise a noteworthy issue in IIs 
involvement. For example, an II will be hesitant to make a move regarding an 
investee company if that company retains customer relations with the holding 
company of II.49 Conflict of interest might likewise be obvious in the situation 
where the II is additionally a director in the portfolio company by uprightness of 
his own shareholding. Such II is not anticipated that would take any move against 
him as a member of the BODs. 
                                                            
47 Ibid (n 44) 
48 Ibid (n 45) 
49 Ian Mac Neil (n 43) 428; Ian Mac Neil, ‘Shareholders’ Pre-emptive Rights’ (2002) Journal of 
Business Law 78 
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Regardless of the above stated issues, the part of IIs has been viewed as being 
noteworthy in current years, particularly after financial disasters. IIs have been 
held responsible for their latent part in monitoring the BODs that added to the 
calamity.50 They could influence the administration of their investee companies 
and enhance general CG frameworks however they neglected to make suitable 
move notwithstanding when this was for the benefits of their clients.51 
The researcher submits that IIs can assume their part in enhancing the governance 
standards of their investee companies in many ways: such as, they can have 
negotiations with the directors; they might additionally chose directors for BODs 
and along these lines monitor the outcome of their investee companies. They can 
likewise go about as shareholders in AGMs to influence the administration to 
adopt and implement CG principles and standards. 
7.3 Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
Investment via investment funds52 has turned out to be more prominent these 
days. This type of investment is motivating for IIs due to the fact that they provide 
a level of divergence which is frequently not achievable for individuals to imitate 
in direct venture.  
It additionally gives business market entrance to individual investors since a few 
issues of securities are open just to IIs, for example, American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) and Global Depository Receipts (GDRs). They are worthwhile 
since they give respective jurisdictions admiration of managing, authority and 
exchange of securities because the IIs advantage by working on a more drawn out 
measure.53 They likewise tackle liquidity problems, in any event in State Owned 
                                                            
50 ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (November 2009) 72 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> accessed 10 May 2015 
51 Myners Review of institutional investment: Final Report, 
<http:archive.treasury.gov.uk/docs/2001/miners_report0602.html> accessed 10 May 2015  
52 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment’ (1958) 48 The American Economic Review 261 
53 Ibid (n 49) 
 225 
 
Enterprises (SOEs), which is a noteworthy issue in concentrated ownership 
business sectors, for example Pakistan. 
The part of IIs in Pakistan is restricted and the fund industry is immature.54 
However, according to the researcher, there is considerable scope for them and IIs 
can solve the collective action problem and can assume a powerful part in the 
business sector of Pakistan in influencing the management of investee companies. 
IIs hold adequate shares to influence the administration of investee companies to 
develop CG standards. The IIs are usually skilled and have expertise of 
investment, and can have an impact on the management to adopt and implement 
CG principles. They have not assumed their due part so far in the development of 
CG in Pakistan. There is still a requirement for change in this segment, 
particularly relating to their part in negotiating with their investee companies.  
The National Investment Trust Limited (NITL) and Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan (ICP) are the biggest financial specialists operating under state control. A 
large portion of the Asset Management Companies (AMCs), global joint 
investors, brokers, provident and private pension funds, and the mudaraba are 
small financial specialists operate as private investors in Pakistan. 
The NITL was the primary finance management institution in Pakistan. The SOEs 
have 8.33% share assets directly and 50% share assets indirectly in NITL. The 
NITL retains share assets in majority of the listed companies of Pakistan. It had 
81 billion Pakistani rupees under its management with 55,109 unit holders as on 
30th June 2013.55  
The ICP was set up in 1966 by an ordinance issued by government of Pakistan 
(GOP). Its goals were to expand the roots of investments and improving the 
business market of Pakistan. The ICP endorses open community problems of 
                                                            
54 Sikander Shah and Moeen Cheema, ‘Corporate Governance in Developing Economies: The 
Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance in Pakistan’ (2006) 36 Hong Kong Law Journal 
341 
55 The information is collected from the website of NITL, <www.nit.com.pk> and 
<http://www.nit.com.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=3%3E%2
0&%20%3C%20http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/Finance/nit.htm#> accessed 10 July 2015 
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shares and takes an interest in equity ventures. It unties and keeps up investors’ 
records because of an end goal to enhance share ownership and broadening the 
roots of business sector by shares trading of listed companies for the shareholders. 
The ICP skims and deals with the mutual funds which offer chains of strong 
policies for shareholders looking for equitable outcomes via pooled investments.56  
The ICP additionally buys and offers shares on the stock market for its several 
companies. It has glided twenty five private and SOEs mutual fund with a 
perspective to provide chances of collective investment to shareholders. The 
companies’ market dealings for its own particular portfolio, investors’ portfolio 
and mutual funds’ portfolios help in fortifying the movement in business sector.57 
The fund industry in Pakistan is relatively small and in developing stage.58 It 
holds almost five per-cents of total market capitalisation. This researcher’s view is 
that, IIs can play a major role here, because of having adequate voting rights to 
have representation in the BODs of their investee companies. Additionally, banks 
can make a condition of loan and therefore can choose their candidate as a 
director of a client company under the Ordinance.59 For instance, NITL, a 
noteworthy investment institution can nominate and appoint directors on BODs of 
several companies and hence can assume a noteworthy part in advancing CG 
standards.60 
However, the operation these state-owned institutions such as, NITL and ICP is a 
significant issue for the growth of institutional investment. The state owns ICP 
and the majority of shareholdings of NITL.61 Therefore, the direct state control 
and interference in appointing directors on the basis of political affiliations instead 
                                                            
56 Information is collected from the website of ICP, <http://investment-corporation-of-pakistan-
133684.pakbd.com/>accessed 12 July 2015 
57 Information taken from <http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/finance/icp.htm> accessed 10 May 
2015 
58 According to the association of Mutual Funds in Pakistan, <http://www.mufap.com.pk/> 
accessed 12 July 2015 
59 The Companies Ordinance 1984 
60 IMF Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) June 2005 on Pakistan 
61 NIT website 
<http://www.nit.com.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=5> 
accessed 10-05-2015 
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of skills, expertise and qualification creates serious governance issues. The 
researcher submits that, it is necessary to give careful consideration to the growth 
of IIs in Pakistan. The latent part of IIs, particularly those who are under state 
control, is one of the significant reasons as a result of which the investment 
institutions remain under-developed.  
This section and the following two sections examine the current position of IIs 
and the fund industry working in Pakistan. The intention is to critique these facts 
in order to establish the scope of IIs in Pakistan, as these sections confirm that 
there is a considerable scope for them in Pakistan and they can make a huge 
contribution in promoting CG in Pakistani companies.  
7.3.1 Institutional Shareholdings in Pakistan 
This section examines the ownership structure of IIs in Pakistan. The overall 
number of companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is 713, out of 
which financial and government owned companies are 208.62  
To observe the pattern of IIs, they were divided in the following categories as 
shown in Figure 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
62 The information is collected from the website of SECP,<www.secp.gov.pk> accessed 12 July 
2015 
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                             Figure 7.3: Categories of IIs in Pakistan63 
The capital market of Pakistan has certain features distinguished from other 
developed jurisdictions.64 For instance: numerous listed companies particularly in 
the textile sector in Pakistan are family-owned.65 This prompts insider control and 
concentrated ownership. The capital market is less developed, because of which 
dynamic trading is conducted in just a couple of companies. Additionally the 
number of new listings is also very less which imply less dependence on market 
for floating capital.  
There is absence of market for corporate control and there is barely any 
occurrence of corporate control and takeovers. And the reason is the same that 
monitoring of ownership depends on directors; substantial dependence on Bank 
financing; share dissemination is done in a manner that the larger part of the 
shareholding is owned by directors directly or indirectly.66  
                                                            
63 Developed by the researcher (information is collected from the website of SECP). 
64 As discussed in chapter five (section 5.5) 
65 Hamid H and Koshich V, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: A Perspective of 
Pakistan’ (2006) 1(1) Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 22  
66 Ibid  
 
Institutional 
Investors 
Government-
owned Financial 
Institutions 
Private-owned 
Financial 
Institutions 
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors 
Banks DFI 
Insurance 
Companies 
Leasing 
Companies 
Modarbas Mutual Funds 
National 
Investment 
Trust Limited 
(NITL) 
Investment 
Corporation of 
Pakistan (ICP) 
Banks DFI 
 229 
 
Table 7.1: Pattern of Ownership in Pakistan’s Financial Sector Until on 30 June 
201567 
Financial Sector Number of FIs % of total 
State-controlled Banks 5 17% 
Local Private Banks 22 69% 
Foreign Banks 7 2% 
Specialised Banks 4 1% 
Investment Companies 7 0% 
Insurance Companies 47 5% 
Development Finance Institutions 8 1% 
Other 234 5% 
Total 334 100% 
 
Table 7.1 shows pattern of ownership in the financial sector of Pakistan. The 
interesting characteristic from this information is that Development Financial 
Institutions (DFI) has ended up being noteworthy equity holders with 8.56% 
holding. In Pakistan DFIs commonly assume a vital part in term-financing like 
several other developing jurisdictions. However, it is apparent from the table that 
financial institutions holding get to be inconsequential if bank holdings are 
uprooted.  
One prominent element is that investment companies have very little equity 
holding. This could be because of market instability, less settled investment 
companies and absence of fund management aptitudes. Absence of advanced 
financial instruments and price revelation system in the market are additionally 
real impediments for non-bank IIs. The configuration of shareholding for financial 
institutions (both government and privately owned) across the sectors is provided 
below. 
                                                            
67 Data taken from the website of SECP, 
<www.secp.gov.pk/annualreport/2014/AnnualReport_2014.pdf> accessed 20 March 205 
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      Table 7.2: Pattern of Shareholding in Different Sectors of Pakistan68 
Sector Newly Incorporated 
Companies for the FY 
Ending 30-06-2014 
Total 
Companies as 
of June 30, 
2014 
Auto and Allied 60 787 
Broadcasting and Telecasting 68 567 
Cables and Electrical 42 682 
Carpets and Rugs 3 71 
Cement 2 102 
Chemical 75 1,643 
Communications 173 2,662 
Construction 306 3,162 
Corporate Agricultural Farming 195 1,225 
Education 132 999 
Engineering 108 1,842 
Finance and Banking 33 1,089 
Food and Beverages 166 2,443 
Footwear 5 75 
Fuel and Energy 82 1,250 
Ginning 8 350 
Glass and Ceramics 5 260 
Healthcare 68 578 
Information Technology 367 2,947 
Insurance 11 284 
Jute - 20 
Leather and Tanning 16 368 
Lodging 22 462 
Miscellaneous 324 5,937 
Mining and Quarrying 66 572 
Paper and Board 87 1,142 
Pharmaceuticals 128 1,390 
Power Generation 125 858 
Real Estate Development 99 1,319 
Services 520 7,182 
Sport goods 12 199 
Steel and Allied 23 508 
Sugar and Allied 10 180 
Synthetic and Rayon 3 194 
Textile 141 4,662 
                                                            
68 Data got from the Annual Report of SECP 2014, 
<http://www.secp.gov.pk/annualreport/2014/AnnualReport_2014.pdf> accessed 12 July 2014 
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Tobacco 4 86 
Tourism 421 6,706 
Trading 544 7,310 
Transport 99 1,286 
Vanaspati and Allied 23 453 
Woolen and Wood Products 11 215 
Total 4,587 64,067 
 
7.3.2 The Impact of Institutional Investment 
A viable CG framework facilitates and encourages not only to local investors but 
also attracts foreign investments,69 and foreign investors not just benefit local 
companies, they additionally contribute in the financial development of a state.70  
Foreign investment can be in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) or 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI). In FDI, a foreign investor or company 
contributes by purchasing a standing company or establish a subsidiary company 
in the investee jurisdiction. However, in FPI, a foreign investor or company 
purchases shares in the investee company of the investee jurisdiction. Such 
trading has considerable impact on the CG structures of the host jurisdiction.71 
FDI is usually takes place by a private or a public listed company (PLC). If FDI is 
via setting up a private subsidiary company then the governance structure of the 
investee jurisdiction might have least impact as the subsidiary company might 
adopt the governance standards of the investee jurisdiction where its holding 
company is registered.72  
                                                            
69 OECD, ‘Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Cots’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf> accessed 20 July 2015 
70 Ruth Aguilera and Alvaro Ceurvo-Cazurra, ‘Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is 
the Trigger?’ (2004) 25(3) Organisation Studies 417 
71  Itay Goldstein and Assaf Razin, ‘Foreign Direct Investment vs. Foreign Portfolio Investment’ 
(2005) NBER Working Paper Series  <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11047.pdf> accessed 10 
January 2016 
72 Ibid  
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On the other hand, if FDI is through setting up a PLC then the governance 
framework of the investee jurisdiction will bear significant impact for the 
subsidiary company as the public companies are bound to follow the governance 
standards of investee jurisdiction. In Pakistan, FDI via PLC is prevalent,73 and 
those companies are mainly from the UK and the USA, and hence can set 
standards for the local companies regarding the adoption and implementation of 
good CG norms.  
Similarly in case of FPI, foreign investors might have serious concern with 
respect to the CG standards in the investee jurisdiction. This is because the foreign 
investor does not usually have direct link and impact on administration and is only 
concerned about getting maximum profits on their venture.74 This practice shows 
that foreign investors normally make their investments, if they are sure about the 
security and the potential profits of their investments.  
Therefore, the foreign investment will take place only if the host jurisdiction is a 
safe place for investment regarding good CG practices and the internal security. 
However, the security situation in Pakistan has been worse since the 9/11 attacks 
in the US. The FDI and FPI declined considerably in Pakistan75 after the 9/11 
occurrences and consequent war against terrorism in Pakistan.76  
The researcher submits that, the security situation and bad CG both are serious 
issues of Pakistan. The NandiPur Power Project (NPP) is the recent example of 
one of the largest CG failure as presented in section 1.2.1. Although the security 
situation is getting better since a couple of months however, the issue of bad 
governance is still there which requires serious attention in order to provide 
protection and attract not only to foreign investors but to local investors as well.  
                                                            
73 According to the Santander Trade Portal, <https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/pakistan/investing> accessed 20 July 2015 
74 Imran Chaudhry et al., ‘Factors Effecting Portfolio Investment In Pakistan: Evidence From 
Times Series Analysis’ (2014) 52(2) Pakistan Economic and Social Review 141 
75 Junaid Ahmed and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso, ‘Blessing or Curse: The Stabilising Role of 
Remittances, Foreign Aid and FDI to Pakistan’ (2013) Discussion Paper, Centre for European 
Governance and Economic Development Research No. 153 
<http://econpapers.repec.org/papers/zbwcegedp/153.htm> accessed 15 May 2015 
76 See table 7.3 
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Table 7.3: Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) in Pakistan during 1996-201477 
 
Table 7.3 above shows that, FPI declined after the happening of 9/11 attacks and 
as a result of them the war against terrorism in Pakistan. In 2007, the FPI 
increased due to the announcement of general elections but the terrorist attack on 
a political leader Benazir Bhutto seriously questioned the security situation which 
had an adverse effect on FPI. Additionally, the military takeover in 1999 was 
another key reason for the decline of FPI in subsequent years. 
 
                                                            
77 Data is collected from the website of State Bank of Pakistan <http://www.sbp.org.pk/>, 
<http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/stats/PakEconomy_HandBook/Chap-7.10.pdf> and 
<www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/NetinflowSummary.pdf> accessed 15 July 2014 
 
Sr. No. Year US $ million 
1 1996 205.2 
2 1997 267.4 
3 1998 221.3 
4 1999 27.3 
5 2000 73.5 
6 2001 140.4 
7 2002 10.1 
8 2003 22.1 
9 2004 27.7 
10 2005 152.6 
11 2006 351.5 
12 2007 1,820.4 
13 2008 19.3 
14 2009 510.3 
15 2010 587.9 
16 2011 364.6 
17 2012 60 
18 2013 119.6 
19 2014 600 
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            Table 7.4: Foreign Companies in Pakistan as on 30 June 201478 
Country Newly incorporated 
companies FY 213-14 
Number of Companies 
as of June 30, 2014 
US 1 156 
UK 2 119 
France 1 26 
Germany 2 25 
China 7 45 
Japan 1 38 
Australia 0 20 
Middle Eastern Countries 2 62 
Far Eastern Countries 4 119 
Other European Countries 2 130 
Other Asian Countries 0 14 
Other Countries 0 93 
Total 22 847 
 
  Figure 7.4: Total Number of Foreign Companies in Pakistan as on 30 June 
201479 
                                                            
78 Data taken from the annual report of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
79 Data taken from the annual report of the Securities and Commission of Pakistan 2014 
19%
14%
3%
3%
5%
4%2%
7%
14%
16%
2% 11%
Foreign Companies Portfolio
US
UK
France
Germany
China
Japan
Australia
Middle Eastern Countries
Far eastern Countries
Other European Countries
Other Asian Countries
Other Countries
 235 
 
 
          Figure 7.5: Province Wise New Incorporation during FY 2013-1480 
 
Table 7.4 and the graphs 7.1 and 7.2 show that, the number of foreign companies 
operating in Pakistan is mainly from the UK and the US as mentioned earlier. 
Such companies can play a significant role in setting the standards of good CG. 
IIs can also play their part in influencing their investee companies and to the 
government for the adoption and implementation of CG norms for the protection 
of shareholders’ interest. As the investor, whether local or foreign prefer to invest 
when he is assured about the security of his investment and potential benefits. 
7.4 The Driving Forces Behind the Activism of Institutional Investors 
This section examines the driving forces behind the activism of IIs in the UK. It is 
important to investigate them here to find out similarities among the objectives 
and incentives of IIs working in Pakistan, as well as to formulate 
recommendations and explore new ways by which the activism of IIs can be 
enhanced in Pakistan and they can contribute to improve the CG of their investee 
companies’ significantly.  
                                                            
80 Ibid 
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The Cadbury Report emphasised on IIs that they can be instrumental to develop 
CG standards due to their large shareholdings and, therefore they are capable to 
have impact on the affairs of companies.81 This view was ratified by the Hampel 
Report which stated that: 60 per-cent of shares in listed UK companies are held by 
UK institution.82  
The later governance reports have also highlighted the importance of IIs and 
recommended for them to leave their indifferent attitude and play a significant 
role in influencing the governance structures of their investee companies. Though, 
the involvement of IIs in their investee companies’ matters will be enhanced if 
they consider themselves as owners of investments instead of just considering 
themselves investment vehicle.83  
Charkham84 contended that since various institutions consider shares as wares 
with no natural potentials instead considering that they can be promptly tradable 
in a dynamic business sector. IIs have liability towards the owners of the funds in 
which they finance. For example, the managers of pension funds have a fiduciary 
association with the owners of pension fund, and should act to their greatest 
advantage.  
Likewise, insurance companies have obligation and therefore answerable to their 
shareholders. Therefore, IIs are bound to maximise the profits on their investment. 
In their part as real shareholders, both the Cadbury and Hampel Reports 
anticipated that institutions would tackle the part of the vast shareholders, who 
                                                            
81  Cadbury Sir Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (Gee and Co. Ltd. London 1992) 
82 Hampel Report, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report: (Gee: London) Para 5.1 
83 Ibid (n 5); John Hendry et al., ‘Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and the New 
Shareholder Activism’ (2004) Working Paper No. 297 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-
research/downloads/working-papers/wp297.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016 
84 Jonathan Charkham, Keeping Good Company – A Study of Corporate Governance in Five 
Countries (‘required reading’ Sir Adrian Cadbury, Oxford University Press 1994) 20; Jonathan 
Charkham, ‘A Larger Role of Institutional Investors’ in Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer 
(eds), Capital Markets and Corporate Governance (Clarenden Press 1994a) “See generally”  
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will influence the company management by monitoring their actions for the 
benefit of minority shareholders.85  
Therefore, it is relied upon IIs to consider about their shareholding positions in 
long-term, and where required, bear cost of intervention to correct 
maladministration. Nevertheless, IIs should be allowed to transfer funds with a 
specific end goal to locate the best return for the recipients of those assets. 
However, it is challenging, surely in a free market environment, to contend that 
IIs ought to keep on holding equity positions in respective companies and bring 
about conventional cost interceding in administration, especially in the absence of 
any assurance that intervention will be effective.86  
Drucker87 contended that: the pension funds are investors not owners; who invest 
the beneficiaries’ funds in the most beneficial venture. In the event that they do 
not like or trust a company or its administration, their obligation is to sell and 
transfer funds. On the other hand, Hutton88 contended that, insurance companies 
and pension funds have gotten to be great truant proprietors, applying influence 
without obligation and making demanding requests upon companies without 
perceiving their equal commitment as owners.  
However, as shareholders, IIs have right to hire directors and their responsibility 
is to monitor that companies are being administered in the benefits of 
shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders are confronted with a potential free-rider 
issue. For instance, if an II took unreasonable activities to mediate in company 
affairs whilst other IIs just did nothing, the interceding II would have fewer profits 
which will be a disadvantage for their clients, at least in the short term. Therefore, 
                                                            
85 Janice Dean, Directing Public Companies: Company Law and the Stakeholder Society 
(Cavendish Publishing 2001) 35 
86 Ibid (n 5); Edward Rock, ‘Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance’ (2015) Faculty 
Scholarship Paper 1458 
<http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2459&context=faculty_scholarship
> accessed 10 May 2016 
87 Peter Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America 
(Heinemann: London 1976) “See generally”; ibid (n 5) 
88 Will Hutton, The State We’re In (Jonathan Cape: London 1995) “See generally”; ibid (n 5) 
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it is challenging to evaluate what motivations and driving forces there are for IIs 
to tolerate a private price for the benefit of all.89 
Hence, the ultimate public good issue emerges due to the reason that individual II 
do not have adequate motivations to interfere in the management of companies. 
However, the diverse sorts of IIs might have different timeframes for investment. 
For instance, pension funds which ought to have a long-term view because of the 
way of their business would be expected to emphasise the significance of getting 
long-term corporate outcome.90  
Charkham91 presented two differentiating positions of active institutional 
investing, relating to the investment conduct of IIs which he named type A and 
Type B. These types represent the inverse closures of the investment range on 
which all IIs can be positioned. The contrasting qualities of Type A and Type B 
investors regarding to their investment strategies are presented in Table 7.5 below.  
              Table 7.5: Charkham’s Conflicting Stances of IIs Conduct92 
 
This Table presents, a Type A fund manager focus on the long-term outcomes of a 
comparatively small portfolio of companies. On the other hand, Type B fund 
managers emphasise the short-term returns of a comparatively large portfolio of 
                                                            
89 Ibid (n 42); Jim Ball, Financial Institutions and their Role as Shareholders Creative Tension? 
(National Association of Pension Funds: London 1990) “See generally” 
90 Ibid (n 42); Mara Faccio and Ameziane Lasfer, ‘Do Occupational Pension Funds Monitor 
Companies in which they Hold Large Stakes’ (2000) 6 Journal of Corporate Finance 71 
91 Jonathan Charkham, ‘A Larger Role of Institutional Investors’ in Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha 
Prevezer (eds), Capital Markets and Corporate Governance (Clarenden Press: Oxford 1994a) 
“See generally” 
92 Adapted from Helen Short and Kevin Keasey 
Qualities Type A Type B 
Portfolio make-up Focus on less shares Wide modification 
Incentives in Companies Large Small 
Communication with firms Close Superficial 
Loyalty to companies High Virtually non-existent 
Dealing activity Less dealings  Frequent dealing 
Interest in CG issues High Virtually non-existent 
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companies. Charkham suggested that the type of approach adopted by a particular 
II is dependent not only on the purpose of the investment, but also on a complex 
mixture of factors relating to the management of those funds, such as the 
motivation and ability of the individual fund managers.  
The types of investment strategies depend on the approach of fund manager 
towards active investing. However, an increase in inactive investment through 
institutions has been noticed in the form of index-matched funds. The index-
matched funds have a buy and hold policy; they ought to be keen towards longer-
term investments. Although long-term investment policies does not as a matter of 
course prompt expanded monitoring and interference.93  
However, the intervention may increase the outcomes of companies and likewise 
the profit on the index as a whole, it is again hard to decide what motivations 
individual II would have to intervene.94 Monitoring and involvement raises 
management expenses for their individual II, whilst it increases the outcomes of 
non-intervening investors as well.  
As a result, the intervening II bears greater costs whilst other investors enjoy 
greater profits at lower cost. In such situation, the costs cannot be even transferred 
to the actual owners as they might then prefer to move towards lower cost 
investors. This highlights the crux of problem: IIs are not the actual owners of the 
funds and therefore do not share in the enlarged profits achieved through 
intervention, while they have to bear the cost of intervention alone. Unless there is 
collective interference by all IIs, the costs of intervention decreases the profit of 
individual II.95 
However, while investigating the aims of IIs, the general investment environment 
needs to be considered. Though, regardless of the way that the nature of business 
sector would appear to demoralise monitoring, there are several instances of IIs 
intervention in the administration of respective companies. For example, in 2003, 
                                                            
93 Ibid (n 5, 42 & 90) 
94 Ibid (n 5, 42 & 90) 
95 Ibid (n 5, 42 & 90) 
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investors at Glaxo Smith Kline voted in order to reject its payment report 
regarding the remuneration package of its CEO, put pressure on the company to 
review its remuneration strategy.96  
Another example of shareholders involvement includes the dismissal of Sir Philip 
Watts as chairman of Shell in March 2004 and the dismissal of Peter Davis as 
CEO of Sainsbury’s in June 2004.97  
In addition, the publication of the Higgs Report in 2003 led to a rather public 
breakdown in relations between the IIs and the executives of large companies.98 
However, Black and Coffee99 noted that, the majority of involvement is normally 
done through private negotiations instead of doing publicly, moreover, commonly 
as a last option in serious situations. 
To summarise, it is evident that the endeavour to combine the part of IIs as 
owners of the funds as well as investors is problematic. However, the objective of 
IIs should attempt to improve the CG standards and the performance of their 
investee companies.  
7.5 The Factors Limiting the Activism of Institutional Investors 
The IIs normally prefer to sell their shares from a problem company instead of 
intervening and monitoring the management of that company. In other words they 
choose ‘exit’ instead of making use of ‘voice’.100 Their stance behind such act is 
that, if they intervene publicly, they are disclosing openly the mismanagement and 
governance problems of that company. Such acts can result into the reduction in 
share value which ultimately will have bad impact on their investment.  
                                                            
96 Ibid (n 5, 42) 
97 Ibid (n 5, 42) 
98  Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (DTI London 
2003) 
99 Bernard Black and John Coffee, ‘Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under 
Limited Regulation’ (1994) 92(7) Michigan Law Review 1997 
100 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and 
States (Harvard University Press 1970) 44 
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Additionally, if they are engaged in the administration of such companies they get 
to be aware of internal information and it becomes difficult for them to exchange 
their shares, possibly aggravating their damages. Moreover, appropriate 
monitoring and intervention is expensive (as discussed above also) in terms of 
time and money, particularly for IIs with diverse portfolios.101  
In order to address these problems that IIs are facing, Hampel102 proposed that the 
choice of departing turns out to be more difficult as IIs build their interests in 
public companies, adopt index tracking policies and as the quantity of institutional 
players in the business sector drops. Trading vast shareholdings in a problematic 
company is prone to be greatly troublesome, especially as the probable purchaser 
is liable to be an option institution with knowledge of the potential issues 
prevalent in the company.  
Nevertheless, Myners103 points out that, even in situations where large institutions 
are not able to transfer their shares without any impact of share value; many 
indicated a market unwillingness to interfere in circumstances where companies 
were obviously facing problems. 
         It has been noticed that, because of the framework of the fund management course 
of action of professional IIs, agency issues emerge at each level in the association 
between the actual beneficiaries of the IIs. The technique and timing of the 
performance capacity of the fund and of the fund manager have a significant 
impact on the motivations of fund manager, and might expand agency issues 
between the parties.104 
Conflict of interest might emerge between the staff and the company, especially if 
the agents are also directors of the company, as frequently seen particularly in 
Pakistan. Directors might prefer to maximise the share price to minimise the 
                                                            
101 Ibid  
102 Hampel Sir Ronnie, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (Gee: London1998) 
103 Paul Myner, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (HM Treasury: London 
2001) 90 
104 Tracie Woidtke, ‘Agents Watching Agents?: Evidence From Pension Fund Ownership and 
Firm Value’ (2002) 63 Journal of Financial Economics 99 
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company’s involvements and potentially use any pension fund surplus to expand 
company returns. The Robert Maxwell issue and the demise of the Mirror Pension 
fund in the 1990s was a serious instance of the issues which might arise between 
shareholders and directors.105 Therefore, investors are under extreme pressure to 
perform better in contrast to median fund, which is often argued to have the 
consequence of focusing fund managers’ attention on their performance relative to 
their competitors, rather than on their absolute performance. 
Whilst, informal mechanisms may be in place in order to give institutions 
motivations to monitor and intervene in governance matters (through private 
negotiations instead of public voice) of their investee companies.106  
Pound107 talks about three unique hypotheses which might clarify the relationship 
between IIs and their incentives to intervene in CG of companies. The diagram 
below presents those hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Pound’s Hypotheses Which Explain the Relationship between IIs and 
their Incentives108 
 
The efficient monitoring hypothesis postulates that IIs are more experienced, 
educated and have capacity to monitor administration of their investee companies 
at reduced cost in contrast to minority or individual shareholders.  
                                                            
105 Ibid (n 5) 
106 Ibid (n 5) 
107 John Pound, ‘Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight’ (1988) 20 Journal of 
Financial Economics 237 
108 Developed by the researcher 
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On the other hand, the strategic alignment hypothesis proposes that IIs and the 
BODs might consider it jointly beneficial to collaborate on particular issues.  
Similarly, the conflict of interest hypothesis advocates that IIs might have existing 
or prospective business connections with the company due to which they do not 
wish to actively curtail administration decision-making. 
In short, IIs bear clashes of interests during their communications with companies 
as a consequence of their part as investor and present or possible business service 
provider, which potentially obstruct their inclination to involve in company’s 
affairs in the occasion of CG scarcities. Additionally, it is evident that IIs 
themselves are not resistant from CG issues and might be criticising so as to 
unwilling to attract regard for these issues the companies in which they contribute. 
Moreover, another similar problem is the relationship between professional 
investors and their supporting companies which is liable to influence the way 
those investors perform towards other companies.109 
        Therefore, agency problems might ascend between IIs and the actual owners of 
funds in situation if the II has motivations to maximise the long-term value of the 
fund however the performance of fund manager is assessed on a short-term basis, 
by virtue of quarterly trustees’ meetings.  
Likewise, institutional evidence presented to the Trade and Industry Committee 
on Competitiveness of UK Manufacturing Industry suggested that, whilst 
performance was monitored on a quarterly basis, performance was assessed over a 
longer period. In addition, a survey by CAPS found that,110 pension funds that 
changed their investment manager in 1993, the mean and median period of tenure 
of the outgoing manager was seven years. However, the Myners Review found 
that one-third of schemes had changed investment managers in 12 months prior to 
their survey. 
                                                            
109 Ibid (n 107) 
110 CAPS, Pension Fund Investment Performance: General Report (Combined Actuarial 
Performance Services Limited 1993) “See generally” 
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         The obvious misunderstanding regarding the time period over which performance 
is evaluated led the Myners Review to conclude that fund managers could assume 
rationally that they could be dismissed after any quarter’s performance, and that 
this could lead to managers being unwilling to take a long-term perspective.111 
         The agency problems increased at the point when the remuneration granted to the 
fund manager is organised in a manner that in the occasion of the fund manager 
taking CG actions, s/he faces the expenses of intervention, however the actual 
owner picks up the profit. Fees are usually calculated on shares’ market value, as 
the market value of shares rises, subject to a fixed minimum charge.112  
Given that the funds under management are likely to spread across a large 
portfolio of companies, it seems unlikely that the benefits of monitoring and 
intervention to the fund manager in the form of increased fee income would 
exceed the costs. Coupled with the potential costs of lost business from the 
management of the offended companies,113 it would seem clear that there are few 
incentives for intervention at the level of the fund manager.114  
        This identifies the root of problem; IIs are not the actual owners of the shares and 
therefore do not significantly get their enhanced profits achieved from IIs 
involvement in company affairs. In this context, it can be concluded that a 
collective action is required to decrease the price of intervention and to enhance 
the profit of fund managers.115 
Moving further, IIs have capacity to have a considerable control over the actions 
of BODs due to the size of their shareholdings in contrast to minority or 
individual shareholders. One aspect of the governance of companies is that the 
expenses of intervention should be less as compared to the potential advantages of 
                                                            
111 Ibid (n 103) 
112  Robert Webb et al., ‘Problems and Limitations of Institutional Investor Participation in 
Corporate Governance’ (2003) 11(1) Corporate Governance: An International Review 65 
113 The fund manager may also be currently managing their pension funds or be a future contender. 
114 Ibid (n 5) 73 
115 Ibid (n 42) 
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intervention if governance activities are to be impacted.116 In this case, 
shareholders with large shareholdings have larger amount of motivations to be 
engaged in governance matters in contrast to smaller shareholders. 
For example, individual shareholders having less shareholding have minimal 
motivating force to accumulate and bear the generally settled expenses of 
gathering data to empower them to supervise and control the conduct of BODs. 
On the other hand, large shareholders might have adequate motivations to access 
the information required to have an impact on management if the advantages of 
such monitoring are higher than the related expenses.117 
Nevertheless, the control of management by large shareholders might incur 
expenses; if these shareholders are restricted relating to their divergence, and 
might have clashes with small shareholders. The influential shareholders and 
managers might co-operate in terms of diversion of resources from other 
shareholders.118  However, it would still appear to be a bold step to conclude 
about the percentage of shareholding, for example that shareholding of even 5-6% 
would be sufficient to affect the actions of corporations.119  
IIs are large as measured by any yardstick. For example, the Prudential had a 
market value of £9,654 million in June 2004, placing it in the top 30 companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in terms of market value. Hermes120 
alone has approximately £44 billion in funds under its control, as at December 
2003. This gives them a voice, via their impact upon the media, of considerable 
volume and a potential ability to influence general perceptions through which 
Hermes have used successfully in CG matters for the past decade. For example, in 
June 1994, Hermes instigated a campaign against directors’ rolling contracts of 
                                                            
116 Satchell SE and Damant DC, ‘Testing the Short Termism in the UK Stock Market: A 
Comment’ (1995) 105(432) Economic Journal 1218 
117 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Credit Markets and the Control of Capital’ (1985) 17(2) Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 133 
118 Ibid  
119 Ibid (n 5) 74 
120 Which manages the BT and Post Office pension schemes 
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longer than three years by taking the then highly unusual step of writing publicly 
to the chairman of the top 100 companies.121  
The ultimate advantages to be achieved by companies and IIs in ensuring their 
influence are in the private rather than the public domain because of which it is 
difficult to measure the influence of IIs. Therefore, it can be suggested that the 
large IIs can be able to influence the affairs of companies far beyond their 
minimal shareholdings. This then moves us on to consider why IIs bother to 
monitor the affairs of individual companies when they can free ride on the actions 
of others. The lack of governance by IIs due to the idea of getting advantages at 
the expense of individual II is responsible for a free-rider issue.122  
Since the advantages of combined efforts benefit to every individual regardless of 
whether that individual has endured any of the expenses of the combined action. It 
infers that, the combined benefit can be given by the business sector framework 
only if the group is small and fulfils some other particular conditions. By 
assuming that IIs are subject to such free-rider issue, it would be more important 
to look at why IIs ever participate in collective action when there are such a large 
number of components representing a mark against such activities.123 
For example, the non-appearance of a commonly acknowledged system for cost 
sharing among IIs that embrace collective action displays a noteworthy snag to 
such collective action. To some extent, the nature of the conflict which may lie 
between private and collective benefits/costs is correspondent to that of the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Nonetheless, there are significant contrasts between the 
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Prisoners’ Dilemma and the system inside of which IIs operate which might beat 
the apparently unconquerable free-rider problems confronting IIs.124 
7.6 Strategies of IIs to Influence the Management of their Investee 
Companies 
The preceding sections have identified the absence of motivations for IIs in order 
to monitor and intervene in the management of their investee companies. Helen 
Short and Kevin Keasey explored the five ways through which IIs can exert a 
considerable impact and can intervene in the management of their investee 
companies.125 
The first strategy available for IIs is to decline to share in rights issues when 
companies go to the market to increase extra value funding. IIs are highly 
influential in these circumstances, due to the fact that the burden is on 
management to negotiate with the IIs. IIs might make the procurement of extra 
finance conditional to the changes in the management of company, such as, 
changes in the BODs. Since the companies are asking IIs to bolster them at the 
time of the rights issues, numerous issues of organising combined efforts will not 
emerge; especially the expenses of these efforts will be less for IIs because of the 
fact that they do not need to start such activity by themselves.126 
The second way available to IIs is negative opinion of public, which might harm 
the company by reducing its share value and reputation. However, this type of 
action also effect negatively to IIs along with the company. For example, Hermes 
in 1994, publicly criticised some companies’ executive compensation contracts, it 
did not receive the warmest response from the companies concerned or from other 
institutions. Moreover, the association with the company is also important, as the 
II requires continuous backing of the company in order to access company’s 
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internal information. Therefore, the IIs might favour private negotiations; as the 
relationship of company and II does not effect in this manner. If private 
negotiations work it is beneficial for parties, the IIs and the company, as it 
circumvents the expenses of extra volatility.127 
The third strategy IIs can adopt is the dismissal of directors through direct and 
collective action. This is an extremely rare course of action: the removal of 
Maurice Saatchi from this post as the director of Saatchi and Saatchi in 1994 and 
the prevention of Michael Green from taking the role of chairman on ITV PLC in 
2003 are not the norm and occur only in extreme cases when it is clear that the 
usual ‘behind the scenes’ negotiations do not work.128 
The fourth way is a threat of selling a company’s shares or in other words, using 
the option of ‘exit’ rather ‘voice’ is another way to influence investee company 
but this action results into damage upon share price and general reputations of not 
only the concerned company but to the IIs as well. Therefore, this course of action 
cannot be used frequently, rather can be saved as a last weapon when other soft 
strategies do not work.129 
The fifth and most effective action available to IIs in order to utilise their right of 
voting at a company’s AGM. The ISC proposed that IIs should utilise their right 
to vote affirmatively and regularly. Moreover, the Cadbury Report130 specified 
that; voting rights can be viewed as a benefit and the utilisation of generally of 
those rights by IIs should be genuinely considered by beneficiaries on whose 
behalf IIs invest. We suggest that IIs should reveal their strategies regarding the 
use of voting rights.131  
The later committees have given more prominent emphasis on the significance of 
institutional voting than Cadbury. Additionally, an apparent advantage of 
compulsory voting is that the costs of keeping up exceptionally expanded 
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portfolios would escalate, possibly compelling investors to alter their investment 
strategies. Given that the expenses of voting will, in any case, contrast between 
various sorts of investment strategies, it is expected that, the pension funds will be 
directed into lower-cost measures; predominantly collective funds whilst still keep 
up profoundly differentiated portfolios.132 
From this time forward, whilst the presentation of lawful commitments for 
pension funds to practice their voting rights might initially appear an appealing 
choice, it is unrealistic to deliver the required advantages of improved monitoring. 
Given that IIs wish to practice any control they consider essential in private, the 
introduction of mandatory voting might just prompt ‘lip service’ being paid to the 
voting procedures, with no progressions to the basic attitude of investment and 
ownership approach.  
Moreover, because of compulsory voting, IIs might essentially fall back on ‘box-
ticking’ due to individual company’s request of the Combined Code, instead of 
submitting to the ‘comply or explain’ philosophy which strengthens the CG 
proposals in the Combined Code, prompting companies to follow the CCG, 
irrespective of whether its proposals give the ideal governance mechanism to 
individual company. 
7.7 Importance of the Legal Environment for Institutional Investors 
A legal environment of a specific state significantly impacts the degree of action 
with respect to shareholders. The IIs are active in the UK, due to the fact that the 
state has adopted solid legal actions to reinforce the CG norms. For example, the 
Cadbury,133 Greenbury,134 Hampel135 and Higgs Report136 mentioned objective 
facts with respect to the characterised part of IIs in promoting CG norms. 
Likewise the ‘Combined Code (the Code)’137 particularly joined a different 
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portion entitled ‘Institutional Investors’ in which the fundamental rule set down is 
that the IIs ought to go into a dialogue with companies in light of the common 
apprehension of end goals.138 This implies that the Code encourages IIs to have 
negotiations with their investee companies in order to point out the matters of 
their concern.    
The Code clearly explains the responsibilities and authorities of IIs in the 
execution of CG standards. The Code requires from IIs to significantly use their 
voting rights.139 It is obligatory for IIs to appear in AGMs of their investee 
companies. Additionally, they are also bound to give considerable attention to all 
significant and relevant issues comes to their consideration at the time of 
assessing companies’ governance course of action; specifically involving the 
structure and composition of BODs.140 
The researcher submits that, these provisions of the Code reveals an interesting 
and encouraging fact that, the strategies (examined in section 7.6 above) which IIs 
were/are using to influence their investee companies are made the part of CCG in 
the UK. Thus, the Code fulfils the dual purpose; on one hand, it gives the power 
to IIs to intervene in the affairs of their investee companies and influence their 
strategies towards better CG standards and; on the other hand, it set the liabilities 
of IIs and bound them to perform their duties towards setting good CG standards 
and hence, creates an equilibrium of powers on both sides; the IIs and the 
companies.  
Such type of legislation is also required for the IIs working in Pakistan’s corporate 
sector, as the situation in Pakistan different. The principal laws directing the 
relationship of shareholders and their investee companies are the Companies 
Ordinance 1984, the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, the listed 
Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting shares and Takeovers) Ordinance 
                                                            
138 Rule E1 of section 2 of the Combined Code 2003, 
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2002 and the CCG of Pakistan. But sadly, these legislations do not contain any 
clear provision relating to the powers, roles and responsibilities of IIs.  
This thesis conducted a thorough investigation of the CCG of Pakistan (in chapter 
four) but did not find any provision relating to the role of IIs. It seems that the 
authorities and regulators in Pakistan has not yet acknowledged the existence and 
importance of IIs in corporate sector, otherwise they should have set out an 
appropriate legislation in order to define and organise their role. 
The economy of Pakistan is unstable because of political instability, security 
concerns due to war against terrorism, energy crises, corruption and many other 
factors; as a result of which the capital market of Pakistan is excessively- 
depressed and underdeveloped. Therefore the need for local and foreign 
investment is highly required for the growth of capital market. IIs being generally 
professional, experienced, and skilled and having large shareholdings can help to 
produce positive modifications and impact on the capital market of Pakistan. 
For this purpose, efforts are required from both sides; the regulators (State, SECP, 
PICG) should give due consideration to the importance of IIs and take measures 
to enhance their role in the CG of the country by formulating a legislation along 
the lines of the Combined Code of the UK, which should define the powers, 
liabilities, roles and responsibilities of IIs towards their investee companies. 
Secondly, the local IIs should also play their part in it and organise themselves 
with mutual considerations.  For this purpose, they can make efforts to establish a 
platform in the form of ‘ISC’ as working in the UK or ‘the Council of Institutional 
Investors’ working in USA with the help of SECP. 
7.8 Recommendations to Enhance the Part of IIs towards their Investee 
Companies 
As examined in the current chapter and in previous chapters, CG in Pakistan is 
still in its developing stage, and the part of IIs in CG has not been recognised 
fully. However, the above data shows a considerable rise in the local and foreign 
portfolio investment in Pakistan. One of the biggest hurdles for II’s particularly 
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for foreign investors was the security situation, which is much better now than a 
couple of previous years due to the undergoing operation (Zarb-e-Azb) of the 
army against terrorists. 
Above data shows a considerable scope for IIs (for both local and foreign in the 
form of FDI and FPI) in Pakistan. This thesis argues that, IIs can assume a vital 
part in the CG of Pakistan through adopting the measures as specified in the UK 
Code141 (those measures are presented below); however, the introduction of a 
strong legal measures along the lines of the UK Code for them are important in 
first instance as mentioned above.   
7.8.1 Private Negotiations 
The IIs should have a dialogue with their investee companies through informal 
meetings and negotiations as usually done in the UK and the UK Code also 
encourages this practices.142 Major contentions can be overcome via mutual 
discussion and negotiation. This practice serves two folds objectives; it comes into 
the notice of companies’ management about an issue IIs face or notice any 
irregularities on the part of BODs which can be resolved behind the doors with 
mutual consent, and secondly IIs do not have to adopt open practices in the form 
of ‘exit’ and thus companies’ reputation and share prices remain stable.  
The CCG of Pakistan does not contain any of such provisions encouraging or 
empowering the IIs to intervene in the investee companies’ matters through 
negotiations. Hence, the CCG of Pakistan ought to explicitly introduce such 
provision which could provide a particular means to IIs to resolve their issues 
through negotiations instead of taking severe public actions and seeking legal 
remedies, which damage the performance and reputation of both parties. The IIs 
might be angry due to any specific action of the BODs, unnecessary remuneration 
of the directors, unjustified favour to few investors or absence of transparency, 
accountability and disclosure strategies. To resolve each of these issues, a 
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dialogue between IIs and their investee company can be proved a more reasonable 
alternative. 
7.8.2 Shareholder Voting 
IIs having large shareholdings can influence and change any adverse decision 
made by their investee company through using their voting powers effectively. 
Non-exercise of voting power by the large shareholders actually permits the 
management, to confer acts of neglect and serious abnormalities by making 
decisions inconsistent with the interests of shareholders’. 
The UK Code143 bound IIs to make a considerable use of their rights of vote in 
order to handle the malpractices of the management of their investee companies. 
However, the Pakistan’s CCG does not contain any such provision conferring 
responsibility upon IIs to use their voting powers effectively; in fact the Pakistan’s 
CCG does not speak anything about the roles and responsibilities of IIs (as has 
been discussed above too). Active involvement of IIs in the undertakings of their 
investee company can be anticipated only if wisdom of obligation to use their 
voting powers is produced through legislation.  
7.8.3 Evaluation of Governance Disclosures 
The IIs should give a due consideration to the matters especially relating to the 
structure, diversity and composition of BODs at the time of assessing companies’ 
governance measures. By doing this, IIs can evaluate the capabilities and 
independence of BODs of their investee companies, as the effective and 
independent corporate boards are pertinent for the better corporate and financial 
performance of companies. The IIs can exercise this activism by randomly 
examining the annual accounts, audit reports and the structure of BODs of their 
investee company.  
Additionally, IIs ought to guarantee that the independent NEDs are demonstrating 
their actual objectives and their recommendations are included in the agenda of 
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AGM of the company appropriately and have been given true consideration in 
order to resolve conflicting matters. An active supervision and the assessment of 
the performance of investee companies by IIs will point out the controversies and 
irregularities at a primary level and will help to expand the wealth of shareholders 
and safeguard their interests.  
The regulators should take measures by introducing such provisions in the CCG 
of Pakistan in order to consider liability on IIs to regularly monitor and evaluate 
the governance practices and disclosures of their investee companies as is done in 
the Combined Code of the UK.144 
7.8.4 Establishment of Institutional Investors’ Committee 
The SECP should establish a committee for IIs along the lines of ‘Council of 
Institutional Investors’ working in the US and the ‘Institutional Shareholders 
Committee’ working in the UK. As, SECP established the PICG in order to create 
awareness among the business community about the advantages of adopting CG 
practices; the establishment of a committee for IIs will provide a platform to IIs 
working in Pakistan to discuss collectively the problems they face while making 
investments and monitoring the listed companies of Pakistan, and formulate 
policies for themselves to take collective action in order to influence their investee 
companies, it will also resolve a significant issue of cost involved in monitoring 
the companies when all institutions will strive to work together.  
This platform will also provide opportunity to IIs to draw attention of policy 
makers and regulators to introduce a specific legislation providing the protection 
to the activities of IIs in Pakistan’s corporate sector and define the powers, roles 
and responsibilities of IIs towards their investee companies and the companies 
towards their investing institutions. Moreover, this platform can also encourage 
and excite the inactive investors and could prompt them towards their active 
involvement in the affairs of the listed companies of Pakistan. 
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7.8.5 Establishment of a Corporate Strategy Committee (CSC) 
The recommendation to establish a CSC is already on table in Pakistan. The 
advocates of creating a CSC confers that, each listed company should establish its 
own CSC along the lines of China, by hiring local or foreign professionals, and 
their responsibility should be to conduct research on the existing corporate laws of 
the country, to examine their implementation ratio and evaluate their impact of the 
performance of company. The CSC should also be able to investigate the 
provisions of corporate laws relevant to their portfolio companies, identify their 
weaknesses and make proposals for their amendments. 
This thesis argues that the idea of establishing a CSC seems interesting in terms of 
its functions, but the extra cost involved in its establishment and hiring 
professionals for this committee may not convince listed companies to take this 
measure and therefore, would not be practicable. However, if the SECP takes 
initiative to establish a CSC as an independent body (as PICG) which should 
operate on behalf of the whole corporate market collectively, it may prove more 
beneficial. Because there will be no extra cost on companies instead its 
establishment and hiring its professional will be the responsibility of SECP and 
SECP will bear its expenses getting approved by the federal government. 
 However, whether government will allow establishing such an independent 
institution or not is another issue of concern. Nevertheless, the research conducted 
by CSC and reports issued by it as Financial Reporting Council (FRC) does in the 
UK, can have a noteworthy impact on identifying the weaknesses of corporate 
laws of Pakistan, their restructuring and those laws, the adoption and 
implementation concerns regarding CCG by the business community and finally 
the impact of those laws and CCG on the performance of companies. 
In conclusion, IIs can play a considerable part in the CG of their investee 
companies, if the policy makers and regulators take appropriate steps to promote 
and encourage them. For this purpose, the introduction of a proper legislation or 
the inclusion of provisions in the CCG is essential clearly defining the powers and 
functions of IIs (as discussed above in detail). 
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7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the role of IIs in promoting CG principles in order to 
attain one of the objectives of this thesis. It conducted a thorough investigation 
regarding the origin and significance of IIs and the notion of their ‘activism’, what 
it entails and what is its impact on the investee companies of IIs generally as well 
as regarding Pakistan particularly. The current chapter has presented the data 
showing the patterns of shareholdings in the corporate sector of Pakistan and 
established the scope of IIs (both local and foreign) in the corporate sector of 
Pakistan.  
This chapter also analysed and explored the incentives available to IIs that 
encourage them to assume their part actively in the CG of their investee 
companies. Additionally, the present chapter examined those factors which limit 
the activities of IIs and analysed the strategies which IIs utilise to influence their 
investee companies and intervene in their management. Lastly, this chapter made 
proposals for enhancing the role of IIs in Pakistan, so that they could play their 
part effectively in the CG of Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
8.1  Introduction 
The previous chapters of this thesis present data analysis and discussion of 
findings to answer the research questions of this thesis. The aim of this chapter is 
to present a summary of the findings of this study. It presents a brief overview and 
recap of the aim and objectives of this study and presents the key findings of this 
study. This chapter further confirms the original contributions of this thesis and 
identifies its limitations as well. It also outlines prospects for future research. 
Lastly, this chapter finishes by providing the concluding remarks regarding this 
study.  
8.2 Overview of this Study and its Findings 
This study set out to explore the ways and measures which can help to improve 
and develop corporate governance (CG) in the listed companies of Pakistan. The 
reason for conducting this investigation is the considerably increasing importance 
of CG globally as established in the previous chapters of this thesis.  This study 
established that the corporate sector of Pakistan is in a transition stage. The 
importance and dramatic benefits of adopting CG principles has not been fully 
acknowledged by the business community of Pakistan.  
Therefore, this researcher wished to explore the ways to improve CG in the listed 
companies of Pakistan.  To achieve this objective, the study sought to answer four 
questions presented below. 
1. Why does the CCG important for companies and what could be the form 
of an effective and efficient CCG for the listed companies of Pakistan? 
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2. How does the implementation and enforcement of CCG be improved in 
the listed companies of Pakistan by reforming the enforcement 
mechanisms of Pakistan? 
3. How do the BODs affect the CG of their companies and what could be the 
model of an effective corporate board for the listed companies of 
Pakistan? 
4. What role institutional investors (IIs) can play in order to promote CG 
principles in the listed companies of Pakistan? 
For this purpose, the research model consisted of four key variables explaining the 
influence and monitoring role of IIs and BODs in the CG of Pakistani listed 
companies is selected. The monitoring role has defined by board diversity, size, 
composition, roles and responsibilities and the effectiveness of BODs in 
improvement of company value.  
The study showed that CG principles help to make corporate boards more 
responsible and accountable, increase shareholder confidence and attract capital, 
which leads to the better financial performance of companies and ultimately 
results in a boost to a country’s economy. The influencing role was described by 
the recommendations to company, inducing changes in company strategy and 
execution of institutional power through IIs in order to improve CG in Pakistani 
listed companies. The influencing role also covered the updating of both ‘law in 
books’ and ‘law in action’.  
As we have seen, CG is usually refers to as a framework through which 
companies are managed and monitored. CG is the formal name of procedures 
through which shareholders’ interests are protected, the goals of a business set out 
and achieved. It additionally deals with the roles, responsibilities and the link 
between BODs, shareholders and other stakeholders. This study found that there 
is a developing concern for the idea of CG in Pakistan chiefly on the grounds that 
CG is a key to adding to a business sector economy and common society in 
developing economics (section 1.2).  
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It is turning out to be progressively imperative to investors, due to the reason that 
companies having higher governance standards have less risks and unexpected 
incidents, this can ensure shareholders rights and give better affirmation that 
administration will act to the greatest advantage of the company and every one of 
its stakeholders. Numerous financial experts in Pakistan acknowledge that poor 
CG practices in the listed companies of Pakistan, such as the absence of 
appropriate disclosure, transparency and accountability in the business sector are 
the major causes responsible for declining investor confidence (the examples are 
provided in sections 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 5.3,).  Therefore, the need for effective CG is 
undeniable for the purpose of rehabilitate investor confidence.  
8.2.1 The Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) of Pakistan 
The first question (objective) of this study was to establish the importance of CCG 
for companies and investigate that what could be the form of an effective and 
efficient CCG for the listed companies of Pakistan. Chapter four dealt with this by 
using an exploratory and interpretative qualitative approach. It discussed the 
framework of CG, the nature and development of CG in Pakistan and found that 
the legal environment in Pakistan is not healthy and supportive to let CG practices 
to flourish there. The CCG is outdated which contains ambiguous and overlapping 
provisions and do not cope with the contemporary needs of corporate sector.  
The study conducted the analysis of the CCG and formulated a number of 
recommendations which are presented here briefly. Firstly, it is found that legal 
process is very slow in Pakistan as the first CCG was issued in 2002 and that CCG 
revised and issued again after ten years in 2012 which is not impressive and 
appropriate. The regulators should update CCG regularly every year or at least 
once in two years according to the changing needs of corporate sector of Pakistan, 
by observing the response of business community regarding previous CCG, by 
discussing with major stakeholders and by carefully considering the regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA).  
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This process will definitely improve the CG practices in Pakistan, as this 
continuous process will be conducted through identifying the weaknesses of 
preceding CCG and adding the new required principles of CG in it.  
This study found that the provisions of CCG of Pakistan are mandatory in nature 
except two (section 4.4). This thesis criticised this in two ways: Firstly, many 
provisions of CCG overlaps with the provisions of the Companies Ordinance 
1984 (identified in section 4.4), in this way the application of CCG becomes 
problematic as adoption of both (the CCG and the Ordinance) is mandatory; 
consequently, the business groups having vested interest expropriate such 
provisions and use them according to their benefits.  
Secondly, one clause of CCG left voluntary is related to the selection of 
independent non-executive directors (INEDs) which requires the appointment of 
one INEDs compulsory however, the preference is given to appointing one third 
members of BODs as INEDs. This thesis argued that this provision should 
actually be mandatory with a modification and that is; the number of INEDs 
should be enhanced from one to fifty per cents of the members of BODs. This will 
improve CG practices by creating the system of check and balance and increasing 
the accountability and monitoring of BODs. 
Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and 
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) should formulate a strategy to 
enhance the awareness among public generally and business community 
particularly regarding two issues: one the benefits attached to adopt CCG and 
follow CG principles, and secondly the business community should realise that 
the office of INEDs is not merely an honorary office rather it is to make BODs 
more independent and create a system of check and balance in the internal 
structure of a company which ultimately enhance a company’s performance, 
shareholders’ wealth and promote CG practices.  
Lastly, this thesis argued that these weaknesses and problems regarding the form 
and application of CCG can be reduced. Indeed it can be improved if the CCG 
could be revised and updated regularly as presented above. Therefore, this thesis 
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answered the first question of this study by establishing the importance of CCG 
for the performance of companies and the protection of shareholder interests and 
also presented recommendations to improve the form and substance of CCG of 
Pakistan.  
8.2.2 The Implementation of CCG in Pakistan 
The second question (objective) of this thesis was to investigate how the 
implementation and enforcement of CCG can be improved in the listed companies 
of Pakistan by reforming its enforcement mechanisms. This research question was 
formulated on a belief that ‘law in books’ only is not sufficient to reform a 
system, ‘law in action’ is also equally important. In fact the laws are those which 
can be enforced and could be seen in active position as established in chapter five, 
otherwise the existence of even best laws would have no use and cannot build a 
healthy legal environment, if they cannot be enforced.  
Chapter five focused on this investigation relating to the improvement of the 
enforcement mechanism in Pakistan. This study found that it is the judiciary and 
capital market which can play their part in reforming the system and making the 
enforcement mechanism more effective. The security of investors cannot be 
ensured with simply the provisions of laws, instead the nature and value of 
enforcement also matters. The law is essential in the initial period of reforms yet 
enforcement of law must additionally be enhanced for improved CG and 
shareholders’ security.  
This thesis argued that an efficient judicial system is required to achieve good CG 
in a specified framework. However, Pakistan’ judicial framework is not efficient 
enough, and remains unsuccessful in providing justice to the overall community 
(see section 1.2.1 and chapter five). The condition of judiciary is even worse with 
regards to issues that are special and technical in nature such as corporate matters. 
Dishonesty, unnecessary postponements in discarding cases, legal cost, 
absence/limited of expert judges in relevant matters and the inefficiency of the 
entire legal framework are the principal issues as discussed in section 5.4.2 of 
chapter five.  
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This thesis argued that, in order to resolve these judicial problems, reforming the 
whole judicial system would not be a good choice; as it would be protracted and 
expensive as well as would not tackle the issue of corporate matters as this will 
necessitate additional training of judges. Therefore, establishing separate 
specialised corporate courts can serve the purpose. The state has already officially 
settled various specific courts and tribunals in numerous fields and they are 
performing in superior way than general courts (see section 5.4.3). 
Secondly, this thesis emphasised on the separation of judiciary from the influence 
of the Executive and challenged the 19th amendment of the Constitution of 
Pakistan 1973, according to which the powers of appointment and removal of the 
judges of superior courts have been transferred to the Parliament. This thesis 
argued that the political interference in the appointment and removal of higher 
officials in the key institutions of Pakistan such as judges of superior courts and 
the commissioners of the SECP should be curtailed in order to reform the system 
and enhance the independence of judicial and SECP.  
The idea of establishing special corporate courts will serve the purpose only if the 
appointment of judges will not be political but rather based on merit. On the other 
hand, judges should also remain separate from politics and no judge should be 
allowed during or after their service to indulge in any political activity. This thesis 
argued that these measures should be considered seriously and implemented if the 
authorities really wish to reform judicial system of Pakistan, as the independence 
of judiciary is most important for the enforcement of laws in true sense. 
The other important aspect regarding enforcement is Pakistan’s capital market. 
This is not mature yet and is in developing stage (section 5.5). The market ignored 
to practice implementation of CCG. Section 5.3 identified the factors which are 
responsible for the unsuccessful implementation of CCG in Pakistan; among them 
the most important are the non-serious role of government (as established in 
section 1.2.1), and family owned businesses. In order to overcome this problem, 
this thesis recommended the phased implementation of CCG by dividing the 
capital market into three segments: such as primary, secondary and third market.  
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The primary market should require more disclosure and transparency in 
controlling related party transactions, International accounting standards (IAS) 
and mandatory compliance with the CCG. The secondary market may require less 
disclosure, transparency and voluntary compliance with the CCG. The third 
market should be for new, private and non-listed companies which will require 
only voluntary compliance with the CCG.  
Multinational and large companies will be more inclined towards having listing 
on primary market due to their reputational apprehensions. This will likewise be 
valuable to small and scattered shareholders who wish to put resources into the 
primary market. The IIs might put resources into both markets as they can utilise 
their position and voting power to guarantee compliance even in secondary 
market and force their investee companies to get listed on primary market because 
of an environment of competition, which will be created automatically after the 
segregation of capital market.  
The secondary market can be of interest for new and small companies and to 
family owned and other vested interest groups who do not like disclosure 
requirements, accountability, transparency and compliance with the CCG; when 
they get acquaintance and recognise the possible advantages of the primary 
market, they might enrol on this market.  
This thesis argued that this division of market will create an environment of 
competition which will involve reputational concerns at its utmost importance; 
secondly this division will also help in creating awareness among business 
community regarding the potential benefits of CG practices and help to the PICG 
to accomplish its task, as the PICG was established for the purpose of creating 
awareness regarding the advantages of CG principles among general public and 
business community. The media, credit rating agencies and IIs can also play a 
significant role in this regard. 
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8.2.3 The Role and Effectiveness of BODs in Promoting CG Practices  
The third question (objective) of this thesis was to investigate the role of BODs to 
find that how they affect the CG practices of their companies and to develop a 
‘Board Effectiveness Model’ for the listed companies of Pakistan. Chapter six 
dealt with this. This thesis developed a Board Effectiveness Model for the listed 
companies of Pakistan on a belief that the BODs can play a considerable role in 
the improvement of CG in their companies, by adopting an exploratory and 
comparative approach analysing both theoretical and empirical impacts of earlier 
studies and by comparing them with the corporate boards of Pakistani companies. 
The thesis found that the main role of BODs is to ensure performance of the 
company. This role consists of advice, strategy development, resource 
dependence, monitoring and accountability. However, to protect shareholders’ 
interests, corporate boards must be effective and efficient as it adds value in the 
company’s corporate and financial performance as established in chapter six. This 
thesis found that, the effective and efficient corporate board is influenced by 
various elements such as, its diversity, size and composition among others. These 
elements discussed and analysed in chapter six.  
This study further found that BODs with diverse backgrounds rather than 
homogenous elite groups with similar socio-economic foundations, expands its 
impartiality and enhances monitoring of the activities of BODs. It acquires 
differing qualities thoughts, point of view, experience, and business knowledge in 
corporate boards. This can aid to handle the complexities of the corporate outside 
environment and marketplace in batter way. It can likewise expand innovativeness 
and development in corporate boards because of differences in intellectual 
capacities, which will leads towards better decision-making.  
Moreover, board diversity connects a company to its outer surroundings and 
protects basic assets, comprising expertise, business contacts, esteem and legality. 
A higher level of board assorted qualities might also give a positive signal to 
probable job candidates which will encourage and attract experienced and highly 
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qualified individuals to be a board member. This might also generate a fair 
competition in company’s inner labour sector.  
This thesis further found that the size of BODs is an important board attribute. 
Agency theory declares smaller corporate boards more worthy and effective in 
contrast to larger corporate boards in enhancing the performance of companies, 
which ultimately affect CG practices. Smaller corporate boards can improve and 
enhance their execution in terms of monitoring. However, larger corporate boards 
have a tendency to underline thoughtfulness, graciousness and courtesy in the 
meeting room at the detriment of truth and honesty.  
The argument is that when the size of corporate boards turns out to be too large, 
agency issues are intensified and the board turns out to be more symbolic and 
disregards its controlling, managing and monitoring obligations. Another 
argument is that when the size of corporate board expands, the probability of 
financial statement deception increments, inferring the requirement for expanding 
monitoring with larger corporate boards. Another argument is that the larger 
boards incur extra expenses normally connected with the process of slow 
decision-making, which are greater ac compared to a few minimal benefits from 
extreme monitoring of the acts of administration as established in chapter six.  
Conversely, smaller boards will probably be strong and will have more operative 
and effective consultations. Therefore, the directors will able to honestly 
contribute and express their point of views within the restricted time. Thus, 
limiting corporate board size can improve efficiency. This thesis argued that, 
although smaller boards are more effective and efficient than larger boards in the 
light of above arguments; the important issue is having a balance of skills, 
experience, expertise and independence in board.  
Therefore, the size of a corporate board in listed companies should neither be too 
small that it becomes difficult to manage the company’s affairs; not it should be 
too large that it becomes an extra burden on company in terms of cost and time 
involved in taking strategic decisions of a company, as larger boards will 
obviously take longer time to reach a decision. However, this researcher did not 
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find any considerable problem in the listed companies of Pakistan in terms of size 
of their boards.  
The range of their board’s size was between 7 to 11 which is normal (section 
6.3.2); however the existence of women on corporate boards of the listed 
companies of Pakistan was found very limited. The researcher argued that it is the 
clear violation of the CCG, as the clause (i) of the CCG of Pakistan requires 
corporate boards to be diverse having a balance of experience, skills and gender. 
This thesis has also established the importance of women on board (section 6.2.2) 
and recommended that the regulators should seriously consider making corporate 
boards gender balanced, as it makes boards more efficient, disciplined and 
focussed. 
Moreover, this thesis found that the composition of BODs is also a significant 
factor which has considerable impact on the effectiveness and independence of 
BODs (section 6.4). The composition of BODs consists upon the number of NEDs 
as compared to the executive directors. The proponents of a large number of 
NEDs argue that the boards with majority of executive directors are less 
accountable therefore they may exploit company resources for their personal 
benefits. However, the advocates of having a large number of executive directors 
on BODs argue that NEDs can impact negatively on company outcomes, because 
they have less experience and knowledge regarding the core business as compared 
to the executive directors. 
This thesis argued that increasing the number of INEDs on corporate boards 
makes the BODs more accountable by keeping an independent external eye on the 
policies of BODs, if the appointment process of NEDs is to be made fair and on 
merits. The more independent corporate boards can better protect the stakes of 
shareholders, can monitor and evaluate the performance of BODs and their 
strategic decision-making. Such practices ultimately promote the CG best 
practices in the country and increase the company performance as well.  
Furthermore, this thesis proposed that, giving representation to IIs in BODs can 
also make corporate boards more effective and accountable. The IIs being 
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professionals and owning large shareholdings can have a better say to provide 
safeguards not only to shareholders but for all stakeholders’ interests and such 
practices would lead to the better corporate and financial performance of 
companies. This assertion also leads and is closely linked to the final question of 
this study that is; what role IIs can play in improving CG practices in the listed 
companies of Pakistan.  
8.2.4 The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting CG Practices 
The fourth question (objective) of this thesis was to explore the role of IIs in order 
to improve CG in the listed companies of Pakistan. Chapter seven dealt with this. 
This thesis established that IIs are growing significantly during the previous 
couple of years and are engaged in various features of the economy of countries 
(section 7.2).  Therefore, the examination of this topic was necessary in order to 
determine their potential importance and influence in the contemporary corporate 
world. The objective was to examine their role in Pakistan’s corporate sector and 
explore the measures through which they can contribute to improve the CG 
practices in the listed companies of Pakistan.  
The study found that although IIs were not active and, indeed, remained passive in 
the corporate sector of Pakistan; their role is increasing there now. The mutual 
funds, investments companies, insurance companies and some other institutions 
are also working there (section 7.2). Though their role is limited, they have started 
to realise that there is a considerable scope for them in Pakistan’s corporate sector 
being in a developing and transition stage. Currently, IIs are working with banks 
and multinational companies in Pakistan; even they have membership in the 
Bank’s BODs as well (section 7.3).  
This thesis argued that this role of IIs can be enhanced to other listed companies 
as well if a healthy and supportive legal environment is provided to them as they 
are working in the UK, the US, South Africa and in many other countries of the 
world. The guidance can be obtained in this regard from other developed 
countries particularly from the Combined Code of the UK where IIs are influential 
enough and contributing in that economy.  
 268 
 
This study further explored the willingness and ability of IIs to intervene in the 
governance of companies and established that they can intercede in companies’ 
governance matters in many ways; for example by refusing to participate in rights 
issues, by adverse public comments, by removing directors through their direct 
and collective action, by the threat of selling company’s shares and through right 
of voting in the AGM. Furthermore, they can also negotiate with investee 
companies as this practice is also common among the IIs in the UK. These 
negotiations may fulfil a two-fold purpose, one management becomes aware of 
the issues and opinion of IIs on a particular point and secondly, these informal 
negotiations do not affect the company’s reputation and ultimately the shares 
price remains stable.  
Moreover, this thesis proposed that the establishment of Institutional Investors’ 
Committee (IIC) along the lines of a ‘Council of Institutional Investors’ working 
in the US or ‘Institutional Shareholders’ Committee’ working in the UK can also 
help in making IIs influential and increasing their role in the CG of the listed 
companies of Pakistan. The idea behind this is to provide a platform to IIs where 
they can share the problems they are facing in the corporate sector of Pakistan and 
discuss their strategies collectively to intervene in the company management in 
order to protect their clients’ interests as well as to promote CG of their investee 
companies.  
This thesis argued that, the active monitoring of the performance of a company by 
IIs is essential for their improved engagement, and it can be achieved only if a 
healthy working environment and strong platform is provided to IIs. The 
regulators should play their role in this by introducing such laws that can provide 
protection to IIs. IIs should also raise their voice in this regard and should strive to 
inaugurate such platform where they could meet and develop policies to work 
together. Such measures will not only enhance the growth of IIs in the corporate 
sector of Pakistan but also will increase the corporate and financial performance 
of companies and will also attract foreign investors which will prove a positive 
step for the country’s economy. 
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Moreover, this thesis found that some corporate experts in Pakistan suggest that 
there should be a Corporate Strategy Committee (CSC) in Pakistan like china. The 
Clause 53 of CCG of China postulates the main duties of the CSC to conduct 
study and formulate proposals for the strategic growth ideas and key decisions of 
the company in terms of investments. The promoters of the establishment of CSC 
argue that, the establishment of CSC will improve the overall efficiency of 
companies.  
The CSC can consist upon the senior members of the company. The professional 
researchers should also be appointed to conduct a research on existing corporate 
laws, rules and regulations, their impact on the performance of company, and 
identify the weaknesses of those laws. However, this thesis argued that the 
establishment of CSC and hiring professionals for this work will incur extra cost 
on companies and due to this reason companies in Pakistan may not well come 
this suggestion. 
Therefore, this thesis provided a slightly different proposal to adjust this extra 
cost. This thesis argued that the establishment of a CSC will be a novel concept in 
Pakistan and can help in improving CG practices. However, instead of 
establishing CSC by every company, it can be established by the SECP and work 
collectively for the corporate sector of Pakistan. This CSC ought to have the 
capacity to measure the influence of prevailing laws and regulations on 
companies’ performance.  
CSC ought to call attention to any rigidity or adaptabilities in the laws, as well as 
it ought to have the capacity to recommend measures that might be contemplated 
by the regulators at the time of making new laws and strategies. The companies’ 
general valuation as to the adoption of CCG ought to be made by the CSC and 
default with respect to a company ought to be accounted for to the regulatory 
authority. As this study also established that the absence of research culture in 
Pakistan generally is also one of the major reasons for being underdeveloped, by 
establishing such CSC will also promote the research culture which is necessary 
for the progress of every field in every State. 
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8.3 Contribution of this Research 
This thesis contributes to the existing and developing body of literature in 
numerous ways and its contributions are classified into theoretical contribution 
and practical contribution. 
8.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
This study intends to create new insights among the business community of 
Pakistan in terms of significance and benefits of CG principles and practices and 
additionally considers validating or spreading the present theoretical literature in 
the terrain of CG. 
Firstly, this study has examined the nature of corporate sector in Pakistan and the 
CCG of Pakistan; and established that in spite of being mandatory in nature, CCG 
is not being followed truly by the listed companies. This study identified two 
major reasons behind partial/non adoption of CCG. One is the outdated, weak and 
overlapping provisions of CCG. This study has formulated recommendations 
which can help regulators and policy makers (SECP, PICG) while revising or 
updating the CCG. 
Secondly, the reason identified is the weak enforcement mechanism of Pakistan 
consisting upon an inefficient judicial system and stock market and the reasons for 
these two important institutions being inefficient. This study has also formulated 
recommendations to reform these two institutions, as a result of which the 
implementation and enforcement of CG will be improved. These causes of failure 
of institutions in fulfilling their duties and recommendations to reform them will 
aid the authorities and policy makers while taking measures to enhance the 
capacity and efficiency of these institutions so that they could fulfil their duties in 
true sense and such actions will increase the adoption of CCG and the 
enforcement of other corporate laws as well. 
Thirdly, this research has examined the role of BODs in promoting CG practices 
of their companies and has developed Board Effectiveness Model for the listed 
companies of Pakistan. This is a pioneer work as such work has not been 
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conducted before relating to the corporate boards of the listed companies of 
Pakistan. This study outlined a number of recommendations in terms of diversity 
in BODs particularly women on board, size, composition, independence, roles and 
responsibilities of BODs; which can enhance the effectiveness of BODs which 
will lead towards advancement of CG practices. 
Finally, another important contribution of this study is related to the role of IIs 
explored for promoting CG practices in the listed companies of Pakistan. Such 
work has also not done previously regarding IIs activism and their impact on the 
corporate performance of their investee companies in Pakistan.  
This study offers a prospect to add in the existing literature by investigating and 
authenticating the noteworthy aspects of CG which will help in achieving 
transparency, accountability, independence and disclosure in the listed companies 
of Pakistan which will also maximise shareholders’ value in the companies of 
Pakistan. 
8.3.2 Practical Contribution  
Although this research is more strategic in nature, it also has meaningful practical 
contributions. This thesis conducts research which is highly important for the 
growth of corporate sector of a country in this globalised world where cross-
border investments have become common and is crucial to regulatory bodies. 
Therefore, the findings of this study can help authorities and regulatory bodies in 
improving corporate norms in the listed companies of Pakistan. The findings of 
this study can have a positive impact on the BODs and enhance their 
effectiveness. It can assist companies’ management in reforming the structure of 
their boards, as this study establish that more diverse boards having a combination 
of skills, experience, gender-balance and fifty per cent representation of INEDs 
make a board more effective, efficient and independent. Such boards can take 
better decisions for their companies, can protect shareholders’ interests in better 
way and usually are more inclined towards adopting CG best practices. These 
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findings can contribute towards achieving more independent and effective 
corporate boards for the listed companies of Pakistan. 
Moreover, this research established the importance of IIs in contemporary 
corporate world and also established the wider scope for IIs in Pakistan. This 
study also explored the measures through which IIs can be more influential in 
Pakistan and can play their part in improving CG practices in the listed companies 
of Pakistan. These findings can be helpful for local IIs particularly in enhancing 
their influence in their investee companies which will also provide incentives for 
foreign IIs to make investments in Pakistan and use their influence to promote CG 
practices of their investee companies.  
In short, this study has a considerable significance as it not only makes an 
addition in the existing academic literature of CG yet additionally provides some 
valuable practical contributions to this vital area. 
8.4 Limitations of Research 
Although this thesis has explored significant findings by successfully answering 
the research questions; therefore achieving the aim and objectives of this research. 
This study offered a strategic perspective of the CG framework of Pakistan and 
resulted in valuable findings adopting a qualitative approach which may have 
considerable impact on policy formulations as well as on future studies. 
Nevertheless, this research like all other research works faced some limitations 
which are presented below. 
This research faced methodological limitations during the course of study. The 
methodology employed to conduct this research is more suitable and appropriate 
for this study; however there are some alternative methodological approaches 
which could have been used and were considered by the researcher; for example, 
case studies, interviews (both structured and semi-structured) and questionnaires. 
But they could not be carried out due to health issues of researcher, financial cost 
involved to carry out these methods and most importantly instable security 
situations in Pakistan (as discussed in detail in methodology chapter). Due to 
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these constraints, the researcher had to consider alternative approaches to conduct 
this research and she adopted the current methodology.  
Nevertheless, the current methodology used to carry out this study is also 
appropriate and justified; as when methodological approaches were changed, the 
research questions were also changed accordingly. The findings of this study 
employing current methodology are more strategic in nature; which could have 
been more practical in nature if the alternative methodology have been employed 
to carry out this study.  
8.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The CG is becoming a subject of its own right in this globalised world, it has 
many dimensions and every dimension has wider impact. This study covers only a 
small portion of it, and there is still a lot need to be done specifically in the 
context of Pakistan’s corporate sector both theoretically and empirically. 
Therefore, the researcher is keen to continue her research journey in the form of 
books and/or research articles in order to explore the unattended areas of CG in 
Pakistan which could help in formulating new and/or to amend existing strategies 
for the country; as well as to enhance the exposure of general community 
regarding the importance of CG through her writings. Some of intended topics for 
future research are listed below: 
 Women on corporate boards of the listed companies of Pakistan 
 An investigation of corporate laws of Pakistan with a particular focus of 
the Companies Ordinance 1984, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan Act 1977 and the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan 
 Why adaptation and convergence in corporate governance is necessary? 
Does convergence help or hinder the progress of corporate governance in 
Pakistan? 
 Corporate governance and its effect on the performance of family and non-
family companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange 
 An empirical investigation of the role and strategies of institutional 
investors working in the Banks of Pakistan 
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 Dynamics of audit quality: behavioural approach and governance 
framework – Pakistan’s evidence 
8.6  Conclusion 
This study focussed on examining the CG practices in Pakistan, the relationship of 
CG norms with the performance of companies and exploring the measures to 
promote and improve CG in the listed companies of Pakistan. The results show 
that an effective CG framework of Pakistan depends upon various significant 
elements. The growth of CG norms highly depends upon the correct 
understanding of CG principles and their advantages among the business 
community of Pakistan.  
Furthermore, it is very important for regulators to update CCG regularly by 
assessing its impact and the attitude of companies towards its full or partial 
adoption. The clauses of CCG should not be ambiguous as well as should not 
overlap with the provisions of other corporate laws. After the issuance of an 
effective CCG, the most important challenge is its implementation and 
enforcement for the regulators. As without being a law in action, there is no use of 
a law in books.  
Moreover, it is important for companies to restructure their BODs to make them 
diverse in terms of experience, skills, knowledge, gender, and professionalism and 
independence by appointing more independent directors equivalent to executive 
directors and giving proper representation to women on BODs. Such corporate 
boards will be more independent, more accountable and more capable to manage 
risks and maximise shareholders’ wealth. 
It is also important for regulators to provide an appropriate platform for IIs where 
they could share problems they face while investing and working with the listed 
companies of Pakistan and discuss strategies collectively to influence their 
investee companies for the adoption of CG best practices. IIs can have a 
considerable impact on their investee companies due to their experience, 
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knowledge, investment skills and more importantly due to their large 
shareholdings.  
As a result, the findings of this study clearly acknowledge the proclamation that 
CG norms meaningfully contribute towards the performance of companies; and 
the recommendations formulated by this thesis may help significantly to improve 
the CG in the listed companies of Pakistan     
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